However, the hope was that the consensus that had facilitated the case being brought before the ICJ coupled with pronouncements to respect the ICJ’s neutrality and abide by its ruling would hold sway. But again diplomatic issues especially issues effecting regime security and perceived national interest, even when interested is beclouded or undefined are never as linear as they appear.

Truth is the outcome, as a whole shouldn’t surprise international affairs practitioners and the nations political sophisticats so I’ll attribute the banal bickering by many commentators and analyst to rhetorical nationalism.

My take is, what next, what option has Nigeria and how on earth does Nigeria get out of this self created quandary for if the Nigerian government intends to hold its position-capitalizing of the ICJ’s lack of enforcement capacity and her perceived "military might"-in a sub regional context, then the Nigerian government misses the big picture.

Secondly, I maintain as against numerous hypothesis that the Bakassi issue is more strategic than legal. The legal component is important but remains a corollary of the overall strategy and not vice versa (in my candid estimation, if there had been prompt realization to that fact in pursuance of Nigeria’s overall strategy- alongside the required asymmetrical initiatives, perhaps the ICJ would have stayed on making a pronouncement in the face of the obvious high conflict potential and initiated another tract even if only to maintain regional peace and security.

Truth is, cases before the ICJ are not as linear as we’d hope, besides arguments before the ICJ are nominally not more important than initiating a good public relations campaign within context to let your case or cause be heard. Besides political horse-tradings and deal-wheelings are the order of the day (its all down to common sense).

Secondly, Nigeria’s self perceived regional superpower status particularly in its foreign and military policy definition which has managed to sink deep roots since late 1980’s in the West African sub-region (which contextually isn’t too far separated geo-politically from North West and Central West Africa) is threatened.

This overall strategy nominally includes the furtherance of Nigeria’s brand of in-place political contraption (military rule, democracy, autocracy etc), all with an end-state of maintaining a "grip" on its "perceived" sphere of geo-strategic interest.

Implications are that little maneuverability room is now left for the Nigerian government and a graduated step towards situational proliferation is a reality especially as possession remains with Nigeria and the government insist on non-compliance with the ICJ’s ruling.

The situational reality is that two of the world’s poorest countries are on the brink of a possibly atrocious and brutal war and the international community must once again intervene to save the overall populace who mostly bear the brunt of bad government policy decisions and response initiatives.

For although I initially thought it expedient to posture defined strategic units of the Nigerian armed forces to preempt the ICJ’s ruling (see)-The thinking was principally preemptive and deterrently defensive rather than offensive and the applicable concept was "triage".

Today, I’m Impulsively drawn to question Nigeria’s prevailing strategic consensus especially amongst those managing the Bakassi case within the government paradigm and the senates call to arms especially as the government has all along insisted on respecting any ruling by the international criminal court of justice.

The truth is, Nigerian policy makers must ensure divestiture from any regional "military super-power" allusions for further military escalation will be consequentially disastrous for Nigeria on the long-term (my assessments are purely based on strategic variables" and not mundane calculations which will at best be wrong)

Furthermore even with an abundant manpower capacity base the Nigerian economy and general infrastructure cannot sustainably fuel a war, the accompanying displacements –IDP’s and Refugee factor will have a domino effect on a sub-region already challenged by the Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote D’ivore crisis creating regime insecurity for the governments in Abuja and Yaounde

Besides the Nigerian armed forces has of recent undergone institutional reform i.e. reduction in size, retirement, loss of able personnel to coups plots etc added to these factors is the military’s involvement in external peacekeeping and enforcement missions. I’m thinking over stretch is setting in implying even strictly reactive-defensive situational eventualities will be difficult to contain.

Finally, I’m afraid that contrary to assumptions, even in a simulated condition of war on which deductions are nominally based, even a theatre-level imbalance of say 5:1 in Nigeria’s favor (which could at best be wrong) doesn’t guarantee outright victory for a multiplicity of reasons which I’d avoid going into now for reasons of sensitivity.

On the whole I’ll caution against any military mis-adventure, which remains a high possibility should a negotiated option not be pursued. For the overall collateral damage cost would outweigh any long-term proportional benefit threatening the polity especially with many opportunist- (hawks) waiting to carve out their own fiefdoms and chiefdoms.

Besides the Nigerian armed forces hasn’t the interoperability expertise for that decisively precise one punch blow required in terms of command control and execution to ensure a short and decisive victory and will likely get bogged down in a war the populace don’t need.

Besides, that France has MOU’s and "agreements"/ mutual defense "understandings" with Cameroon-as well as some of its old colonies, is really a non factor when its national interest is assured or facilitated for these so called "defense pacts", agreements etc are mostly limited in operational scope and applicability and as with most western liberal democracies France is unlikely to ever directly deploy French troops except in issues of uttermost eco-strategic importance.

The question here is without precise exploratory or seismic results quantifying the oil in the Bakassi peninsula, will France stake its Nigerian investments to please Cameroon when Nigeria has more capacity on offer than Cameroon?

I think not. It all boils down to what concession is given the French companies-this is the age of political economy. Besides the international community will frown upon any direct French attempt to destabilize West Africa for the multi-dimensional effect.

Truth is, the risk factor is too much for the French, besides they would rather everyone live in beneficial harmony and once the interest of French companies are assured the French government will tow the line.

On the flip side, I’m wondering if Nigeria has defined the type of French support for Cameron and the strategic threat of the support to Nigeria’s interest. For support in situations such as Bakassi come in different types, from intelligence gathering to the repair, replacement and provision of military equipment’s, to facilitating strategic and operational level support to facilitate command and control components etc.-on the flip side and remaining pragmatic I dare opine that if a poor New South Country such as Cameroon diverts 10- 22% of its GDP to buys arms from French companies or through French middlemen, its is good business for the French and no one should scream for their being rationally smart.

My take is, the French would rather walk the fine line especially if Nigeria initiates rea-approachment even if there’s nominal and clandestine support for Cameroon. And more so especially as it is obviously too late in day to test French resolve.

Truth is any overt or covert posturing of the armed forces as the Nigerian senates suggest will only escalate a tense situation so its advisable Nigeria initiate contact with the French government but also properly research to understand French peculiarities in international relations (because Nigeria has possibly never dealt with the type of challenge or opportunity the French present)-(my only fear is of French intelligence (within context) who might prove critical in terms of intelligence support for the Cameroonian should there be an escalation added to the obvious vulnerability of the Nigerian intelligence apparatus to disruptive French influence).

More so, these "pacts" and agreements were mostly ratified in the immediate post independence years when the cold war was a challenging factor and divisive ideo-political agendas created a bi-polar situation whereby many newly independent territories sought MOU’s and loosely symbolic understanding with perceived friendly states or their former colonial masters who inadvertently become "protecting states".

With the end of the cold war the symbolic limitations and lack of article value of these pacts have become accentuated vis-à-vis the strategic subject value- kindly research part events that culminated in the Genocide in Rwanda, the international communities actions and reactions to get a clearer indication of how the Western powers view these nominally inconsequential "pacts".

In my estimation these servant and master "pacts" are also challenged by term ambiguities and applicability because of the bi-polar "definition" of interest of the parties involved. For while the guiding consideration and concept for the protecting states (mostly western) remains political economy the partner states (mainly states of the New South Group) are sometimes beclouded by mundane considerations and ambiguities many atimes accentuating regime and sectional interest above collective national interest since there’s no clear definition between either from their standpoint.

In that vain, I’m thinking since the oil from Bakassi wont do much more to buoy the French economy than make a few French companies happy and make some locals rich as well as giving the central governments a little more money to stash away in Swiss banks-in truth Bakassi can never have a meaningful direct impact on the French economy or the cacq-sic (stock market where it counts).

So the marginal influence of France, which has business interest in Nigeria and Cameroon, will mainly favor and lean towards the dictates of the French businesses who I’m sure are more of a threat to Nigeria’s interest than the French government in this instance.

So nine out of ten times with proper strategic management the French will opt to walk that fine thin line where a semblance of peace exist.

The International Court of Justice has ruled and Nigeria should respect the courts inviolability and neutrality status. The lesson learnt here also makes it imperative government policy planners be circumspect when contemplating even purely national issues because of the prospect and reality of the current international configuration and arrangement- Yesterday's thinking cannot suffice.

The disintegration of the Cold War and the New World order should push thinking beyond nation-state boundaries, for while the world community will not "gang-up" against "Nigeria" as has been laconically maintained, the international community will also not idle to threats to international peace and stability.

Consequently I see challenges ahead but I also see areas of mutual opportunity for Nigeria and Cameroon. Truth is and as articulated by Prof. M Ikhariale, the ICJ’s ruling in favor of Cameroon wasn’t totally un- expected given Nigeria’s poor overall strategy and bad judgment calls in overall management.

There’s none. In truth it would be ideal to see Nigeria be responsible member of the international community. Perhaps take the ruling on the chin-respect the ICJ’s ruling.

On the flip Its totally possible that Nigeria get away with its recalcitrance especially as the worlds attention totally focuses on Iraq (in truth most of you in the field of international relations and development will agree that Nigeria to my likes is as important as I make. No one cares about a disagreements between two poor New south countries who rather than facing their collective economic challenges are poised for war) But this remains my personal opinion.

The irony is that Nigeria’s self-delusion isn’t over or perhaps "someone" fails to inform Mr. President that the end-state of most negotiated and mediated settlements is to facilitate a win-win situation. In this instance, the question is what has Nigeria to bargain with (I’m wondering what his BATNA or WATNA is as negotiators/mediators put it)? I’m thinking his insistence on Nigeria’s willingness to "talk" is rather misleading.

Going forward It is apparent a multiplicity of strategic errors in situational assessment, our own rather undefined interest and strategic objective (aside wanting to keep Bakassi for possibly reasons of mineral exploration etc) coupled with poor strategic case handling (the issue wasn’t merely a legal one and Nigeria never seemed to realize that.

Also the failure to persue asymmetrical diplomatic initiatives alongside the legal was also a major factor. But I’m thinking the biggest strategic miscalculation that will probably hunt Nigeria will be pursuing the military escalation option especially as we fail to acknowledge the limited projection, and interoperational capability, lack of expertise and numerous structural challenges faced by the armed forces.

On the flip side I’m thinking just maybe a mediated joint sovereignty type arrangement can be worked out possibly for 15 years. With plans for a referendum to determine which country assumes sovereignty (but again I’m sure those of you interactive with international law are aware that the very concept of sovereignty is itself undergoing redefinition- (a school of though exist).

In truth this option doesn’t even guarantee a win for Nigeria because of the government has failing to facilitate proper socio-econ-developmental initiatives to alleviate the inherent poverty and lack amongst the islands inhabitants- (lack of expertise-one only has to look at the end-state of our co called classical peace enforcement missions in Sierra Leone and Liberia where reconstruction efforts weren’t planed and re-escalation set in) but I’m thinking the joint sovereignty arrangement might prove a shrewder option than any precipitous or unilateral escalation.

I’m conclusion; I admit the limitations of this article/discourse especially for its inexpansiveness in perspective. Although the theme is Bakassi and should have considered the multiple components, the focus here remains strategic in view of my personal outlook. Besides I’ve already acknowledged the excellent articles by Prof. Ikhariale that deals with the legal and commentary perspective added to the several other articles by the BBC- Africa Service, analyzing the economic perspective and touching on aspects of the military challenges especially for the Nigerian Navy’s Eastern command (I have analyzed aspects of the military challenge-from a strategic standpoint without quantitative data for reasons of sensitivity. I have also clearly avoided the awakening nationalist sentiments and the secession threat especially as part of my family roots can be traced to the island- I cant guarantee remaining circumspect in my analysis, besides that issue is left for the intelligence agencies of both Nigeria and Cameroon to work out.