Based on the general tone of his article and suggestions, Mr. Gbanite must have concluded that the best interest of Ndiigbo in this election cycle lies in the defeat of the incumbent administration in its re-election bid. He tends to agree that a successful re-election bid by President Obasanjo in 2003 will make it very likely that Vice-President Atiku shall be well placed to become a formidable candidate for the top job in 2007. A defeat for the Obasanjo/Atiku ticket in 2003 by IBB is the best way for assuring that an Igbo presidential candidate shall emerge in 2007 if he contests now with an Igbo VP candidate. But wait, did he forget that a successful IBB ticket in 2003 may just as well decide to seek a second term in 2007? If his dream ticket ends up with an Igbo Vice-President after 2003 elections, there is no guarantee afterall that a presidential bid from a Southeasterner in 2007 is a done deal. The permutations and combinations for sorting out all the goings-on in Nigeria’s political maze may not be as simple or straightforward as the author would like us to believe. He really got so carried away by these vacuous calculations that he forgot to clearly explain to Ndiigbo and the rest of Nigeria why the choice of his candidate is the way to go for 2003 presidential elections. Perhaps, he expects his readers to trust his judgment and conviction that all will be well hereafter once his man from Minna hills returns to his former place of abode at Aso rock in 2003.

Short of the war-time Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon, IBB served the longest of all others who ever headed the government of Nigeria. I resided in Nigeria throughout the period that IBB was at the helm of affairs and I can attest that, more than any Head of State in Nigeria’s post-war era, he made the greatest effort to radically transform the Nigerian political landscape single-handedly. He came on stage as a reformer of sorts after the dreary rule of the austere duo that were intent on regimenting Nigerians back into the Dark Ages. For all intents and purposes, IBB had a free rein and he sure played his hand to the fullest. He tackled the political and economic fronts with flare of a youngster who somehow found himself in a toy wonderland. I personally partook in both the economic and political debates which his administration orchestrated ostensibly to feel the pulse of the nation before embarking on far-reaching decisions. His was an administration where everybody was engaged in debating solutions but only the Presidency was in the position do what pleases it at the end of it all. How else could one justify what followed the debates on the IMF loan conditionalities and political choices for the Third Republic? Relying on his infinite wisdom, IBB’s interpretation of these national debates was that Nigeria needed a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) and two centrist political parties with one being a little to the left and the other, a little to the right. Can his return to Aso Rock become a revival of this style of governance or has anything really changed?

General IBB, as Head of State, created many states and local government areas nationwide, sometimes, just for the asking. If my memory serves me right, the Igbo honorary chieftaincy title given to him was in appreciation for acceding to the request for creation of more states and local governments in Alaigbo, not for lifting the import license regulations which had happened earlier. Some, of course, would disagree that relaxation of importation licenses is to the ultimate advantage of the average Igbo. While the average Igbo may have mercantile inclinations, only a handful of Ndiigbo are importers and exporters. If anything, the removal of "essential commodities" bogey from Nigerian lexicon was more of interest to Ndiigbo because market forces were once more allowed to control distribution of commodities instead of government parastatals as was the case in the preceding regime. What appeared to have given the former military President some relish was his capacity to manipulate the internal political dynamics of Nigeria at will. During the transition program that he engineered, his administration had the last say about who could partake and under what conditions such permission would be granted. It was no surprise that when it became clear that his political plans were not unfolding as intended, he simple opted to scramble the board and declared the chess game over. Judging from the way IBB ran Nigeria under his stewardship, the June 12 imbroglio should not have been a surprise to anyone.

The point I am trying to get across here is that the protagonists for IBB’s return to Aso Rock must understand that their candidate already has established a track record while in office as a Head of State. A clamor for his return will make more sense if there are clear associations established between their candidate for the 2003 presidential contest and the former Head of State who picked up Nigeria in his fingertips and spun it like a top for more than 8 years when he was at the helm of affairs. In other words, the success or failure of IBB candidacy does not necessarily depend on the availability of an Igbo Vice-Presidential candidate to run with him as it does hinge on the ability of his team to orchestrate a political campaign which, in spite of his previous track record, can fly and hopefully prevail in present circumstances. I suspect that IBB supporters may not be very enthusiastic to make their candidate’s track record the object for asking for his return to the seat of power. If not because of his sterling track record, what else are the compelling reasons for anyone to partake in a crusade to recruit a former military Head of State into a popular electoral contest to return him to a post from which he had ruled for 8 years? Mr. Gbanite’s previous assertion that IBB is the only one to overcome the Obasanjo/Atiku rigging machine in 2003 may not be enough to convince people of my disposition to join his campaign train, for example.

Mr. Gbanite and other IBB admirers have the prerogative of pursuing their dreams for the 2003 polls. But, just for the record, it would be germane to remind Mr. Gbanite of his own 1999 political prescription for Ndiigbo, namely to seek out and support a presidential candidate from the Southsouth since the Southeast may be ill prepared for now. If that idea made sense in 1999, it is even more so now. I agree with him that such a move would become a veritable basis to rebuild the regional solidarity block that will ultimately be to the benefit of inhabitants of that area of which Alaigbo is part. His calculations, which appear to have focused exclusively on choosing the shortest and quickest route to send a Southeasterner to Aso Rock, may have omitted the strategic import of the Southsouth to the political and economic wellbeing of Alaigbo. Why is being a Vice-Presidential candidate to IBB now more deserving for the average Igbo than a proactive support for the emergence of a credible presidential candidate from the Southsouth? Granted that there are issues to sort out in order to assure the emergence of a potentially successful presidential bid by a Southeasterner in the 2003 presidential contest, but is scurrying up North to solicit for IBB’s candidacy the best option for Ndiigbo now?

As the countdown to presidential party primaries ticks away, the choices that are available to Ndiigbo get narrower by the day. I was bemused by Ohanaeze’s reported stance on the timing for making its choice presidential candidate from the Southeast public. From published reports, security considerations were given as the excuse why this body’s preferred presidential candidate should be kept a top secret, at least, for now. I am perplexed that anyone aspiring to become the Commander-in-Chief and Head of State of Nigeria has to be kept out of public view because of considerations for his personal safety or those of his sponsors. Wherein lies the credibility of such a potential national leader? It is not only that someone who should lead us in battle, if needs be, ought not to be fickle minded but also he should never be portrayed as such, especially in the perception of the electorate that will choose the next President. Or could this be a proverbial scenario where the wily old man is judiciously backing away from an angry bull as he as he makes gestures of bravado at the beast to impress onlookers? There may be substance to Mr. Gbanite’s assertion that the Southeast political elite have shown little or no enthusiasm for an Igbo candidate that they would readily rally behind. If the Southeast political leaders are unsure of producing a winning candidate within their ranks for the 2003 polls, I would support the suggestion that Ndiigbo should look elsewhere for a candidate that can best meet our needs in the interim.

The best place to look is obviously the Southsouth zone. Geographically, the Southsouth almost surrounds the Southeast but for the latter’s northern border with Kogi and Benue States. Historically, the Southsouth and Southeast share recent and remote political and cultural ties because of contiguity and also as parts of the former Eastern Region during the First Republic. In spite of the de facto existence of the newly configured 6 geopolitical zones, the old West and North still manage to function as distinct entities in the fashion that is reminiscent of the First Republic. A palpable schism has kept the Igbo heartland and the minority groups of the Southsouth apart in many crucial aspects since conclusion of the Civil War. The consequences of Biafran collapse at the end of the Civil War still reverberate through the Southsouth and Southsouth zones. For obvious reasons, it is expected that the victorious side in the Civil War does not mind the continuation of mutual alienation of entities that comprised or sympathized with the former East. But the war ended more than 30 years ago and we now have a majority population of young Nigerians who have no personal recollection or firsthand knowledge of the Civil War era. With each passing day, it looks odder that geopolitical entities that should be closely collaborating for mutual benefit are still at war with each other to the detriment of the strategic interests of their constituents.

Amidst all the hoopla that abound in contemporary Nigerian politics, the painful reality is that the former East and the adjoining Niger Delta produce the bulk of income-generating export that fuels the national economy while only a minuscule of proceeds earned by Nigeria ever return to these areas. This is the major aberration in the operational dynamics of Nigeria’s political economy. Residents of the Southsouth and Southeast zones have shouted themselves hoarse by crying "marginalization" to a de facto alliance that sustains its present leverage over the rest of us by keeping the status quo intact. Since screaming for outside help has not yielded much dividend over the years, the next logical option for those marginalized is to come together, strategize together and act together for protection of their mutual interests. Such convergence of interests will make it possible, for example, for the Southeast and Southsouth to produce a common or at least, compatible agenda for dealing with other interest groups that are based outside the two zones. Because of how intricately intertwined the strategic interests of these 2 geopolitical are, commonsense demands that we ought to share a common political and economic agenda when relating to other competing interest groups elsewhere in the country.

The subject of choosing a presidential candidate of Southeast origin has split the Igbo political elite down the middle, with one side in support while the other lacks enthusiasm about the idea for a variety of reasons. The latter side is led by the Executive Governors of the Southeast with the exception of Governor Orji Kalu of Abia. Ohanaeze Ndiigbo, on the other hand, has vowed to produce a presidential candidate of Southeast origin for the 2003 polls, rain or shine. Within the Ohanaeze, there are powerful members who have overtly pitched their tents with the Obasanjo re-election camp. One of Obasanjo’s political advisers and serving ministers in this administration are members of the Ohanaeze. The Ohanaeze Political Committee Chairman featured with 4 governors of the Southeast in Obasanjo re-election rallies in Otta and Abuja. The loyalty of rest of the Southeast political class appears to be torn between allegiances to PDP, the dominant party in the zone and the grand design of the Ohanaeze leadership. From all indications, the chances of success for a potential presidential candidate from the zone are already compromised by this lack of unity of purpose amidst politicians of the Southeast. Will imminent announcement of a presidential candidate chosen by the Ohanaeze conjure solidarity or lead to greater polarization in the Igbo political elite in the run-up to the election primaries? Your guess should be as good as mine.

If the Southeast is not disposed to producing a compelling presidential candidate in this electoral cycle, the wise thing to do is for Ndiigbo to give their neighbors the chance to field a candidate that they can support in the 2003 polls. To cement this new rapprochement, political leaders in these geopolitical zones must come together soon to resolve the pernicious issues that constitute a sore irritant amongst the two neighbors. The Southeast support for a presidential candidate from the Southsouth, for example, could be buttressed by a firm understanding that such a candidate would spearhead an endeavor to resolve the so-called abandoned properties saga that has bedeviled the relationship between Ndiigbo and the political elite of former Rivers State. With this thorn in the flesh taken care of, many more avenues for collaboration can be opened up on sociocultural, economic and political fronts. The end objective will be the opening up of Nigeria’s Eastern Economic Corridor to counterbalance that in the West which extends from Lagos and Ogun States into the hinterland. With the establishment of vibrant economic activities in the disenchanted communities that comprise the Niger Delta, southeast coastline and the hinterland, another potent engine of development would have been unleashed east of the River Niger for the ultimate glory of the entire nation.

Some points made by Mr. Gbanite in his latest article are factual and thus are mostly incontrovertible. The only bone of contention appears to be his firm resolve to see IBB return to Aso Rock next year by riding on the back of Ndiigbo. He cannot prove that having an Igbo to serve as Vice-President, under another Babangida tenure as Head of State, is the fastest or surest way of getting someone from the Southeast elected as Nigeria’s Chief Executive. With the proliferation of parties, it is quite easy to find a political platform through which any determined candidate can contest for any office in the land, including the presidency. His confidence in IBB victory in 2003 appears to be based more on sentiment that hard facts. His candidate has ample amount of baggage from his former days at Aso Rock which might get his candidacy bogged down whenever he actually throws his gauntlet in the impending electoral contest. Delay in the emergence of a credible presidential candidate of Southeast origin makes it more likely that the Obasanjo/Atiku ticket may not face any tangible resistance to its re-election bid in this geopolitical zone unless a favored regional candidate emerges from the Southsouth. The presidential candidate from Southsouth, which will certainly require support from the Southeast, can provide the focal point for establishing regional rapprochement in the East which, in turn, shall open many doors of opportunity for both inhabitants of the area and the entire country. This is a choice that Ndiigbo must consider seriously before opting for another Vice-Presidential slot on anyone’s ticket, including that of the ex-General from the hills of Minna.

OKENWA R. NWOSU, M.D.

Greenbelt, Maryland. U.S.A.