From Philosophical Rationalism to Monistic Theosophy: Observations on Banu Az-Zubair's Comment (1)
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I have read the comment of my dear friend, Dr Kabir Banu Az-Zubair, on my piece on Islamic Theology, Western Philosophy and Predestination. I begin by commending Kabir for a brilliant presentation, even while expressing my reservations about some of his theses. It is important to point out, at the outset, that Kabir did not set out to confute the arguments presented in my piece, so that strictly speaking, this is not a debate. However it is in the nature of rich intellectual discourse that every contribution raises new issues begging for a response, until the dialectical process leads to some form of synthesis or common understanding. A summary of the principal motif in my own paper, and my reading of Kabir's essential theses, is perhaps a good starting point.
My objective in writing my initial paper was simple and precise. I set out to show the impossibility of establishing the incontrovertible truth of metaphysical arguments, of which the questions of free-will (voluntarism) and predestination (determinism) are a sub-class, based on the proofs of Pure Reason. This point is self-evident to students of philosophy. We know, from the empiricism of Hume, that causation can not be established on the evidence of the senses, even where there is a constant sequential conjunction between any two events, say A and B. Building on this, Kant has shown that such a relationship may be known rationally through the medium of the Category of Causation as a "Form of Understanding." This Category enables us know that in all cases such that "if A, then B always follows", that A causes B. However this is only possible in the realm of sensible experience and no claims of this nature can be proven, in the super-sensory realm, based on the evidence of Pure Reason. So any claims of proving the metaphysical argument that the moral actions of man are caused either by him or by God, based on rationalism or empiricism, cannot be true. It seems to me Kabir was in complete agreement with me on this point.
What Kabir set out to do, was to present what he considered to be the correct Islamic position, which is summarized in his own words: "The evidence is so overwhelming that man's power and ability depends on divine providence, which enables man to act as a free being. Man is responsible for what he does of his own free will, based on the potential and power granted him by the loving and merciful God." In other words, Kabir considers ethical voluntarism (or qadar) to be the correct position of Islam, and agrees with the mufawwidha that God has delegated to man the power to choose and act of his own will and thus be responsible for his actions. This is, as I mentioned, a view held by the Mu'tazila and the Shi'a. The problem I have is not so much in the choice of school but in the dogmatic claim of "overwhelming evidence." The truth is that the voluntarists (qadariyyah), the determinists (jabriyya) and the salafis all quote copiously from the Qur'an to defend and support their position, and adopt exegetical approaches to interpretations of texts that conform to their world-view. It would seem to me that to defend a position as supported by "overwhelming evidence" we need more than quotations from the Qur'an carefully selected and interpreted to conform to our dogmatic predisposition. It is for this reason that I will present in this paper a justification for my preference for the salafi view which, contrary to Kabir's suggestion is different from the qadari position in that it adopts a determinist attitude to the good and a voluntarist one to the evil.
The second major area of disagreement I have with Kabir is in his analysis of evil. I do agree with Kabir that the western conception of evil is materialistic, but it is trite Islamic theology that good and evil are defined in ethical terms. Indeed the entire debate on free will and pre-destination is intricately linked, in Islamic theology, to the debate on the nature of good and evil and the capacity of unaided reason to determine what is good and what is bad. The Mu'tazila, who are mainly voluntarist, believe that reason can arrive at correct ethical judgements even without revelation and man is bound to act in accordance with the dictates of reason in the absence of revelation and will be held so accountable. The Ash'arites, on the other hand, who are mainly determinist, believe that good and evil are defined by revelation and man is only held accountable for actions based on compliance with or rejection of the Shari'ah. Thus that evil is defined in ethical, as opposed to materialist terms, is not in dispute. What I will object to is Kabir's philosophical definition of evil, which is based on a dangerous adoption of the controversial principle of "Unity of Being" (or wahdatu 'l-wujud), associated with the theosophical school of the Andalusian mystic, Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi. This principle, long considered as some Islamic form of proto-Spinozian pantheism, is presented as theological truth and evil is defined as nothing other than the "de-coupling" of the material world from the Absolute Reality, or God. I will quote at length from Kabir on this point and dispute what I consider a dangerous time-bomb in his thesis- the intoxicating cocktail of a monistic, proto-pantheist view of Reality combined with messianic eschatology. This will be the subject of a subsequent paper that concludes my response.
The Salafi Position and Qur'anic Coherentism
I stated in my first article that my preference in the debate on voluntarism and determinism is for the Salafi school as articulated by ibn Qayyim in his Madarij al-Salikin. This school holds that Allah is the cause of all good and responsible for it, while no evil is attributable to Him as its Cause. I have already made the point that the justification of such a metaphysical proposition necessarily must rely on an epistemological framework that is neither empiricist nor rationalist. I present here a justificatory framework that is essentially internalist, as I will try to show that the position of the Salafiyya in this matter is closer to a coherent reading of the Qur'an and Sunnah than either the voluntarists' or the determinists'.
I begin with a tradition of the Prophet narrated by al-Bukhari in the Book of Hajj, (Chapter on Talbiyah), which includes in part this explicit statement: "And (all) good is in Your (i.e God's) Hands; and evil is not (attributable) to You (ie God) ."[wal khairu fi Yadaika; wal sharru laisa Ilaika]. This hadith makes it clear that nothing bad should be attributed to God while all good comes from Him. A close reading of the Qur'anic text shows that it is replete with examples that follow this pattern. Everytime a verse involves action with ethical implications and God involved, that act is only attributed to Him if it is wisdom and goodness and justice. If it is contrary the semantic form is such that either the subject is anonymous, or responsibility is explicitly attributed to man or to the evil soul or to Satan.
I will give several instances to establish this thesis, which was lucidly elaborated upon by Ibn al-Qayyim in a short but extremely useful book, Tafsirul Mu'awwadhatain, his exegesis of the last two Surahs of the Qur'an (al-Falaq and an-Nas), as well as in his book al-Fawa'id al-Makkiyya. We read in al-Fatiha (1: 6-7): "Guide us to the straight path; the path of those upon whom Thou hast bestowed Thy blessings, not of those on whom there is anger, nor of those who have gone astray." In referring to blessings or bounties (Ni'mah), God attribute them to himself, but anger and going astray are not attributed to Him. Also in al-Kahf (18: 79) we have Khidhr saying about the boat he damaged (a bad deed) "and I desired to damage it" (fa aradtu an a'ibaha) whereas when he lifted a wall to protect the treasure of orphans (a good deed) (18: 82) he says "so thy Sustainer (ie God) willed it (fa arada Rabbuka) that when they come of age they should access their treasure by thy Sustainer's grace". Similarly, the believing Jinn said(72:10) "and we do not know whether evil fortune is intended (a sharrun urida) for those who live on earth, or whether their Sustainer wills to endow them with guidance(arada bi him rabbuhum rashada)" In discussing evil fortune (sharr) the construction is neutral and the subject who "wills" it anonymous. In discussing guidance (rushd) the subject is explicitly "their Sustainer."
There are many more examples. In al-Hujurat (49:7), we read "God has made faith an object of love to you (habbaba ilaikumul iman) and made it beautiful in your hearts (zayyanahu fi qulubikum); while He has made hateful for you (karraha ilaikum) all unbelief, iniquity and rebellion." On the other hand, we read in Al-Imran (3:14) "The enjoyment of worldly desires through women and children and heaped up treasures of gold and silver.....has been made alluring (zuyyina) to mankind." We see here how God uses different forms of the root verb tazyin or beautification. In one case, because it is good for faith to seem beautiful the form used is the active zayyana, accompanied by God as the subject responsible for the act. In the case of worldly desires a passive form zuyyina is used leaving the subject anonymous (majhul).
Another example comes from the words of the Prophet Ibrahim in al-Shu'ara' (26:77-82): "As for me, these deities are my enemies except the Sustainer of the worlds. He, who has created me and is the One who guides me. He, who gives me to eat and gives me to drink. And when I fall ill, He restores me to health. He, who will take my life and bring me back to life. He who I hope will forgive my faults on Judgement Day." Look closely at these verses.
It is God who creates, and guides, and sustains, and gives health and forgives; but it is Ibrahim who falls ill, and who has faults. He does not say God makes him ill, he says when I fall ill (wa idha maridhtu) it is He who cures me (fa Huwa yashfini).
A final set of examples is the following. In reference to the People of the Book (Jews and Christians), whenever Allah says "Those We have given the Book"(alladhina a taina humul kitab) as in al-Baqarah: 121, it is in the course of praise for good deeds. Where they are being castigated for wrong-doing, or where praise is mixed with criticism, the Qur'an comes with the the passive form "Those who have been given the Book" (alladhina utul kitab) as in al-Taubah: 29; or al-Bayyinah: 4. Similarly, we read in al-Fatir (35:32) "And then We gave the inheritance of the Book (aurathnal kitab) to those We have elected among Our servants." But in al-Shura (42: 14) we read: "But those who were given the inheritance of the Book (wa innal ladhina urithul kitab) from those who preceded them are in doubt and suspicion about what it contains." In discussing His elect, God says "We bestowed upon them the inheritance of the Book" but in discussing those who were in doubt they "were given the inheritance of the Book" but the giver is anonymous (majhul). In the first case He uses the active form aurathna, in the second the passive urithu.
The point is made. The Qur'an is clear that good things are attributed to God and bad things not. This position is also supported by the hadith mentioned above. It is therefore clear that the choice of scholars like Ibn al-Qayyim to be determinists with regard to the good and voluntarists with regard to the bad is in keeping with the internal coherence of the sacred texts. It also is most beneficial to a Muslim. By attributing all bounty to Allah-faith, piety, knowledge, wealth, health-man learns humility and modesty and gives due praise, thanks and glory to his Creator and Sustainer.
By attributing evil to himself man learns remorse and repentance and fear of Divine wrath and grovels before his Lord seeking forgiveness and trying to change. In both cases he is exalted and comes closer to his God by doing His will.
In summary, the qadariyya, the jabriyya and the salafiyya all have verses and traditions that they interpret to support their position. The first group interprets the Qur'an and the Sunnah to support a pre-established theory of ethical voluntarism. The second does the same to legitimate a pre-established theory of ethical determinism. The third does the same in line with the example of God and His prophet, as exemplified in the Qur'an and Hadith. The first two groups lead with their intellect, and try to find justification in revelation. The third starts from revelation and this lights up the way for the intellect to see the result in all its glory. I therefore dispute the dogmatic claim that the evidence for qadar is "overwhelming", unless Kabir can come up with an epistemological theory of justification that outweighs this perspective of Qur'anic and Sunnaic coherentism.
With this I conclude the first part of my comment. In a subsequent article, I will discuss the principle of wahdatul wujud, to which Kabir clearly subscribes, and critique its appropriation as the definitive basis for the origin of evil, which is linked to a denial of this conception of Reality, and affirmation of the distinction between God and His creation. I will also question the use of the term apocastasis, which refers to the final restitution of all things at the appearance of the Messiah, an idea extended by the mediaeval Christian theologian Origen. I suspect Kabir adopts the term under the influence of the Messianic eschatology implicit in Ibn 'Arabi's Mahdist prophesies. I should say, however, that I have no intention of claiming orthodoxy or accusing Kabir of heresy, conscious as I am that for seven centuries this debate has not been resolved, and perhaps it may reflect different visions of Islam rather than monopolistic claims of any side to the whole truth. But the point has been raised for discussion.
So discuss it we shall.
August 2003