FROM THE BARREL OF A GUN: THE BENUE GENOCIDE AND NIGERIA’S CONCEPT OF PEACEKEEPING

By

William Etim-Bassey

 

…They said some men are too ignorant, and vicious, to share in government. Possibly so, said we…Abraham Lincoln- July 1, 1854

 

PREAMBLE

 

It is an old, old story. It goes by various names: Survival of the fittest. Eat or be eaten. Law of the jungle. Might make’s right. It is based on an ideology that says taking is better that giving, and that compassion is a sign of weakness.

 

Recent events with wider political implications such as the murder of Bola Ige and the electoral law reform’s have overtaken the reprisal killings of Oct 22nd-24th 20001 when men identified as members of the Nigerian Armed Forces arbitrarily rounded up and executed hundreds of civilians, unarmed men women and children. Mainly Tiv’s from the Benue region in Nigeria in reprisal for the unfortunate murder of soldiers designated as "peacekeepers" to the conflict plagued middle belt region of Nigeria.

 

Retrospectively, I’m thinking Lincoln’s words above best articulate on-goings, post Odi, Benue till date. Ongoing I’ll here discourse based on actions misconstrued as peacekeeping by the Nigerian government which remains guilty of while hoping to restrain the Armed Forces to its designated constitutional albeit traditional role, exploit and apply the Armed Forces muscular capacity to tackling civil-disobedience and internal discontent. A task naively defined as peacekeeping. Even in the face of educated and informed consensus that matters of civil disobedience should traditionally be left to less muscular security components like the civil-police force.

 

Firstly, I emphasis that the Nigerian government’s definition of peacekeeping is theoretically conceptually and historically suspect. I dare opine that perhaps governments understanding, grasp and interpretation of peacekeeping or even the security centered challenges facing Nigeria vis-à-vis conflicts and reasons for malcontent and agitation is at best challenged which is reflected by the governments often faulty analysis, interpretation and response initiatives. In attempts to tackle Nigeria’s numerous plaguing conflicts.

 

Secondly, I’m conscious of the fact that especially in a third world context that Coercion or its elements are an almost always-convenient option in conflict resolution. Especially in cases of civil disobedience and agitation when the opposition is civilian. However, history witnesses that resolving conflicts will test any constituted authorities capacity and will. So experts in the field of conflict resolution insist that impulse for revenge must not be satisfied because violent or coercive response is disastrously counterproductive and will always proliferate or escalate tense situations.

 

Against this background I’ll here discourse implications of the reprisal killings in Benue vis-à-vis peacekeeping, briefly touching upon views and thoughts relating to the history and concept of War, Retaliation and Genocide hoping to overwhelm by force of reason and educate to inform.

 

"The Benue genocide" (Omo Omoruyi 2001) it’s aftermath and reaction is suggestive of many things. Above all, it suggests an inherent weakness in the moral fabric of all Nigerians. A lack of will to challenge wrong. An enormous capacity to live in subjugation and misrule. A seeming consent to maintain a non-existent status quo. A reaction some suggest as self-preservative in intent even if wrong in principle, concept or moral. I need not go into very recent history to articulate reasons for my view. I even sometimes ask my self if this is a reflection of our socio-cultural identity? It’s perhaps a task for greater minds than mine to research.

 

Factually, the reprisal killings in Benue is a crime against humanity, The Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know, W.W. Norton 1999 and Heike Spieker’s portion on, Civilian Immunity and Crimes of War make a good read, thus Prof. Omoruyi’s cry of culpable genocide is justified and applicable in the Benue context. But I’m refusing to agree with notions that the ruling government’s reaction and actions post the reprisal killings in Benue reflect general societal opinion that the government and the Nigerian Armed Forces are in the right and their reactions justified.

 

I’m believing Nigerians are civilized people? Civilized enough to allow for due process to take precedence. Even in cases of escalated civil disobedience. For as weeks turn to months and public interest and attention shifts to happenings with perhaps wider political implications, opinion and will to challenge the governments feeble and half-hearted attempt to decisively investigate and court-martial personnel involved in the reprisal killings wanes. And the perpetrators and seeming invincible and getting off lightly. For only the Afenifere and a minority have unequivocally condemned government’s dubious reaction and handling of events post the killings.

 

The truth is and must be told that the reprisal killings in Benue by Nigerian Armed Forces personnel is despicable. It negates military ethos and goes against the core values, professional ethics, principles and standard President Obasanjo’s government seeks to instill in the Nigerian Armed Forces-Omoruyi’s "Obasanjo’s Use of Army for Political Survival: Recipe for Disaster" makes a good but limited perspective read.

 

Firstly, the reprisal killing does severe credibility damage to the Nigerian military, to president Obasanjo’s government and to Nigeria’s image internationally. The very act of military reprisal fouls many instruments-articles of multilateral treaties, covenants and international agreements to which Nigeria has consented to, ratified, is signatory to and thus bound by (see article 40(5)(a) of the Vienna Convention 1969). Agreements which not only seek to regulate the behavior of States as they interact but how these States treat their citizens.

 

Of the top of my head I can list articles fouled which in include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights- http://www.hri.ca/uninfo/treaties/1.shtml , Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment- http://www.hri.ca/uninfo/treaties/39.shtml , Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide- http://www.hri.ca/uninfo/treaties/87.shtml , Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement- http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/GuidingPrinciplesonInternalDisplacement.htm , the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War-http:// www.hri.ca/uninfo/treaties/93.shtml  the and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights- http://www.hri.ca/uninfo/treaties/3.shtml .

 

I counsel that the president and his policy adviser be mindful of long-term implications of their actions. The flowing "agbadas" and stashed millions won’t be savior when the chips are down. Implications are, current International Treaty Framework and Dispute Resolution and Compliance mechanism allows for future accountability of stewardship when there’s overwhelming evidence of humanitarian and human rights abuse- A. Pinochet’s case, Hissein Habre’s trail and the current case against former Yugoslav president Milosevic are de’facto precedents.

 

From a personal perspective, I’m thinking the most damage done is to the credibility of the United States sponsored re-professionlization program, which I’ve always seen as a positive step towards modernizing the Nigerian Armed Forces. My belief being that interactive training will develop skill and capacity thus broadening the scope of the average Nigerian soldier.

 

I know the United States Armed Forces operates within the confines of the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1942 and the principles and articles of International Humanitarian Law which principally seeks to define combatants, their and their role’s in a theater of operation. The objective being to protect "defenseless people" and do away with retributive attrition i.e. reprisal etc. So, if these principles steadfastly made applicable and a guiding light behind United States Armed Forces war doctrines and posture in a military context, Operation Desert Storm and Enduring freedom exemplify the continues and strict adherence to ROE’s (ROE’s are specific instructions defining conduct, reaction and how to operate during specific scenario’s in a given theater)-(see http://www.aetc.randolph.af.mil/ja/loac/000.htm ) even when opposition forces are unmindful of International laws of armed conflict. Why should the Nigerian Armed Forces, whose peacekeeping component troops are trained by experienced United States reservist apply such mass and muscle in an internal "peacekeeping" operation. That is, if the term "peacekeeping is applicable in the Benue context.

 

Resulting from the reprisal killings in Benue between Oct 22-24, I’m now questioning the lessons learnt aspect of the whole re-professionalization exercise. It’s inconceivable that a well trained designated "peacekeeping" component units primed for peacekeeping operations/duties can be so un-methodical and rag-tag like in response to an obviously challenging situation. I’m thinking, was reprisal killing taught as an optional tactic or strategy in conflict containment, de-escalation, resolution or peacekeeping? Or is there a dubious duplicity of standard in play? My mind goes back to the time honored rhetoric of "African solution to African problems" but I’m hoping that is non-applicable in this instance. I wonder and ask myself, can would be peacekeepers in any part of the United States or the Western world react in reprisal and the government or populace condone or turn a blind eye? These

 

Perhaps, baring in mind governments often wrong response initiatives resulting from mis-interpretation and mis-judgement of events my observation in "The truth about United states Military Aid II- - (http:// www.nigerdeltacongress.com/tarticles/truth_about_united_states_military%20aid%20to%20nigeria%202.htm  ) that the Nigerian rulership is dominated by minds I termed "old-think" does justifiably holds sway even against Chief U. J. Ekaette’s seminal article-"How we Rule Nigeria". For the very concepts and principles articulated by Chief Ekaette as the founding principles guiding governments decision and policy making are obviously non-applicable in the Benue reprisal killings context judging by the governments glee, feeble rush to offer reasons justifying the reprisal and non-attempts to bring the culprits of the killings to face the law.

 

I’m thinking perhaps Hon. Na’abba’s reactions best mirrors the inept, confused and un-informed thinking in Aso Rock where there’s and obvious disconnect between understanding of concept, policy, decision-making and execution of orders vis-à-vis peacekeeping and conflict resolution.

 

The truth must be told it is reflectively and fundamentally wrong to dispatch combat troops as peacekeepers in internal inter/intra communal or ethnic disputes/conflicts. That duty is clearly for the civilian police and it’s components. The Benue reprisal killings vis-à-vis governments insistence on soldiers in tackling civil disobedience and malcontent further stressed on the need for President Obasanjo who enjoys so much international goodwill to perhaps facilitate to refine peacekeeping, law enforcement or whatever name he chooses to call such operations.

 

DEFINING PEACEKEEPING

 

Peacekeeping is contextually defined in terms of its mission, mandate and end-state-objective.

 

Post the Dumbarton Oaks accord peacekeeping has been seen as a United Nations mandated presence in the field (normally involving civilian and military components) that, with the consent of the conflicting parties, implement and monitor arrangements relating to the control of conflicts and their resolution. Peacekeeping is really a technique initiated by the United Nations as a means for maintaining international peace and security.

 

In the Nigerian context I observe that as well as being challenged in understanding the concept of peacekeeping, which really aims at resolving conflicts and bringing about concerted peace and order, there’s a lack of understanding that peacekeeping principally aims at alleviating human suffering.

 

A useful way to approach the concept of peacekeeping is to divide it into three broad categories: 1) assist in maintenance of, cease-fires, 2) implementation of comprehensive settlements, and 3) protection of humanitarian operations.

From an international perspective, of uttermost importance to peacekeeping especially in its modern context is the rule or body of international laws, defining regulating and establishing an operational framework. The obvious non-observances of these principles and laws have resulted in the genocides1/9/02 in Odi and lately Benue.

 

Conclusively, peacekeeping in context remains consistent worldwide. Thus rules, regulations, rules of engagement and mandate even when modified should remain applicable in every context aiming to alleviate human suffering.

 

There are no double standards. I’m thinking if the mess defined as peacekeeping that has resulted in Odi and Benue reflects Nigeria’s peacekeeping methodology, then many will understand my insistence that Liberia and Sierra Leone were not successful peacekeeping operations. Liberia and Sierra Leone operations in my view remain mainly glorified by the un-esoteric even if the prescient concept of ECOMOG is remarkable and visionary.

 

Perhaps Nigerian policy makers and advisers with the benefit of hindsight now understand part of the reasoning behind why Nigeria as the largest contributor couldn’t take direct charge of command and control when Sierra Leone became a United Nations operation etc.

 

INTERNATIONAL CONEPT OF PEACEKEEPING

 

Internationally, the concept of peacekeeping is now based on the principles of the "New Peacekeeping Partnership". A concept developed by the Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Center.

 

The "New Peacekeeping Partnership", is a concert involving mission military, civilian, civil police, humanitarian agencies, policy maker’s diplomats etc. All, operational component partners working in concert to achieving mission mandate and end-state.

 

Peacekeeping is now about humanitarian assistance. Including peace negotiations, rebuilding infrastructures, picking up garbage and a host of other activities aimed at helping the people.

 

Not understanding these facts demonstrates a disconnect between theory and practice. Especially between policy makers in the nations capital Abuja and peacekeepers on the ground.

 

ISSUES

 

For reasons of doctrine, posture, composition, command and control. Professionals in the peacekeeping and conflict resolution field maintain that the Armed Forces are non-suited to handling civil disobedience. A notion again reinforced by the reprisal killings in Benue. A non-obviously bi-polar to President Obasanjo’s insistence on applying the Armed Forces capacity in instances of civil disobedience. An insidious ill-advised stance taken with wide long-term political, national and strategic implications even if expedient in intent.

 

Especially in Nigeria’s case when the so designated "peacekeepers" have little knowledge of the precepts of social-responsibility or law. Mediation to the recruit being a gun butt to the belligerent party’s forehead.

 

ALTERNATIVE

 

Perhaps the government should try a Civil-Military share based strategy, collaboration involving civil society and the national security mechanism (Civilian-Military interface and cooperation), especially in cases of civil disobedience.

 

Another option being the concept of National Guard. A concept canvassed by many for its alternate strategic leverage. A concept in principle first muted by Gen. I. Babangida (N. Omogui 2001)

 

 

The National Guard concept offers better tactical opportunities with immense strategic capacity. Mainly because its an interface between the Armed Forces and Police combining operational capacities of both without a negative historical remainder or burden of being a repressive tool which facilitated state sponsored terrorism in the past.

 

Also, Nigeria’s rising international profile requires new and perhaps different approach to issues. Not only issues of conflict resolution and peacekeeping. A sense of social responsibility must always prevail.

 

In the context of conflict resolution and peacekeeping, There’s the need for a "human face" as President Obasanjo once said in reference to S.A.P (Economic structural Adjustment Program) under the presidency of Gen. I. Babangida.

 

Government-the defense ministry and the Armed Forces must adapt and improve upon it general security mechanism and strategies. With reference to Benue especially on how its peacekeeping operations are planned executed and conducted.

 

Internationally, as NGO’s through concepts such as the SPHERE project seek standardized basic operational level’s to facilitate effectiveness. Most peacekeeping facilitating countries are seeking to establish a standard. And this standard disallows revenge killings, mass murders or Genocide

 

IN SEARCH OF JUSTIFICATION

As facts and reactions trickle in about the reprisal killings in Benue, I tried rationalizing, seeking justification for the Nigerian government and the military high commands reaction. I tried rationalizing to decipher to decipher the thought process that must have led to an order for reprisal. Even in empathy for the initially murdered "peacekeepers" I find none.

 

I’m not justifying the initial murder of the peacekeepers. I only bring to bear the training and capacity development I have personally undergone in preparation for task and as one in the field. Perhaps I feel not the anxiety and frustration of the family of those initially murdered. But I’m trained for peacekeeping and as a professional interactively involved in peacekeeping. It’s the path I’ve chosen to life. It’s a path I’m willing if need be to sacrifice for. Even in all I still cannot justify the reprisal killings in Benue.

 

I’ve examined the doctrine of Just war, first articulated by Augustine of Hippo in the 4th century even though its principles are sometimes dialectically opposed to the concept of peacekeeping. Principles sometimes non-applicable in context.

 

Studying the text on Prudential Judgement and Proportionality consistently seeking to justify the reprisal killings. I find none. The tugging question in my heart remains, what has changed, why is the Benue reprisal killing different for me? I’m thinking perhaps, that after Odi and Benue which Nigerian community is next? Will this soon become a way of lifelike the lack of good roads, portable water and electricity?

 

The concept and principles of warfare or retaliation are sacred and universal. Just war doctrine, if there is any such thing has two parts jus ad bellum (the right to go to war), and jus in bello (what is right in war) which we nominally refer to as the moral code governing military actions once war has commenced. In the Benue context I’ll substitute the conflict situation and not define as war. As the Nigerian Armed Forces had no defined armed or legitimate opposition forces to contend with but a bunch of unarmed and untrained women, children and men-villagers.

 

In my understanding and interpretation of jus ad bellum I note an emphasis on just ‘cause and right intention which excludes revenge…with insistence that war-which Clausewitz defines as a craft; a great socio-political activity distinguished from all other activities by the reciprocal and legitimized use of purposeful violence to achieve political objectives, be as a last resort. Used only after its established those non-violent methods of dispute resolution will not resolve the situation at hand. I’m my candid opinion these conditionalities were never met in Benue. In the jus in bello criteria which consist of discrimination and proportionality, the intentional killing of civilians such as in Benue is un-justifiable. And proportionality is sometimes made non-applicable as in the Benue reprisal killings as the values and goals in consideration weren’t sufficiently important enough to warrant reprisal killings.

 

One thing I picked out in the Benue reprisal killings was that the Nigerian Armed Forces for once before the initial murder of the 7 peacekeepers toyed with the concept of ROE- Rules of Engagement. Apparently they got their fingers burnt thus the reprisal in killing. My take is, If in ordinary interaction, there’s always a projection of "muscularity" by way of imposition of will. How will the average Nigerian soldier react in a changeling situation such as that in Benue before the reprisal killings? We all know most Nigerian soldier have an above the law attitude.

 

As per lame arguments that the federal government and military authorities have no knowledge of who ordered the reprisal. I’ll say that traditionally and especially in a peacekeeping context. Peacekeepers operate with ROE’s. These ROE’s, in critical scenarios act as a check. They aim at preventing prevent soldiers from reprisals and taking out-killing targets of opportunity even when they self presents. ROE’s generally emphasis on target approval as prerequisite which require authentication up the chain of command so as to validate targets.

 

Implying an officer in the Nigerian Armed Forces post authentication authorized the reprisal killings in Benue. This very action makes that force commander or his superiors culpable of genocide.

 

For the already discussed principles of prudential judgment and social responsibility in theaters of operation centers on understanding, interpretation and decision making. What Col.John Boyd defines as the OODA Loop. This is especially most applicable in a peacekeeping context which the Nigerian government insist the operations in Benue was the Nigerian government insists.

 

All in all I still cannot rationally justify the Armed Forces reaction in Benue. There’s a lump in my heart for I have lost acquaintances on peacekeeping duties. As for as I know the families have never sought reprisal. I remember talking to the widow of a Canadian peacekeeper lost in one of the early missions, the Suez or Cyprus, I can’t recollect. On a cold winter night at the Peacekeepers lounge. During one of the company of good-chair dinners at the Pearson Peace Center.

 

 

 

The dinner is an age-old tradition now adapted to honor incoming and outgoing graduating peacekeepers from one of the several courses run at the Center. Where a time honored one-minute silence is observed in honor of fallen peacekeepers worldwide. Men who lost all in the service for peace. I recollect no bitterness, no sadness, just pride that her husband was given an opportunity to serve. Retrospectively and in the light of Benue, maybe the cultural difference now becomes an issue. Perhaps the culture of where I live and the life I’ve been exposed to make’s the Benue reprisal killings in comprehensible to me. My thoughts probably mirror the society I live in where soft skills, negotiation, mediation and accommodation form the core value and foundation of the society. Maybe if I live in Nigeria I will be more understanding, but I doubt. You can’t murder in the name of peace?

 

So I conclude that consistent mistake’s of methods becomes a big challenge in the face of non-justification. Nigeria had reached a turning point where it has to overhaul its overall conflict management and resolution strategy. Because if Odi and Benue are pointer’s, there’s chance for assumption of re-occurrence. The question being in which part of Nigeria.

 

Conclusively I have raised and answered many questions. But this work is in no way through. There are many perspectives issues and fundamentals I’ve overlooked. My only hope is that Gen. Victor Malu weep also for the people of Odi as he does for his own people and desist from personification of issue’s. We all know the killings in Benue are shameful and genocidal.

 

Conclusively and in a lighter mood I write to Gen. V. Malu suggesting, supposing, just maybe the Nigerian Armed Forces high command has made an honest mistake in authorizing the reprisal killings resulting from distortion of orders. Caused by a bridge of communication between command and control?

 

After all Gen. Malu maintained till the very end, that the Nigerian Armed Forces had impeccable peacekeeping credentials. Better than the Americans? I hope in his quiet times he reflectively assesses to understand why many of us supported the governments quest to have Western trainers for the armed forces even if it all seems suspect after the Benue genocide.

 

 

NOTE,

After studying Heike Spieker’s, Civilian Immunity, I acknowledge the ambiguities and purported limitations suggestive of some articles/protocols. However I clearly recommend Protocol II for reading, which explicitly states that… civilians, i.e., all persons "affected" by a non-international conflict, "shall enjoy the general protection against the dangers arising from military operations" in the course of noninternational armed conflicts "unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities…" In the Benue Genocide, since belligerents hadn’t been defined and a declaration made by the Nigerian Armed forces or federal government as stated under International Humanitarian Law and an article of the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, which by symbol badge or emblem defines even in a belligerent context a combatant the reprisal killings in the village amounts to a Crime against Humanity and Genocide.

 

I also do note further under Protocol II that addressed exclusively are noninternational-armed conflict, as there are no explicit distinction between civilians and combatants, and neither are combatants mentioned…The protocol distinctly prohibits making civilians object of attack or the undertaking acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which being to spread terror among the civilian population.

The principle of distinction is a technical term in the laws of armed conflict intended to protect civilian persons and objects. Under this principle, parties to an armed conflict must always distinguish between civilians and civilian objects on the one hand, and combatants and military targets on the other.

The meaning of the term was spelled out in Additional Protocol I of 1977. While a number of States have not ratified Protocol I, the obligation to uphold the principle of distinction is also valid as customary law.

The civilian population enjoys immunity insofar as it shall "enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations" and "shall not be the object of attack." The Protocol prohibits actions whose primary purpose is to spread terror among the civilian population… WEB, January 9th 2002

 

Citations & References:

War & Law, since 1945, Geoffrey Best, Claredon press Oxford

Fear itself: Hazards of massive Retaliation" by Neta C. Crawford
Commonwealth Institute, 14 September 2001

"What justifies Military intervention?" Charles Knight 2001

Humanitarian Intervention and just war, Mona Fixal and Dan Smith. Merson International Studies Review, # 42(1998)

Interventionism Reconsidered: Reconciling Military Action with Political Stability, Lutz Unterseher, Commonwealth Institute Project on Defense Alternative Guest publication September 1999

Geneva conventions of August 12, 1949

The Precarious Triumph of Humanitarian Rights, David Reiff, New York Times, August 1999

Civilian Immunity, Heike Spieker (Ref Crimes of War, http://www.crimesofwar.org/book.html )

Crimes of War, http://www.crimesofwar.org/book.html 

The New Peacekeeping Partnership, Edited by Alex Morrison, The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Center

Humanitarian Peacekeeping: Ethical Considerations, Stephan collect, page 159, The New Peacekeeping Partnership, Edited by Alex Morrison, The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Center

The Role of Police Forces in International Peacekeeping, Herman Beaulac, page 94, The New Peacekeeping Partnership, Edited by Alex Morrison, The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Center

The Changing Nature of Civil-Military Operations in Peacekeeping, Andrew Bair, page 64, The New Peacekeeping Partnership, Edited by Alex Morrison, The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Center

Willful Killing, Peter Maass, Crimes of War, http://www.crimesofwar.org/book.html 

Wanton Destruction, Jeremy Bowen, Crimes of War, http://www.crimesofwar.org/book.html 

January 2002