GENERALS ARE COMING: SHOULD THEY BE WELCOME? WHY NOT? Conclusions (5)

by

Professor Omo Omoruyi

Research Fellow, African Studies Center, Boston University

General Williams human rights/political efficacy argument in Part (4) is in sharp contrast with President Obasanjo’s ‘height of insensitivity’ argument (Part 2) and it compares favorably with the second condition for the evaluation of the retired military officers in politics set by General Ogbeha (Part 3).

While General Obasanjo does not even tell Nigerians how candidates for election should be judged, General Ogbeha’s view is that Nigerians should judge the retired military officers as to their favorability rating by the Nigerian voters. In General Williams’ position, the civilian politicians seem to have lost faith in themselves and seem to have lost the respectability of the Nigerian voters. Therefore, they are likely to score low in favorability rating compared with the retired military officers not because the retired officers are so but because the politicians with no military background have no confidence in themselves.

This is a very serious development, which Nigerians do not seem to be addressing and instead they are focusing on dividing Nigerians into two groups. No one seems to be addressing the crisis in the political class, which in General Williams’ view is attributable to the failure of the Civil Society organizations charged with the political empowerment of our people. This is a very disturbing development.

There are obvious questions that one would have to wrestle with, if we are to understand this issue within the phenomenon, ‘Generals are Coming’. What should be our attitude towards Generals in politics after retirement?

There is no basis for outright rejection of Generals this or Admiral that or Air Marshall that, who are Nigerians when Alhaji this Professor that or Chief this, Nigerians without a military background are in the forefront campaigning for retired military officers.

The first question has to do with how, when and why did the Nigerian politician with no military background lose his reputation to the Nigerian politician with a military background? It will take many pages to deal with this question.

Some will simply put the cause as money. The argument goes like this. The military amassed so much money since 1970 and could launch themselves into political life with ease. The same argument is used to link all civilians with wealth with the military. Some even say that wealthy Nigerians who want to venture into politics are creation of the military or are front men of the military. The issue here is that there is no Nigerian civilian rich man, who has enough money to spend in pursuing political ambition, who cannot claim their association one way or the other with the military.

Others would argue that because of many years out of politics under the ‘military in politics’, it would take the politicians with no military background time to acquire the confidence to compete with their former military benefactors.

Others would say that the many years of the subordination of the civilian political class to the military for too long might have made the politician with no military background unsure of himself when a retired military officer declares his interest in one office or the other.

What all these amount to in simple.

The civilian politicians have little or no faith in themselves. They cannot challenge the retired military officers,who want to seek political office.

The second question has to do with how, when, and why did the international community decide that the politicians with no military background are not worth fighting for. These questions have been dealt with in my earlier essays and I would not like to repeat myself all over again. The summary of that argument is that the international community and the retired military officers saw the politicians with no military background as part of the anti-democratic past of Nigeria.

It is part of the history of the crisis of democratization in Nigeria that the so-called civilian politicians sold the mandate of the June 12 in 1993 to the military. Those who sold the June 12 are key political players promoting the retired Generals today to the voters of their communities.

It is also part of the history of the crisis that the civilian politicians collaborated with the military junta to sustain the annulment of the June 12 between 1993 till the death of the military leader, General Sani Abacha in June 1998.

It is part of the history of the crisis that the same civilian politicians were in the forefront in the self-succession project of General Abacha in 1998. The same civilian politicians are in the National Assembly today as ‘democrats’.

The foregoing explains why the masses of Nigeria have no confidence in the politicians who betrayed them in the past. This also explains why the international community and the retired military officers take them as part of the problems of the Nigerian society.

This further explains the ease with which the international community and the retired military officers from the north decided to invite a retired military officer, (General Olusegun Obasanjo) to succeed the military junta in 1998. For those who have wondering as to why they did that, should understand the dilemma facing the military junta at this juncture. Here was a retired military officer with NO political base of his own, with no affinity to a political party and with no faith in the political class being entrusted with the onerous task of midwiving the democracy in Nigeria! This was a desperate move by the military junta because of the failure of the civilian political class.

The history of the emergence of General Obasanjo and his journey from Abacha’s Gulag to the Presidential Villa still needs to be told. This is not the place to do that. What was done with the emergence of Chief Obasanjo in 1999 cannot be repeated. Could another set of retired military officers form another coalition and bring about the emergence of another retired General? Is this what the civilian political class want to change? This is the crisis facing Nigeria.

Why did the civilian political class feel that General Obasanjo could deal with politicians and succeed the military junta after the death of General Sani Abacha in June 1998? Now that it is obvious that he is failing, as the Nigerian print media concluded after the first half of his administration, Nigeria is faced with a major crisis of succession. Who is to succeed him is the million-dollar question, called the Politics of 2003. This is what the Minister of information, Professor Jerry Gana should be addressing and instead he started to lambaste the editors who called President Obasanjo journey so far as a disaster.

Professor Gana should appreciate one fact about a four-year term of office. If the President’s vision is not manifest by the end of the second year, he could as well forget making further promises or telling Nigerians that he would do winders in a nomination year, which is the third ear. Certainly the fourth year is an election year. He would have to reap what he sowed. I hope the Minister understands the dynamics of a four-year term of office. Maybe that is why the frenzy about an extension! An extension does not resolve the crisis of succession; it only postpones it. Nigeria should face it now.

I supplied the way to approach this question in my earlier essay titled, ‘After Obasanjo: Who/What’? This essay was published in the www.Nigerdeltacongress.Com . The essay is still available on the web. I am happy this essay was recently published by the Vanguard, May 11, 2001. This, in my view is the road map to discover who would succeed President Obasanjo.

One, we should approach the ‘Generals are Coming from the point of view that the military is all-pervasive in Nigeria. Hence any attempt to divide Nigerians into two camps, one for the politicians with a military background and the other for the politicians with no military background is futile. If this is what some that have no sense of history of how the military came into the Nigerian political life want to pursue, that would lead the country into further disaster. They tend to minimize how pervasive the military has been in Nigerian life since 1966. They want to push the retired military officers out by merely say so; I am afraid it would not work because the retired military officers are everywhere in the country as our brothers cousins, friends and fellow citizens.

Two, we should stop the artificial distinction between the civilian politicians and the military politicians because once a military officer retires from the military, he should be part and parcel of the civilian sector of society. That distinction is not made in business where many retired officers in boards of major businesses.

Three, we should advise the retired military officers that they should not herd together like cattle. They do not do this in business and in politics, which is more social than in business they should fee themselves of their fellow retired military colleagues and work with those Nigerians with no military background. They should imitate the Israeli or the US retired military officers who easily integrate into the wider society as civilians. If they are not careful, the civilian would await them to be ‘eaten up’ as cow meat.

Four, they should learn from the origin of the Yar’Adua political machine. I still recall how General Yar’Adua was able to build a national political organization without the support of his fellow retired military officers. This is the advise one would like to give to those former military administrators that served General Abacha who are herding together like cattle and moving into the new political association, the National Frontiers. One wonders why they should decide to move together into the National Frontiers. This also applies to those retired military officers who served General Babangida who are also herding together under the platform of the National Solidarity Association. Going through the names of the retired officers in the National Frontiers and the National Solidarity Association, one wonders what they are likely to tell voters in their various communities why they are getting involved in politics? How are they going to relate their past with the present and the future of these communities? Some of them are alien to their various communities.

Five, the retired military officers should make their views known on the critical issues afflicting the country. They need to make their views known, which would form the basis of Nigerians considering them as an alternative to President Obasanjo. Again they should go back to the list of issues in my essay, ‘After Obasanjo; Who/what?’

Six, the retired military officers should imitate General Yar’Adua in another way. The lesson from General Yar’Adua was that he was able to articulate a progressive platform extending beyond the north. He was contender for an alternative vision to the Caliphate in the north and won a majority of the supporters. He rejected the northern conservative platform, which was championed first by the Northern Elders Forum and later by the Turaki Committee. I am sure he would have refused to ally with the Arewa Consultative Forum if he were alive today and he would have pushed for the depoliticization of religion because it is counter-productive and divisive.

Seven, there should be nothing like a civilian and a military politician. Retired military officers should shed themselves of the military titles before they go to the Nigerian people for a mandate. Nigerians are skeptical of substituting one General for another General. Retired officers should help by shedding themselves of the military titles. Have we not seen the US practice of retired military officers in the US not addressing themselves as retired this or that in public events? They are everywhere. They do not parade their titles in politics, in business and in non-elective offices even though many of them are retired officers in the US Senate, Congress, Departments, etc. Maybe this is why General Ike Nwachukwu wants to be called Senator Ike Nwachukwu and General Obasanjo wants to be called Chief Obasanjo.

Eight, we should make the voters the deciding factor and they should be accorded the position of the king in the resolution of who should govern in Nigeria.

In furtherance of the above, we should deal with two issues.

One is how to empower the civilian politician. How do we make the politician with no military background feel that he can be President? This is where the civil society organizations are failing the Nigerian people, argued General Williams.

Second is how to guarantee that the election is not only free and fair but that it must be seen to be credibly so. This is where the factor of money and the use of internal and international instruments of credibility can be dealt with.

I hope readers would not been asking me how would these two things be done. I do not want to dwell on these two issues in this essay. They are technical and I may not want to give the details of how to deal with them in an essay of this nature.

If the members of the Nigerian political class with a military or with no military background recognize these issues as a problem, maybe one can deal with them on a solicited and on an advisory basis. Certainly not in an essay of this nature!

I hope contributors to the debate would direct their advice to the Nigerian people and not to me. They are the ones who are involved in the process of deciding on the question, After Obasanjo; Who/what? They are the ones faced with the Generals everyday in Nigeria; they are the ones who are in search of what to do. How they should confront the issue should be the contributions of Nigerians to this issue. We should approach the matter as a practical political problem facing our people in Nigeria. Those who are in touch with our people are constantly facing questions about one General or the other. At least I do and the advice to those who call me is that they should ask these Generals and others their vision for Nigeria from the issues afflicting their community.

I decided to analyze the views of three Generals in order to demonstrate that Nigerians with military background are articulating their views while Nigerians with no military background are slow to respond to the issue. I have not read a reasoned opinion by politicians with no military background on the matter. Yet it is an issue that Nigerians all over the country are facing everyday.

This is a subject, in days gone by which would have been a THEME of an annual conference of the Nigerian Political Science Association. It still can be. Maybe it could be sponsored by the current administration instead of hiding under the negative position of the height of insensitivity argument. The phenomenon is real and critical to the survival of democracy in Nigeria.

My personal position has been made clear from the reading of my comments on the contributions of the positions of the three Generals. We, as individuals cannot legally stop any Nigerian from seeking any elective office. But we can politically decide on how we shall use our votes. This was denied Nigerians in the past including the implementation of the transition program under General Abdulsalami Abubakar.

As I have argued elsewhere, Nigerians were made to work from the answer. The military junta had the answer; it crafted a transition program, which was implemented to achieve that answer. If General Obasanjo wants a new term in 2003, he would have to allow his vision to be tested along with other visions for our country. Simple! This is democracy. This series was prompted by the question, ‘After Obasanjo, Who/What? To aid in the resolution of this question, I devised bases for answering this question in an essay with the same title.

2001