In the Event of Nigeria-Cameroon War
By
Cameroon's Special Duties Minister. Professor Ngole Ngole. was reported in ThisDay to have said in an interview on the BBC, last week Wednesday
20th February. that "even our Nigerian brothers know that Bakassi has always remained part of Cameroonian territory. What has been going on since their invasion
of that piece of Cameroonian territory amounts to nothing but adventurism and we hope that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) will put an end to it so
that the two countries will continue to enjoy cordial and neighbourly relations." Can the ICJ really put an end to the border dispute? Has there been any
cordial relationship since the 1961 UN plebiscite?
According to the same reports. Professor Ngole, in response to a question on whether Cameroon would be able to go to war with Nigeria. also declared: "as far as
we know, we are serious. We have the might and we have the w ill and the 16 million of Cameroon are behind the Government to defend the territorial integrity of
our country. Therefore it is not a joking matter."
This statement is normal. One cannot expect any Minister worth his salt to go into the open to say that his country is afraid to do a battle with another
country. However, Cameroon does not have the territorial size. demography, resources etc, of Nigeria. Even if all the inhabitants of Nigeria may not support
going to war with Cameroon at any given point in time, the truth remains that more than 16 million of them have always believed that Cameroon has always been a
bad neighbour. The 1981 killing of five Nigerian naval patrol officers by Cameroonian gendarmes is a good reminder here. More than 16 million Nigerians urged
the Government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari to reciprocate the killing of the Nigerian naval officers and even to go to war. President Shagari refused to be
prevailed upon but simply compelled Cameroon to apologise and pay compensation to the bereaved families. Thus, if Cameroon is dreaming, she must also learn to
see more clearly at the same time. Reason: in the event of any Nigeria-Cameroon war. Cameroon will suffer more than Nigeria will do and for many obvious
reasons.
First, contrary to the reports that fighting between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi "first flared in 1994", the truth is that the year 1994 was the first
time Nigeria decided to respond militarily to Cameroonian military incursions. Before then, there was no fighting, hence, we should not be talking about the
flaring up of the conflict. What obtained before 1994 was that Cameroonian gendarmes frequently invaded Nigerian villages and always ran back only to apologise
thereafter. So when Nigerians decided to meet force with force, Cameroon, which had refused until then to accept international arbitration of the dispute, ran
to The Hague to seek the intervention of the ICJ. Since then, military hostilities have been temporarily put at bay. The implication is that Cameroonian
authorities are not in the good position to assess the strength and good will of their 16 million people in relation to that of more than 100 million people of
Nigeria.
Second. the strength and will of the people of Cameroon might have been informed by some expected help from the Francophone world. especially, France. This
situation may not be dismissed with a stroke of the pen, as France has a special military understanding with Cameroon. However, the likelihood of France's
preparedness to go to war with Nigeria because of Cameroon is very remote. Rather than invoke the Franco-Cameroonian defense pact, France encouraged Cameroon to
go to court in 1994. France has important investments in both Cameroon and Nigeria. In fact. Nigeria plays host to more French investments than any Francophone
country in Africa. French investments in the whole of Francophone West Africa are not up to French investments in Nigeria. For France to accept a war between
Cameroon and Nigeria is also to accept the destruction of her investments in both countries. It is also accepting the polarisation of Francophone Africa. While
some of them will support France and Cameroon, some of them will also be compelled to stay by the side of Nigeria for geo-political reasons. It will be
difficult for Niger Republic to support Cameroon against Nigeria as a landlocked country which has been importing its foreign goods through Nigeria. Even though
Benin Republic has generally voted against Nigeria's position at the United Nations, she has also generally shared the same position with Nigeria at the West
African level for reasons of their contiguity and special border communities. This division of the African Francophones cannot be in the interest of France. At
a time the French are trying tooth and nail to make more Nigerians speak their language, the likelihood of the French accepting any disruption of the gradual
Frenchification of Nigeria is very remote.
Third, Cameroon is currently a house very divide against itself and the likelihood of the division remaining so for a long time to come is high. Cameroon is a
bilingual country: Francophone and Anglophone Cameroon. The Anglophones living along the international frontiers with Nigeria, have been complaining of
discriminatory policies and marginalisation, and therefore have been pressing for autonomy. In the event of any war between Cameroon and Nigeria, an opportunity
for physical separation of the English- speaking Cameroonians from the Francophones will be provided. An opportunity will also be directly given to Nigeria to
actively support them. Until now, the Nigerian government has been hostile to the re-definition of international frontiers of African countries. With a war, the
Anglophone Cameroonians will find in Nigeria a natural ally. In other words, the good will and strength of the 16 million people of Cameroon will be, at best,
very relative.
Fourth, Cameroon seems to be sitting on an imaginary chair by running away from the truth or by sticking to her own version of the truth. In the words of
Professor Ngole, "Cameroon trusts the ICJ and sees the process going on right now as natural and we are hopeful and confident that the proceedings at the ICJ
will favour Cameroon..." because the Bakassi has been an "integral part of Cameroon since colonial time." If we define colonial time to mean any time before the
independence of Cameroon in 1960, the Special Duties Minister's statement may be admitted as a valid hypothesis for verification. In this regard and for
scholarship purposes, as from when should this colonial time' be dated to? From simple logic, the Bakassi Peninsula could not have ab initio, belonged to and be
an integral part of Cameroon. If, indeed it was, how do we explain the fact that Cameroon is arguing that Nigeria's Gowon did cede, in an agreement, the
peninsula to Cameroon? Why should Nigeria cede a territory that allegedly belonged to Cameroon to her again? The problem therefore is not about who has
sovereignty on the peninsula but on the validity of the agreement in which there is cession of the territory. For as long as the validity of the agreement is in
question, Cameroon cannot reasonably lay claim to the peninsula. In fact, it is the ceding country. Nigeria, that can continue to lay legitimate claim to the
peninsula pending the final determination of the case by the ICJ.
Based on this point, one may ask the logic of Professor Ngole's point when he said he was pretty sure that the ICJ would rule in favour of Cameroon. It is a
wel1 known fact in international law that a non-ratified accord cannot produce any effect. It is also a legal truism that a bilateral agreement cannot create
any obligation for both parties until the exchange of instruments of ratification are duly received by both parties. There is also no disputing of the fact
that, in the light of the principle of 'dol'. any signatory to an international document could have been induced into error, and therefore a duly signed
agreement can always be denounced the moment any 'fundamental error' that might have informed the signing the agreement is discovered. The implication of
Professor Ngole's submission is that, if, for whatever reason, the ICJ does not rule in favour of Cameroon, there will be renewed violence.
Fifth, and more importantly, the resolution of the dispute over the Bakassi does not lie with the Cameroonians or even with the Nigerian government per se. The
resolution of the dispute depends largely on the inhabitants of the peninsula. Cameroon is relying on the June 1, 1975 Maroua Declaration, as well as on the
1913 Anglo-German treaty which put the Bakassi as part of the Cameroonian territory. Whether or not these agreements were ever in force, the Bakassi is
essentially populated by Nigerians who do not want to be part of Cameroon. Neither the Nigerian government nor the Cameroonian authorities can compel them to be
part of any territorial grouping they are not interested in joining. Cameroon has tried to take taxes from the inhabitants of the peninsula, all in an attempt
to argue the case of effective occupation of the peninsula, but all to no avail. The inhabitants have always resisted Cameroonian stick and carrot policies. As
a result, any ICJ ruling is not likely to change the situation. It will be absurd to ask the inhabitants to leave their land so that the land can belong to
Cameroon. Besides, it is only an irresponsible government that will not come to the aid of the inhabitants if they say they are Nigerians and do not want to
leave their land. In other words, the government of Nigeria cannot but respond to the call for protection. The problem, therefore, has little legal importance.
It is very political and the solution must be found at the political table.
Above all, the strength and will of the Cameroonians ought to be located at the altar of African unity and integration. To what extent does the strength and
will promote intra-African unity and integration? I and a Cameroonian classmate, Erik and another Malian friend, Moulaye Zeini, engaged in the discussion of
problems of African unity in 1979 at the Sorbonne. We noted that most of Africa's problems were traceable to African leaders. Today, there is nothing to suggest
that there has been a change in situation. Cameroon runs to France whenever she has problems with Nigeria. For how long will this continue? As ordinary person,
I do not have any problem relating with any Francophone but when discussions become governmental, there is a problem. Africans must therefore warn Cameroon to
stop thinking of any war, as the costs may be beyond her imagination. The ICJ begin the hearing of the case as from mid-March but the hearing has the potential
of only compounding the problem and therefore amounting to nought in the long run.
March 2002