JIHAD: Revolutionary Islam and Nigerian Democracy

By 

Sanusi L. Sanusi

In the name of Allah, Most Gracious. Most Merciful

A. Political Islam: Religion or Politics?

It is with some trepidation that I stand before this gathering to deliver a paper on Islamic political theory which is likely to generate a great deal of controversy in activist circles. It has come to be a widely-accepted reality that religion and politics are inseparable. Even western capitalist countries have come to recognise that separation of the State from the Church is not exactly the same as separating the State from religion. In the domain of Islam, there has never been a "Church" in the sense of an organized ecclesiastical order of Ulema or "men of religion" (with the possible exception, as we shall see, of Shiism) and the question therefore never arose. However, the nature of Islam as a religion with something to say on all aspects of human life from personal piety and worship (Ibadat) to interpersonal relations and contracts (Muamalat) to crimes (Jinayat), punishment (Uqubat) and political Administration (Al-siyasah al-shar’iyyah) etc, makes it inextricably linked to what is commonly understood as politics.

This reality is the precise source of my trepidation. Where does Islam cease to be a religion and become politics? Or rather, how does one analyse the political dimension of Islam as separate from its purely religious dimension? As we read the works of Jurists and political scholars/activists like Mawardi, Ibn Taymiya, Khomeini, Qutb, Mawdudi, Afghani, Abduh, Turabi etc, how do we separate the Words of Allah and His Prophet (S. A. W.) from the interpretation and interpolation of human beings, each influenced by his academic background, his personal experiences, his basic nature and inclinations and the peculiar historical, social and political environment which impacts upon him in one way or another? This question needs to be addressed.

I begin from the premise that in its various intellectual forms and practical expressions, Islam, once taken out of its purely religious sphere of Ibadat and Muamalat, means (or can mean) different things to different people; that when we deal with literature on Islam in its political sphere we are dealing with a political theory propounded by individuals each of whom seeks the interpretation of politics in the light of the content of revelation, as he sees it. Consequently, I should be the first to resist any charge that the theory which I may accept or propound, or the strategy which I propose, is any the less Islamic because it is not in conformity with the interpretation of one respected jurist, or another.

This of course is consistent with the academic orientation of Universities like yours. It is also consistent with progressive attitudes of Ijtihad or independent analytical reasoning. Unfortunately, it is not consistent with the mind-set that has become typical of the Muslim Ummah, a community which seems more inclined towards accepting without question, following without understanding and attacking without reason. Two years ago, in the Sudan, a Nigerian Muslim brother accused me of being "Salman Rushdie II" for suggesting that several freedoms enshrined in the American Constitution were exactly what we find in the Quran. My crime was that I was " comparing the word of God to some document written by infidels in America two centuries ago". It was a frightening experience but, not being one to shy away from controversy, I am risking it again by continuing my efforts to articulate a philosophy for the Nigerian Muslim which factors in, but does not necessarily accept, the prescriptions of received Islamic political theory.

B. Political Islam: Piety or Power?

A second dimension to the complex relationship between Islam and politics is the distinction between Political Islam as a moral force and political Islam as a social and political movement capable of gaining and retaining power. In an ideal situation, this dichotomy would not exist. The ideal Islamic State is run by men of virtue and piety, who combine political power and a high sense of morality, justice and compassion. This is the ideal, like Plato’s republic where the wise philosopher is king. The reality is that history has only seen glimpses of this ideal in the likes of Umar b. Abdul Azeez, the Umayyad Caliph. For the greater part of history, the most pious of men have been out of the political sphere. This has been sometimes a result of their having been forcefully excluded, at other times because they voluntarily withdrew and at still other times because the most religious of people are not necessarily the most astute of politicians.

Throughout the history of Islam (and, indeed, other religions) pious men have been a moral force in politics. Abu Dharr al-Ghifari stood resolutely against what he saw as abuse of power and material display of opulence in the days of the third Caliph Uthman ibn Affan. He stood first against Muawiyah in Syria and later against the Caliph himself until the latter banished him from Madina. Abu Dharr is considered the first socialist produced by Islam. Abdullah b. Zubayr - resisted Muawiyah’s conversion of the caliphate into a dynasty and openly resisted the decree proclaiming Yazid successor to Muawiya and continued his rebellion until he was killed in the Kaabah by the forces of Hajjaj b. Yusuf. Such names as ibn Mussayyib, ibn Jubayr, Al-Qadi Abu Yusuf, ibn Taymiya etc continue to reverberate in the list of religious men who had little political power but remained a moral force in the politics of their lifetime – not only preaching piety and justice but condemning dictatorship and autocracy. In the early Christian Church, the role played by St Ambrose in AD 390 when he condemned the massacre of civilians by Roman soldiers on the orders of the Emperor Theodosius is a Christian parallel on the moral role of religion in politics.

On the other hand, history is replete with attempts by religious persons to actually take over political power and govern society according to their interpretation of Divine Law. The Papacy, while remaining theoretically a spiritual office, for centuries had effective control over the temporal emperors, kings and princes of the Roman Empire. Various revolutionary movements such as the Wahhabiyya in Saudi Arabia, the Sanusiyya in Northern Africa, the Mahdiyya of the Sudan, the jihads of Dan Fodio, El-Kanemi, Sheikh Amadou and El-Hajj Omar in West Africa as well as the Islamic Revolutions in contemporary Iran and Sudan fall into this category.

Thus, Islam as a political force through the ages has sometimes taken the form of a moral force, seeking change through preaching (Da’wah) and at other times a revolutionary force seeking political power for the purpose of establishing God’s rule on earth. The various Islamic movements that have sprung up in most parts of the Muslim world today and with which we are concerned are of this second category. In Nigeria, a number of groups have declared their commitment to an "Islamic State" but there is, sadly, little or nothing in terms of intellectual/theoretical writings that can serve as a guide to the analyst. Indeed, the paucity of intellectual discourse is the bane of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria which seems to have a vanguard made of persons who have memorised slogans and believe that is sufficient for political change. When one reviews the amount of literature produced by Iranian Intellectuals before the revolution, the works of the Muslim Brotherhood and other movements in Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Algeria and Saudi Arabia, the Jamaat in India and Pakistan and even the vast literature of Uthman Dan Fodio and his disciples, one can not help but wonder if we have a serious movement in Nigeria. It is like an army without officers. The probability of success of a movement without intellectuals is exactly that of an army going to war under the leadership of corporals. No offence intended, but it is the bitter truth.

II Revolutionary Islam: Intellectual Sources and Variety of Form

It remains an open question whether all, or even most, of what has been written of a political nature by Muslim Jurists and scholars qualifies as political theory. A lot of the literature, particularly in Sunni Islam, has been devoted to the legitimization of the status quo and enjoining Muslims to "listen and obey" their ruler, who is Allah’s vice-regent on earth. Where people come under the brutal rulership of tyrants, there is always the Hadith showing that it is a punishment for their lack of fear of God and, if they change their ways, God will soften the heart of the leader. There are also several Traditions which enjoin Muslims to pray for their leaders that God may change them rather than curse them.

Thus a large part of what goes for political theory in traditional Sunni Islam is a justification of the status quo. There is also significant literature that is really "Public Administration" such as the Ahkam al Sultaniyya of Mawardi or Al-siyasah al-shar’iyyah and Al – Hisbah fil – Islam of ibn Taymiya. We may include in this category also dhiya ul-hukkam of Abdullahi ibn Fodio and Usul al-Siyasah of Sultan Mohammed Bello ibn Uthman.

The attitude of the scholar often depends on the time in which he lives and the circumstance in which he finds himself. Ibn Taymiya sounds rather more radical and revolutionary in his fatawa than he does in Al-Siyasah. He lived at a time when the Abbasid Empire was collapsing, falling under the rule of Mongols, threatened from the East by Tatars, from the West by Christian crusaders. Even Sheikh Uthman b. Fodio sounds more moderate in such works as Najm al-lkhwani which were written after he came to power than in pre-jihad works such as his magnum opus, Bayan Wujub al-Hijra.

Most of Islamic Revolutionary theory has come from elements, as it were, in the opposition. Perhaps the earliest roots of what we find as the common strands in political Islam go back to the concept of Hakimiyya, which is largely associated with the Kharijites, a puritanical sect which emerged from the earliest days of Islam, specifically during the battle of Siffin between the fourth Caliph, Ali ibn Abi Talib and the then rebel forces of Muawiyah b. Abi Sufyan, governor of Syria. I will not delve into the long history and the specifics of this incident. It is too well documented.

However, it is seems that when the battle got intense and it seemed clear neither side could win, both Ali and Muawiya decided to each appoint a wise judge (Hakam) who will represent him in a peace – talk. Both parties undertook to subject themselves to the judgement of the two Hakams. Ali appointed Abu Musa al-Ash’ari while Ma’awiya appointed Abdullah bin Amr bin’As. The latter was reportedly able to trick the former into believing that the solution was to remove both Ali and Muawiya and to unify the Ummah under the leadership of a different person altogether. Abu Musa announced the removal of Ali to the congregation but Abdullah, when he mounted the podium, reneged and affirmed his loyalty to Muawiya, a situation which led to the collapse of the truce.

The Kharijites constituted a large part of the army of Ali. They were tribes who felt marginalised and dispossessed under the leadership of the third Caliph Uthman, a cousin of Mu’awiya’s. The radicalism of the Kharijites reflected not just in their puritan theology but in their politics. They felt betrayed by Ali, whom they had supported after the assassination of Uthman by rebel groups of whom they were an integral part. They had stood by him in the "Battle of the Camel" against Aisha, Talha and Zubayr, and then against Mu’awiya at Siffin. They felt betrayed that he was willing to give in to human law, when he was the duly appointed Caliph with the God-given duty of subduing all rebels and holding on to his mandate. They declared both Ali and Muawiya apostates for accepting a law (hukm) that was not God’s. Their slogan became La hukma illa lillah (No law except Allah’s). Politically, the Kharijites were more democratic than both the Sunnis and the Shii’s. Unlike Sunnis of the time who argued that the Imamah (leadership) of the community was vested in the prophet’s tribe, the Quraysh, or the Shii’s who believed it was vested in members of his household, (Ahl-al-bayt), the kharijites saw no difference between Muslims on the basis of race, colour or tribe. Using the Qur’an and the Sunnah, they rejected the supremacy of Arabs or white skins over other tribes and races, and made the "fear of God" the only basis for accepting superiority. The Kharijites killed Ali, but failed in their attempt to assassinate Muawiyah. Their departure from Ali’s camp weakened his army and led to defeat.

Their slogan, La hukma illa lillah is the origin of the concept of Hakimiyyah (from the word hukm, Arabic for law) a rejection of all law (and later, all government) that is not Allah’s. Although both Shii’s and Sunnis consider the kharijites a heterodox sect prone to extreme puritanism, the guiding ideologies of contemporary Islamic movements have traces of hakimiyya. The Islamic Revolution is, in a sense always an attempt to uproot a "Godless" government and instal an "Islamic" one. But what is an Islamic Government and what is an Islamic Revolution? I will try to present below several positions and illustrate that Revolutionary Islam has many faces or facets, and means different things to different people. I will defer discussion of critiques of the concept of Hakimiyya to the section dealing with Jahiliyya.

Broadly Speaking, I would say there are three important building blocks for revolutionary praxis. The first, on a philosophical plane, is an ideal: in this case an Islamic Society, perfectly patterned on the will of Allah as expressed in the Quran and Sunnah. As Socrates would say, the right insight leads to the right action.

The second is a theoretical/ideological framework reflecting the marriage of that ideal with reality. Precisely what should an Islamic State look like? what are its defining characteristics? This is the sphere of political theory. To be realistic, theory must recognize that the perfect society is a Utopia, an El-Dorado, an idea. To be a Platonist, it exists because it can be imagined, even if it has never been attained since the Prophet’s death. At what point in Islamic History did the ideal state exist? Many are quick to point to the "golden age" as the era of the four rightly – guided Caliphs (Al-Khulafa Al – Rashidun). Yet although as a community and as leaders they may be the best (indeed we believe they are) we can hardly forget that three of these Caliphs were definitely assassinated, that the community was embroiled in successive leadership crises, that the tenor of the third caliph ended in a rebellion, that of the fourth started and ended in a war with all the implications and consequences thereof. It would be difficult to defend this as the ideal model for all generations of Muslims.

The point here is that a theory can not be a description of a historical state which may or may not have existed in the form described. The politics of the early state represent a historically-specific development which can not be transposed from their time-space dimension. A theory, to be meaningful has to be a concrete formulation of the Utopia, such that it is clearly worth aspiring to and probably achievable or approachable by means of articulate strategies and tactics.

The final building block is a strategy aimed at moving the society towards the ideal, as defined by the theoretical framework. In what follows I will first review, to the best of my ability, understanding and recollection, the essential formulations of political theorists of Revolutionary Islam and then zero in on the target problematic, which is the Nigerian State and the process of Islamisation.

The major contemporary sources of ideology for the Nigerian Muslim Youth are the works of Iranian scholars and of various arms of the Muslim Brotherhood. The former are Shiite while the latter are Sunni. Various groups in Nigeria have been influenced by either sect in their theology, politics and Jurisprudence. I shall as much as possible avoid the theological and sectarian questions in this paper and emphasize political theory where , in several cases, we find common positions taken by scholars across the sectarian divide. I shall try to indicate which of the theories I feel is most appropriate to Nigeria and justify my selection.

The Islamic Government in Iran which came to power after it won the upper hand in a bitter struggle between various subsystems which constituted the popular rejection of the deposed Shah, is conducted on the basis of a unique theoretical formulation, largely attributable to Ruhollah Khomeini, the concept of the "Wilayat al-faqih". (Guardianship of the Juris Consult)

Iran, of course, is Shii and Khomeini’s theory remains a basically Shii innovation. It is to be recalled that the essential difference between Shii and Sunni political doctrines lies in what constitutes legitimate Imamah (leadership/government). While Sunni political scholarship crystallized at the recognition of the right of the community to accept a leader selected by the council (Ahl-al-hall wall ‘aqd), Shii scholarship had always maintained that the only legitimate government is that headed by the Imam, divinely decreed to be from the household of the Prophet and specifically Ali and his direct descendants. On this, all the Shii sets are in agreement, in spite of differences in the number and identity of divinely decreed Imams between the Imamiyya or Ja’fariyya (the twelvers), the Isma’iliyya (the seveners) and the Zaidiyya.

The fundamentalist Shii sub-sects known as rejectionists (Rawafidh) reject the legitimacy of the government of the first three Caliphs and go as far as making this rejection an article of faith. The twelvers, among whom are Iranians, largely hold this view as is clear from some of Khomeini’s writings, particularly Kashf-al-Asrar. What concern us here are not the theological implications of this doctrine but its political ones. Traditional Shii political thought is based on rejection of all authority other than that of the Imams. But after the "disappearance" or "hiding" (ghaiba)of the twelfth Imam, who is still awaited (The Mahdi al-muntazar) Shii politics now fell into a quandary. In the absence of the Imam, is any government legitimate? If it is not then an Islamic Revolution is meaningless at least until the Imam emerges. This, more or less, became the dominant theme in Iran and the Shii states during long periods of political passivism and as a consequence Persian Shiites lacked a State for centuries.

Khomeini’s revolutionary theory lay in his arguing for the legitimacy of an Islamic Government led by a faqih (Juris-consult) who is to be "partly appointed by God and partly selected by the Ulema". This theory effectively provided legitimacy to a successful revolutionary government such as was formed in Iran after the fall of the Shah, although it represented, for Shiism, a Volte-face or if you like intellectual suicide, since it effectively returned Shii political thought to the same plane as Sunni orthodoxy, and confers legitimacy to governments selected by human beings. Khomeini posits that the legitimacy is contingent, or interim, in the interregnum of the hiding of the Imam and the Faqih will in the meantime act only as the Imam’s representative and claim the rights and privileges due the Imam in the latter’s absence.

Already, the seeds of absolute power are planted in this theory. This was later strengthened by the writings and theories of Khomeini’s protégé, Ayatollah Murtadha Mutahhari. Mutahhari as an ideologue, was concerned both with a need for a revolutionary theory to justify rebellion against the Shah’s unIslamic regime and in-built checks to neutralize the growing influence of socialist thinkers, whose revolution against the Shah would be not just to have Shari'ah but, perhaps more importantly, to establish the rule of the oppressed and dispossessed (the Mustadh’afin). This would be a threat not just to the capitalist classes who were allies of the Ulema but to the Ulema themselves who formed a stratum in the higher echelons of society.

Mutahhari strongly emphasized the "classless" nature of Islamic Doctrine in the sense that piety and the fear of God cut across all social and political classes. Since the Islamic system does not differentiate humans except on the basis of taqwa (fear of God) radical and class-based theories were unIslamic. Motahhari adds "flesh", as it were, to Khomeini’s basic principles by arguing that the position of leadership and decision making is reserved for the clergy. He argues that only those who are thoroughly familiar with the Qur’an, Sunna, Islamic Jurisprudence and epistemology can occupy positions of leadership in the Islamic State.

The net effect of Mutahhari’s embellishments is to upgrade Khomeini’s theory of the Islamic State into one of a full-scale dictatorship of the Ulema. The state is a free state and freedom of thought and conscience are guaranteed, within the bounds of Islam as defined by the clergy. Capitalism and Private Ownership of wealth are also defended so long as such wealth is not "illegal", again as defined by the Ulema.

The theories of Khomeini and Mutahhari thus form an integral whole, providing legitimacy to a revolution that cuts across classes, united by faith in Islam and (presumably) willing to subject themselves to the rule of Islamic Scholars. After the Iranian revolution, the Ulema did in fact move to consolidate their position, crushing allies like the Mojahedin, forcing liberal elements like Bani Sadr out of the power and into exile, and marginalising others like Prime Minister Bazargan.

Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Mutahhari are both Shii and leading clerics. This background is very clear in their conception of the Islamic State. The contemporary Iranian State is the closest Islam has seen to a theoracy in its history. It is strikingly similar to the Roman Catholic State where "men of religion" are in power, as opposed to just religious men. The similarity between the two systems perhaps explains this. The Shii system has an organized hierachy of Ulema. Shii Jurisprudence, particularly with regard to Zakat and Khums gives the Ulema access to financial resources. The veneration of saints and the role given to the personal "Marji’al taqlid" (reference guide) places Shii Ulema almost in the same position as Catholic Priests. Even a number of rituals are very similar. During visits to the graves of Imam Ridha in Mashhad, and his sister Fatimeh Zahra in the Holy city of Qom, and even Khomeini’s grave outside Teheran, I was amazed by the amount of money pilgrims threw into the tombs seeking closeness to God and the intercession of the dead. It reminded me of the year of the Jubilee, instituted by Pope Boniface VIII in 1300, when plenary indulgence is granted to all Catholics who visit Rome and perform certain ceremonies while there. This brought so much money to the coffers of the Curia that the Jubilee year which was initially to be every hundred years was shortened to fifty and later twenty-five at which it remains to this day. The Iranian system certainly makes a lot of money from Shii pilgrims who pour money into the holy graves either as worship or in fulfilment of commitments to God (Nuzur). None of this is to say Shiism is Christianity or to reduce from the Islamic nature of Khomeini’s government. However the system of belief and the organization of religion make possible a government run by the clergy.

These parallels are also important to draw attention to the fallacy of the presumption that Islamic Political Thought is an island unto itself, a completely new philosophy never before contemplated, rather than an integral component of a process of World Civilization and universal human experience. Khomeini’s Islamic Republic, which vests absolute power in the infallible Juris-Consult is not different from Plato’s Republic ruled absolutely by the Philosopher-King, or even from the Catholic State run by the infallible Pope. Mutahhari’s general theory of the dictatorship of the Ulema expresses the same suspicion of the capacity of the "masses" to know what is right for them that Plato’s teacher, the "Great Master" Socrates, had expressed about the democracy of Sparta, and mirrors the latter’s preference for a dictatorship of philosophers.

The Philosopher, the Pope and the Faqih are all human beings presumed to have acquired knowledge of the ideal society who are entrusted with the responsibility of moving their people towards it by force, if necessary. The Philosopher-King is selected by other philosophers, the Faqih by the Ulema or Council of Guardians, the Pope by the council of Cardinals. The Papacy and the Wilayat al-faqih are in my view, specific expressions of a general theory.

In addition, just as the Papacy is a specifically Catholic, as opposed to Christian manifestation, so is Khomeini’s theory a specifically Shii, as opposed to Islamic manifestation of the general theory. In my view, it is as difficult to transpose this manifestation and apply it to Nigerian Society which is Sunni as it is to have a Papacy in the domain of Protestantism. It is perhaps for this reason that those groups which have adopted Khomeini’s political theory have ended up crossing the sectarian divide into Shiism with their political activity mingled with Shii evangelism. The groups are also characterized by the hierarchical structures and hero worship which we have described above as peculiarly Shii characteristics.

It is clear, therefore, that I do not subscribe to the view that the Iranian model, as exemplified by Khomeini’s view of Revolutionary Islam, is applicable to Nigeria.

Immediately after the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate, emergent Muslim States were thrown into a crisis of identity. For the first time Muslims found themselves without a leader and the community became defined by geographical area or tribe rather than common faith. The defeat of the Caliphate led to an inferiority complex and new leaders vigorously pursued a path of copying the West, adopting industrialization and modernization as the keys to progress and development. Kemal Ataturk in Turkey, Reza Shah in Iran and Gamal Abdul Nasser in Egypt all in one way or another, pursued this path. In Turkey and Iran, in particular, the process of secularization or, rather, de-Islamisation, went to extremes. Leaders seemed to actually believe that western culture and values, in addition to science and technology, were an integral part of the requisites for progress. Men would somehow think better if they wore European hats and shaved their beards. Women would be more enlightened and progressive by simply abandoning the veil and wearing mini skirts without scarves on their heads.

The utter failure of these various attempts, and the inevitable confrontations between the State and traditional religious values, led to the revival of Islamist tendencies and a definition of Islamic Society all the more clearly in Juxtaposition to the society of ignorance, or Jahiliyya. Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi and his Jamaat in India (later inPakistan) should probably have credit for initiating this line of theorization. In Iran, Mujtaba Navab Safavi, reacting to the Shah’s modernization drive, proposed a return of the social enforcement of Islamic morality, values and customs as was prevalent in Iran between the Safavid and Pahlavi dynasty. He called for a repudiation of secular systems and laws, the combating of foreign values, minimal contact with the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and the U. K. among others, construction of a mosque in all government offices and other steps that will achieve the set objective. He was not particular about economic ideology as he had little respect for academic economists. Any system, it seems, was compatible with his system as long as interest was prohibited and the Zakat (income or wealth tax), the Kharaj (land tax) and Jizya (Poll tax on an non-Muslims) replaced the taxation Laws in existence. Safavi’s system remained specifically Shii in many respects and after his execution in 1956 along with three key members of his Fada’iyan-e Eslam (Devotees of Islam) the movement was appropriated by Mutahhari on direct orders from Khomeini and the ICMG was formed which later became a short-lived nationwide Islamic Organization the Hizb al-Milal al-Islami (Party of Islamic Nations)

In the Sunni world, the most profound theoretician of the Jahiliyya concept was Sayyid Qutb, a martyr of the Egyptian movement, whose ideas were adopted and popularized by other members of the brotherhood including his brother Muhammad Qutb and Zainab al-Ghazzali. A lot has been said about the circumstances influencing Qutb’s vision of Society – the relationship between the Muslim Brothers and the Free Officers who carried out the Nasserist coup, the sense of betrayal and frustration felt by the Brothers when they were left out of government and persecuted, Qutb’s own sense of anger and frustration with the treachery and cruelty of the Arab Socialists. Also, his ideas crystallized in prison, an environment likely to bring out anger and graphically present the dark sides of injustice. Some of these positions are, in my opinion, unfair and serve to detract from the revolutionary content of Qutb’s theory. The theory itself gained acceptance first because Qutb became a hero and martyr of Islamic activism and second because of the defeat of Arab forces by Israel, a defeat attributed to Israel being a Jewish State which had not separated its religion from politics and therefore had Allah’s support against the secular governments of Egypt, Syria and Jordan.

Qutb’s theory essentially views society as one of two things: Islamic or Jahili. A Muslim, by declaring his faith in Allah at the same time repudiates all man-made systems and laws. Islam represents a clean break from Jahiliyya just like the Qur’an was a clean break from existing literature and the Prophet and his companions were a new society, an Ummah, completely different from the Jahili society around them. There is no link, no relationship between Islam and other systems. A Muslim can not reform Jahiliyya by preaching or warning, he must obliterate it and build an Islamic Society from new foundations. This is a simplistic, but fair exposition of Qutb’s thesis. He does come up with arguments that show Western Civilization as wicked and materialistic and its adverse impacts on Muslim society. The way out is al-Hakimiyya, the declaration of total sovereignty and rulership of Allah, a full revolt against human rulership in all its forms, systems and arrangements, the destruction of the kingdom of man to establish the kingdom of God on earth.

In Nigeria, Qutb’s works, but particularly Maalim fil Tariq (Milestones) and his Tafsir, Fi Zilal al-Quran (in the shade of the Qur’an) have been very popular particularly in the 1970s and 1980s. They shaped the thinking of many Muslim Brothers. The Nigerian Society was considered a Jahili Society and a number of brothers refused to work for Jahiliyya and dropped out of Jahili schools and Universities. Western Education was suspect and Muslims were encouraged to distance themselves from Western (Jahili) customs, values and civilization.

A revolution based on this theory does not think of improving the existing system, of understanding it or participating in it, but of destroying it first and then building a new one. It is based on the assumption that there is nothing good in the system.

The reality of course is that this theory, attractive as it may be, is not Islam. The prophet (S. A. W.) never claimed that he was sent to destroy both the good and bad. Even the hadith "Al-Islam Yahdimu ma qablahu" (Islam destroys what came before it) is a portion of a hadith in Sahih Muslim quoted out of context and which refers to the evil deeds of Jahiliyya, not the good ones. The prophet said, "I have been but sent to complete noble attributes (Makarim al-Akhlaq)". He was not the first prophet. Islam was not the first message received, the Qur’an was not the first of revelations. The Religion of Islam, the Prophet of Islam, the Book of Islam are but fulfilments and seals to what had passed before. Allah says in the Qur’an "Today I have Perfected your system of belief and made full My favours bestowed upon you and chosen al-Islam as the creed for you" (Al-Ma’idah:3)

Islam does not pretend to separate itself from world civilization. Indeed as the early companions expanded the dominion of Islam they borrowed extensively from what was on ground in the more politically organized States of Persia and Iraq what was necessary for the Arabs, a nomadic people, to learn as they settled in towns. Innovations were introduced to the interpretation and distribution of booty, the creation of an Islamic calendar, the opening of a Diwan (roster) for welfare from the State etc. The Muslim takes what is good from civilization around him, and leaves what is bad. In this, Mawdudi’s conception of Jahiliyya was far superior to Qutb’s or Safavi’s. Mawdudi recognized that even in understanding the Qur’an, a Muslim should imbibe and digest the most recent results and discoveries of human thought and use these to arrive at a better and more relevant comprehension of God’s Word.

The Muslim Brotherhood was not itself unanimous in accepting Qutb’s doctrine. It is clear from Duat la Qudat, a book written by the general guide (Al-murshid al-‘Am) Hasan al-Hudaybi, that his vision of Jahiliyya is that it is made up of the good and the bad to varying degrees and Islam endorses and builds upon the good while rejecting and obliterating the bad.

This brings me finally to Hakimiyya. It is true that Allah (S.W.T.) says in the Qur’an in three verses in chapter V, (Al-Maidah):

"And those who do not judge by God’s revelations are infidels (Kafirun)" …..V:44

And those who do not judge by God’s revelations are unjust (Zalimun)" V:45

And those who do not judge by God’s revelations are transgressors (Fasiqun)" V:47.

The word used for judgement in Arabic is Hukm. The judge is a Hakim. It has been argued by some that these verses refer to the specific context of court cases and judgement of a judge (Hukm al-Hakim). Others believe it extends to all spheres and dimensions of the word hukm including rulership. The government is called Hukumah and the ruler of a territory is a Hakim so the injunction applies not just to a specific part of his function, arbitration and passing judgement, but to the laws and system by which he rules. I personally support this second position which is more consistent with the accepted guidelines of Tafsir.

But having accepted that, precisely under what circumstances does a Muslim operating a man-made law become an infidel (Kafir), an unjust person (Zalim) or a transgressor (fasiq)? Perhaps the best analysis of this point I have seen is in a fatwa given by the Saudi Scholar Sheikh Bin Baz who based his opinion on the rulings of experts in exegesis including ibn Abbas

First Bin Baz stresses the various grades of infidelity, injustice and transgression and the distinction between the greater ones (Akbar) and the lesser ones (Asghar). The first takes one out of Islam, the second is a big sin.

Second, he makes the point that the verses refer to cases where Allah and his Prophet have already given an injunction. Where the Qur’an and Sunnah are silent, mankind may make laws for the well-being of his society where these do not conflict with established religious principles. (Yusuf Al-Qardawi also stresses this point when explaining the meaning of hakimiyya).

Third, he addresses the situation where a Muslim applies a man-made law that contradicts Allah’s law and thus puts aside the revelation. In doing this, that person may actually believe that man’s law is as good or better than Allah’s. This person automatically is a non-believer.On the other hand, he may believe Allah’s law is better and correct and man’s law wrong; in which case we have to go back to why he applies man’s law.

He may do this out of materialism, the quest for luxuries in life (Tahsiniyyat) or some requirements that are not necessary to his survival (Hajiyyat). In this case he commits a great sin (Kabira).

He may do this because it is the only way he can survive and one of the recognized necessities (Dharuriyyat) of life will be under threat if he does not. In this case there is no harm as necessity makes lawful that which is ordinarily prohibited. He should however limit his contravention to the minimum he can get away with.

Finally, he may even do this because he feels that there is some part of the law that is Islamic and to keep it and protect it some compromise has to be made on other parts. Or because Muslims are subject to that law or rule and if Muslims do not participate the religion and believers will actually be worse off. In this case he is actually in Jihad and rewarded by Allah for service to Islam.

So the hakimiyya too, is not as clear as it would seem at first. Nonetheless many radical groups begin from the concepts of Hakimiyya and Jahiliyya and proceed to the conclusion that Jihad against the system is the only option open to Muslims. Thus we have such groups as Jihad in Egypt and Al-Takfir wal Hijra in a number of Arab nations dedicated to destroying the system and building a new one on a pure, unadulterated Islamic foundation. Perhaps the Taliban of Afghanistan are another example of this tendency, with extreme Sunni Puritanism making them want to rid their society not just of non-Muslim but also non-Sunni elements such as the Shiis:

My view is, again that the Qutbian theory of Jahiliyya, Hakimiyya and Jihad in its popular form while widely accepted in Nigeria should be looked at again in this light and can not in this form continue to represent the theoretical building block for Muslim activism.

Although the Wilayat al-Faqih has become the dominant theme of the Iranian Constitution and the ruling ideological building block for the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khomeini was not the principal ideologue of the Iranian Revolution.

That distinction belongs to Dr. Ali Shariati, a Sorbonne-trained philosopher who developed an integral revolutionary theory incorporating Marxian Political Economy into the Islamic Schema.

Shariati was very active in academic circles at a time when Marxism was the popular ideology among intellectuals and students. During his stay in Paris he had been influenced by such themes as anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, anti-despotism, humanism, social democracy and social justice. He believed that intellectuals, and not the backward masses, were the catalyst of social change and sought to present these essentially western-inspired radical themes in the language of Islam. Recognising the contribution of such great western thinkers as Pascal, Marx and Sartre in the process of liberation of man, Shariati then argues that the sum of the merits of these scholars and more were contained in one man, Imam Ali Ibn Abi Talib. Shii intellectuals did not have to look beyond the life of Ali for their ideological constructs.

Shariati considers the Islam of Imam Ali (Al-Islam al-Alawi) to be the quentessential expression of Islam as a polarized view of society based on struggling classes, the correct outcome of which struggle should lead to the transformation of present class and power structures and the imposition of the economic, political and social power of the oppressed and dispossessed (Mustadh’afin) over the proprietors and oppressors (Mustakbirin). Imam Ali had only accepted the caliphate to restore justice and equity which had been upheld by the first two caliphs but neglected and violated during the rule of the third caliph, Uthman.

Shariati’s theory had a pivotal role for the Shii conception of the Imam, as the life of Ali and other Imams, particularly Ali’ s son Husseyn, were to form a guide for correct interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah. He believed strongly in revolutionary praxis, in the benevolent dictatorship of a just revolutionary leader and in some form of Islamic reformation or protestantism which would once and for all prevent the emergence of a religious and clerical despotism.

Shariati divided Marxist thought into three stages, the young Marx, the mature Marx and the old Marx. The mature Marx was for him more consistent theoretically, more forceful morally and more palatable religiously.

Although Shariati became very popular with intellectuals and youth his theory was bound to bring him into conflict with vested interests. He was a threat to the clergy which had entrenched itself in the upper echelons of the constellation of Iranian Social Classes. The Ayatollah Mutahhari criticised the class-based nature of Shariati’s system as unIslamic and discriminatory as Islam only discriminated among people based on piety. Also, since Shariati was not a Mujtahid, there was the inference that only real Islamic Scholars could interpret the Qur’an and Sunnah and govern the Islamic State. The anti-clerical bent of his ideology was anathema to the Ulema. Khomeini backed Mutahhari on this point and on at least one occasion referred to Shariati as a divisive phenomenon, the introduction of whose ideas was a pre-planned "Satanic plot" aimed at breaking up the unity of Muslims and sapping their energy.

Shariati refused to accept what he called al-Islam al-Safawi (Safavid Islam) which emerged during the Safavid period when the monarchs, especially Shah Sultan Huseyn, embraced Shii Islam, propagated superficial and formalistic aspects of the faith but denied it of its singular pillars of justice and revolutionary leadership(Imamah) In this, one would be right to assume that Shariati would not completely agree with Mujtaba Navab Safavi who did not see any thing wrong with monarchy so long as it imposed Islamic law and morality. He probably would also consider Sayyid Qutb’s theory of Jahiliyya incomplete for its silence on revolutionary praxis.

Some of Shariati’s favourite terms such as "Mustadh’afin" and "Mustakbirin" found their way into establishment vocabulary. Even Khomeini was wont to use them. The official line on Shariati, however seemed to remain what was reflected in a book published in 1983 by the Instructors of the Qom Seminary, popularising Mutahhari’s defence of Islam against the "conspiracy" against the faith hatched by the "poisonous deviationist", Ali Shariati.

Shariati’s system as we have seen has strong Shii undertones. His emphasis on the exclusive example of Ali and Husseyn implied in some respects a castigation of other Islamic sub-systems. The only "monothestic" Islam is the Islam of Ali. All other forms of Islam, even where they profess the creed of La ilaha Illallah(there is no other God but Allah) are "polytheistic". Beyond this, however, his system is, in my opinion, much more inclusive than would seem at first. While the system of Khomeini and Mutahhari is inextricably tied to organisational structures of Shiism, Shariati’s theory is based on a more general theory of Political Economy, and can thus acquire the same degree of universal applicability as other Marxist-leaning political theories. Indeed I will go as far as to say that the Revolutionary Islam preached by Shariati is exactly the same ideology guiding Mallam Aminu Kano and his NEPU/PRP. Aminu Kano, himself a committed Muslim Scholar saw the correct direction of Islam lying in the liberation of the oppressed and dispossessed (Mustadh'afin, Talakawa) from the proprietors and oppressors (Mustakbirin, Yan handama da wawura da babakere)

I am of the view that Shariati’s system, stripped of its doctrinaire elements, is one possible source of inspiration for the Islamic Movement as it represents a progressive ideology aimed at not just imposing morals and laws but actualising Islam’s objective of establishing justice and equity in the relation of man with man, and of liberating mankind from the service of men to the service of the "Creator of men". On the other hand, it suffers from the same handicap as all Marxist –inspired political theory since the collapse of the Soviets Union, a collapse considered as a failure of Marxism as an ideology and a victory for capitalism. To that extent, some of its major themes may appear outdated in the present world.

Personally, I think it is too early to write the history of socialism or declare the victory of capitalism at least not with all the inequities of our world. I also believe that the weaknesses and contradictions of Das Kapital, the failure of the dictatorship of Communist Russia etc. need not detract from the strong moral force of Marxist theory. For this reason, I will not reject Shariati’s theory outright in the manner in which I rejected Khomeini’s or Qutb’s.

The final perspective I would like to bring is that which views Revolutionary Islam as a struggle for the enthronement of Democracy. A few of the Scholars sometimes associated with this tendency may actually protest it. Dr Yusuf al- Qardawi, prolific writer, Egyptian Scholar and active member of the Muslim Brotherhood, would certainly object to my listing him as a proponent of Liberal Democracy. Al-Qardawi, though a moderate, is careful not to give the Islamic label to any system not grounded in Qur’an and Sunnah. Yet I find that beyond the terminologies, the substance of his arguments sometimes justifies my inclusion of his name in this section. His instinctive rejection of the "democrat" label is reflective of conventional

fallacies. "All cats have four legs, my dog has four legs, therefore, my dog is a cat." Similarly "Islam is based on the Qur’an and Sunnah, Democracy is not based on the Qur’an and Sunnah therefore, democracy is not Islamic". Because a number of people in this audience have read several of his works and might disagree with my representation of him, I am obliged to refer them to his work " Awlawiyyat al-harakah al-Islamiyya fi al-marhalah al-qadimah. (Priorities of the Islamic movement in the next stage), and, in particular to a small chapter titled Al-harakah wa qadhaya al-hurriyyah al-siyasiyya wal-dimuqradiyya. (The movement and questions of political and democratic freedom).

Dr. Qardawi stresses in this chapter that it is compulsory for the movement to firmly stand at all times against dictatorship and political oppression, to say to dictators "no! and no! even if these dictators pretend to support it".

He quotes the hadith "when you see my Ummah unwilling to say to an unjust ruler You perpetrator of injustice ! You may say bye bye to it" He quotes Quar’anic verses condemning not just oppressors but those who follow them and support them. He asserts that history has shown that political Islam is always crushed and strangulated by dictators, and that it blossoms and grows and gets stronger in an environment of freedom and democracy.

After this thorough analysis, Qardawi throws in a disclaimer. "I would like to stress", he says, "that Islam is not democracy, and democracy is not Islam and I would not like to associate Islam with any other system, it is unique in its objectives, methods and tools, and I do not mean to copy western civilisation… without giving it our values and mores…" Then (surprise!), he says "However, the tools and guarantees that Democracy has attained are the closest thing to the political fundamentals which Islam came with for checking the excess of rulers, such as: consultation(shura), Advice (Nasiha), enjoining good, forbidding evil, refusal to obey an instruction to sin or err, opposition to hated infidelity, changing evil by force if possible… here we find the power of a legislature capable of changing any government that violates the constitution and the rule of law. So also the power of a free press, a free pulpit, the force of opposition and the voice of the majority." True, Qardawi says the laws should not violate the Shariah but at the same time it is clear he speaks in the context of a Muslim Society where Muslims who believe in these principles are in absolute majority. The point here is that despite these disclaimers, I am not unfair on Qardawi by calling him a democrat and reading him as holding the principles of democracy and revolution against dictatorship to be consistent with the principles of Revolutionary Islam. Note that Qardawi does not bother to state exactly in what way an Islamic Democracy differs from Western Democracy.

Among contemporary Shii Scholars the first prime minister of Iran after the revolution, Mehdi Bazargan holds this same position, albeit in a more thoroughly articulated form. In a sense Bazargan, Mutahhari and Shariati were all developing theoretical frameworks to counter the growing influence of Marxism in Iran. The difference is that while Shariati integrated, then subdued Marxist principles to his Islamist framework, Bazargan and Mutahhari look a confrontational position, denying any links between Islam and Marxism. These two on the other hand differed in that while Mutahhari opted for a subsystem in which proximity to God and salvation was determined by following the directives and leading role of the clergy, Bazargan views Islam as a non- discriminatory religion in which the most rewarding act in the eyes of God is to serve the people whom He has created. His system is one of non- exclusion in which even the "others" - the anti- clerical intellectual, the capitalist, the unveiled woman-are not castigated as "corrupters on earth" but included in God’s family thus making tolerance the cornerstone of Islam.

Bazargan, like Shariati is not a Mujtahid. It is said, however that he does not need a Marji' al-taqlid because he practices Ihtiyat - (caution in selection of fatwa). Bazargan begins from the premise that God has willed individuals to be free in their judgments and decisions, and also stated that there should be no compulsion in religion. Once this is accepted, then forced compliance with Islamic edicts becomes meaningless and coercion as a mechanism to ensure Islamisation loses validity and justification. While Bazargan has the implementation of the Shariah as the principal objective of Islamic activism, he insists that only a society that has consciously and freely chosen the Shariah as its guide can be truly considered an Islamic society. God does not wish to impose His view of what is good on individuals, since coercion would negate their God-given freedom of choice. This freedom of course is not limitless in a social context. God will not allow the right of one individual to be violated by another .So Bazargan applies the principle of pareto- optimality to Islamic Social Relations. An act which improves the welfare, pleasure or position of one person or group at the expense of the welfare of other persons or groups is unacceptable.

Finally, Bazargan stresses the concept of Shura (consultation) which God ordered the prophet to conduct in his government of the people. Political Democracy is therefore the cornerstone of Islamic Political Thought. Bazargan argues! "one thousand years before the emergence of the concept of democracy in the West, the government of the people by the people was practised in the days of the prophet"

This brings me full circle to my introduction to this paper. This was the comment I made for which I was called "Salman Rushdie II". It is the comment I make now. I find myself , as a Nigerian Muslim more inclined towards participation in a process that will lead to popular democracy than any other, even though on the economic front my ideological leanings are more towards Shariati’s leftist theory than Bazargan's capitalist views.

Bazargan’s views brought him into conflict with the clerical dictatorship in Iran. His vision of Islam as compatible with liberalism and democracy made him reject the concept of wilayat al-faqih. In January, 1988, Khomeini proclaimed the absolute power (wilayah al-mutlaqah) of the Faqih, a proclamation that provoked the reaction of Bazargan’s movement , the Freedom Movement of Iran (FMI). FMI declared that from a sociopolitical point of view, the absolutist government of the Juris-consult is nothing other than religious and state despotism and dictatorship, resulting in the disappearance of freedom, independence and identity"

In all this, Bazargan’s position is endorsed by the highest juristic authorities in the domain of Shiism. No Marji al-taqlid seemed willing to associate himself with this concept and several of them criticised it openly. But, expectedly, Bazargan had to pay a political price for his views, which he had started expressing long before this particular edict. Indeed, during the third presidential elections in the summer of 1985, the Council of Guardians excluded, from a total of 50 presidential candidates, Mehdi Bazargan, the first Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic, and 46 others on the grounds that they did "not possess the required Islamic qualifications".

My personal inclination after this review is to agree with Shariati, Bazargan and Qardawi and I will in the next section briefly discuss the implications of this choice for the Nigerian Muslim.

"I do not define Islam in terms of Nigeria. I define Nigeria in terms of Islam." So did the Sunday Guardian quote a leader of a segment of the Islamic Movement in a recent review.

This statement is succint and very clear. It is also reflective of pure idealism. The implications are that the holder of such a view forms an impression of the ideal Islamic State and then seeks to move the material reality towards it, without understanding that reality. Technically, it reflects a lack of comprehension of the dialectical-relationship between the idea and matter, and of the fact that the ideal society can not be attained except through progressive proximations occasioned by the dialectical process resulting in evolution.

A man who believes he knows an ideal but does not bother with reality is like a man who knows where he wants to go but knows not where he is. As a result he does not know whether he should go north or south, east or west. If he sets off in any direction, no matter with what resolve, there is a high probability of his not getting there. Of course there is always good fortune, sheer luck or, if you like Divine Providence, in which case he can get there anyway even if he did not know where he was headed.

I hold the view that any person who is concerned about moving society towards any ideal is subject to certain basic rules. He must understand the ideal. He must also understand the society and its processes. I do not wish to go into Nigerian History or discuss the nature of Nigeria as a multi-ethnic multi-religious entity. I do not also wish to review here points I have exhaustively discussed in other papers where I have made a strong case for basic freedoms, federalism, mutual co-existence and even cooperation between religions, democracy etc on the basis of the Qur'an and Sunnah. I refer those interested in these details to two of my articles previously published in the weekly Trust Newspaper "The Muslim Activist and Multi-religious opposition: Imperatives from the Qur'an and Sunnah" and "The Islamisation of Politics and Policisation of Islam." I will make both available to the organisers of this forum.

As we tread towards a transition to democracy we must look around us and ask, what is the role of Muslim Activists? Nigeria is just coming out of a period of dictatorship of a type not seen even under colonial domination. The Islamic Movement received a lot of bashing, its members locked up for extended periods without reason, even executed arbitrarily. We are living witnesses to allegations of extra-judicial executions of members of JTI on the orders of Kano State Administrator Abdullahi Wase and Police Commissioner Hashimu Abdullahi. Today, Wase, Abdullahi and Abacha are dead but the police officers who conducted the executions are still in service. We are aware of how muslims were subsequently clamped into various jails under the obnoxious Decree 2, and were only saved from certain death because the Attorney-General, Solicitor-General and other officers of Kano State Ministry of Justice refused to allow themselves to be used in building-up trumped-up charges of murder.

We are also living witnesses to the detention of Ibrahim El-Zakzaky and various leading members of his group under this decree, the demolition of his house and the harassment of his followers.

We are living witnesses to the brief arrest and detention of Dr Uthman Bugaje by security forces.

The point in all this is to go back to the words of Dr Yusuf al Qardawi mentioned earlier. All of these things were possible because the nation had fallen into the hands of dictators. It is time for Muslims to join hands with other Nigerians and say: no more! no more dictatorship! No more will we allow any group or individual to violate the rights of Nigerians with impunity! We must remember that the late dictator did not limit his oppression to the Muslim Movement. Journalists, Politicians, Christians, NADECO, any one who did not succumb to his evil machinations was bound to land in jail or in the grave. The first issue before us therefore is to ensure that political democracy and the rule of law which at least guarantee us the freedom to conduct our peaceful activities is established.

The second issue in Nigerian politics today is the issue of restructuring the federation. I personally feel the issue is overblown but this reflects dissatisfaction with an Unitary System we have been running under the military. So far, the agitation for Federalism has come from the South. In reality, Muslims should be in the vanguard of those asking for devolution of powers. In a democratic environment with a restructured Federation, states with a Muslim majority would find it much easier, if they choose, to speed up the process of Islamisation. Unfortunately Muslims, particularly from the North, are allowing this opportunity to pass by and even resisting the calls for a restructured federation. Islamic values and laws have been a major casualty of the Unitary State and the erosion has been a continuous and gradual process.

The third issue is the question of platform. First, even in the so-called Islamic Movement there is no unity. In the Abacha days, every time a section of the movement was hit other sections stood-by, unconcerned. In some cases they actually expressed joy. It should have dawned on all of us by now that those divisions remain a weakness and that we are a house divided among itself. Second, Muslims in a general sense have no voice in politics. Today in Nigeria tribes have recognised that in a democracy, you get mileage by forming a pressure group for securing party offices, elective offices etc and sponsoring members committed to your cause. The Afenifere is pushing the interest of the Yoruba. The Ohaneze is pushing that of the Igbos. Tribalism of course is Jahiliyya and the greatest mistake Muslims can make is to respond in defence of tribal or sectional interests. But this is precisely what we are doing. Because we did not take the initiative, we are reacting in the name of the North, or of the Hausa-Fulani, whatever that means. Our politicians have not thought of coming together as Muslims, irrespective of tribe. If so, they would today have formed a formidable political grouping with a voice and a focus. When I call for participation of Muslims in Nigerian Democracy I am not calling for people to join as individuals. We have seen the experience with that sort of thing before. A Muslim Brother joined Abacha's government as Legal Adviser and ended up allegedly drafting the decree under which we were all detained. Besides he was Legal Adviser to a dictator whose complete disregard for law was unprecedented.

Those interested in real progress should form a group, preferably involve active politicians with influence, and have the clear objective of establishing justice, honesty and freedom in our society. Members who contest elections should be answerable to the party. It may be too late to achieve this in this transition but with hard work, you will be surprised at what we can achieve by the next election.

I have tried in this paper to review various expressions of Revolutionary Islam and justify its compatibility with liberal democracy and federalism. I have also tried to highlight what I consider primary issues facing the Muslim Activist in Nigeria.

I repeat that this paper is a paper in politics not religion. I am neither a Mujtahid nor a trained political scientist and am the first to admit that it is a modest and amateur attempt by a banker to delve into an area in which he is not versed. I have not maintained academic standards of presentation such as footnotes and notation although I attach a select bibliography of sources that have influenced my ideas. You will hopefully forgive me and understand that for bankers, reading and writing are a luxury for which we hardly ever have the time-very much unlike those lucky lecturers who are actually paid to read and write, although it seems they often find time to go on strike because the government is not paying them enough.

My disagreement with, or criticism of the political view of any personality should not be construed as a detraction from his religious worth. All those mentioned in this paper are better Muslims than I can ever hope to be and their love and service to Islam is there for all to see. However, this does not make their political theorisation faultless. More important, even where their political theory is perfect for their environment, it does not make it applicable to ours.

I begin with the premise that every one has to interpret Islam in the light of his own historico-political context. I refuse to accept that someone, anyone, living in another part of the world and/or another generation has studied and found a solution to the Nigerian political problem. If I am at fault, my fault lies in the belief that each of us must have the courage of his own convictions and shed off the yoke of intellectual laziness and blind followership. I do not however condemn those who disagree with me.

The path I have selected as the path to Islamization is the formation of a vanguard that will form the arrow-head of a National Democratic Revolution. I do not claim that the result will be an ideal Islamic state. But I do hold that of all the options open to us based on the different facets of Revolutionary Islam discussed this is the most progressive and achievable.

Khomeini's theory leading to a despotism of the Ulema can not work in a Sunni (not to talk of a multi-religious) environment. Even if it could, we have seen that serious and logical questions have been raised pertaining to its religious validity and social and political desirability.

Qutb's model is one based on the principle of demolition first, before designing and building a new structure which is at the moment undefined. We have examined its theoretical weaknesses. If we accepted it, the logical step would be to declare a civil war in Nigeria in the name of a Jihad against Jahiliyya. In a world that has seen Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechnya, Kosovo, Rwanda, Lebanon, Liberia, Sierra-Leone and Congo, it is hardly surprising that some of us do not believe this is what God wants for His people.

That leaves us with two options: Shariati's left-wing progressive revolution or Quardhawi's and Bazargan's right-wing political democracy. In my view, both can be accommodated in a peaceful democratic transition depending on ideological leanings of activists. I would opt for a radical democratic party but that is a personal preference.

Let me admit, before closing, that I am conscious that in my analysis I have brought to bear my own subjectivity, not deliberately, but inevitably. My social background, my academic training, my personal experiences have all come into play, as they have in the case of all the theorists covered in this paper.

All I request is the right to be properly understood and represented. I also request the right to my own opinions and free expression. Finally, I request the right to be corrected, where wrong, and guided, where in error.

Thank you very much and God bless you all.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ayubi, Nazih, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World

Ayubi, Nazih, Overstating the Arab State

Russell, Bertrand, A History of Western Philosophy

Russell, Bertrand, A Freeman's Worship and Other Essays

Rahnema, S. and Behdad, S. (eds.) Iran after the Revolution: Crisis of an Islamic State

Mernissi, Fatima, Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World

Rahnema, A. and Nomani, F., The Secular Miracle: Religion, Politics and Economic Policy in Iran

Donohue, J. and Esposito, J. (eds), Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives

Sivan, Emmanuel, Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics

Warburg, G. and Kupferschmidt, U. (eds.) Islam, Nationalism and Radicalism in Egypt and Sudan

The writer is a Manager at UBA Lagos