Permit me to begin by congratulating Alhaji Saidu Adhama and all those who were involved in setting up "the Kano Debate". This forum is to me important not just because of the concrete policy recommendations that may come out of it, but particularly because it represents a return to a forgotten culture of our people, a culture of education and intellectual discourse. We often forget that only through enlightened discussion can society generate the ideas necessary for progress. If there is anything to learn from our nation’s recent history, it is that a people is doomed, once it hands its affairs to those who attach little value to education. Until we return to education as the foundation of our society, our future as a viable community will remain clouded in uncertainty. This thesis will be central to my talk today.

I have chosen to speak on "the Kano political Economy", as opposed to "the Kano economy"(as requested by the organizers), for a deliberate reason. Although a trained economist, I have always viewed my discipline with more than a little suspicion. Over the years I have learnt to question the presuppositions of bourgeois theory, to cut through the obfuscating opacity of systems of equations, elaborate graphs and technical jargon, and focus on the simple questions that should be at the heart of economic analysis: the actual living conditions of human beings, the ability of people to earn a decent living or, in other terms, the quality of human life. When I speak about the economy of Kano or try a study of it, therefore, my interest transcends the number of industries opening or closing, the number of big businessmen who have suddenly gone bust, or the decline in export proceeds for say, the tanning industry. These statistics are important, but to me not as an end in themselves. My concern is on the number of people from Kano who are poor, incapable of earning a living above poverty line and struggling from day to day in open or disguised unemployment.

Economic analysis is about unemployment, about hunger, about insecurity, about disease and about death due to poverty of real men, women and babies. The bourgeois compartmentalization of the human being into "the economic man", "the social man" and "the political man" does not, in my view, present an objective picture of reality. The science of economics finds relevance only because no society has enough to provide all of the needs of all of its citizens. Every economic decision, (every direction in economic policy, every budget) involves a choice as to, not just which needs, but also whose needs are to be satisfied with the nation’s limited resources. It is not just a matter of naira and kobo, it is, a fortiori, a matter of human beings, (or rather, different groups and classes of human beings), and their living conditions. Certain segments of the society will always benefit at the expense of other segments and thus a program may be for the rich or for the poor, for the political office holders or for the citizenry, for the manufacturer or for the middle-man, for the industrialist or for the commission agent, for the indigenous capitalist or for the foreigner, for the nation as a whole or for a particular region. These choices are political, not economic, and reflect interests that those who control the machinery of state are determined to serve. There can therefore be no discussion of the economic independent of the political.

In my talk with you today I will show how the crisis we will discuss is both systemic (as a product of the logic of the macro-economic policies and philosophy of successive Nigerian governments since 1985) and structural (reflecting the distorted priorities of Kano society itself, a quasi-feudal social formation the logic of which advises the under-education and under development of its masses). I will make my own task, and that of the discussants, easier, by summarizing my views on the nature of the crisis and what I consider to be the best path to its resolution. Let me state that I believe the systemic issues can be confronted immediately and perhaps resolved in the short-term. Structural problems are of a long-term strategic nature and the policies recommended will take time before yielding results.

Our systemic crisis is a direct result of the implementation of the policies of the "Washington Consensus" by the Babangida administration in the mid-eighties, compounded by the inability of subsequent governments to transcend the transitory stage of "Primitive Accumulation". In consequence, the state has failed in the most basic requirement of sustaining capitalist development: the reproduction of the conditions of production. Because those who hold political power, whether in Khaki (through coups) or in Agbada (through (s)elections) are interested not in production but in the rape and plunder of the Nigerian treasury to support conspicuous consumption, the main thrust of the federal government since 1985 has been the reproduction of the conditions of primitive accumulation. The greatest testimony to the success of the political class in this area is the determination of those outside political office to get in at high cost, and the desperation of those already inside to remain there at all cost.

The people of Kano have already shown, based on their sterling performance in the 2003 elections, that they have no intention of being part of this process of reproducing the conditions of primitive accumulation. I believe that the present government in Kano understands that its mandate is to arrest that process. But beyond that, the uniqueness of Kano in 2003 confers on us, and on our government, an additional responsibility. Even as we stood alone against the wind of rigging and theft in 2003, we must stand as the credible political opposition to the federal government as presently run and constituted, as the proof that all hope is not lost for the common man. I will in this paper articulate the nature of this opposition in economic matters. I would also argue, rather controversially, that our moral responsibility in praxis involves opposition to any attempt to hand-over the federal government, come 2007, to those who established and encouraged the spread of the cancer of corruption in public life.

I will in this paper also discuss what I refer to as structural causes for our economic crisis. Quite apart from the systemic nature of the crisis, Kano has, in my view been uniquely vulnerable because of structural problems, broadly defined. First, the Kano economy has been characterized by over-concentration, spatially and vertically. Spatial concentration is reflected in the fact that over 80% of commercial activities in the state are carried out in only three metropolitan local governments- Fagge, Nassarawa and Municipal LGAs. I use vertical concentration, for want of a better term, to refer to the concentration of wealth in the hand of the few persons and families who dominate commerce and industry in Kano. Wealth from industry is in the hands of Chinese, Indian and some Lebanese families and corporations. In commerce, wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few Lebanese and Hausa families. The vast majority of the indigenous population is dependent on this minority, as factory employees, distributors or as hangers-on and parasites, generally without much education or diverse skill base. The business community and the traditional leadership have not seen the education of our youth as a priority for different reasons. In the realm of economic production and commerce, the army of illiterates is a source of cheap labour for exploitation by the owners of capital, be they Nigerian, Lebanese, Chinese or Indian. In traditional society, a hierachical system based on heredity provides a ready army of genuflecting, praise-singing masses, who are permanently at the service of their masters. The only reason for this sorry state of affairs is that these otherwise normal human beings have nothing else to do, and in fact have been taught nothing other than prostration, praise-singing and general sycophancy. Education frees people from such unseemly subservience and precipitates the demise of the entire system, unless it also educates and reinvents itself.

Many of the indigenes of Kano working in factories are blue-collar workers. Many of the "boys" working with the big-traders are uneducated. Once these industries were hit, and the businessmen ran out of business, we faced the stark reality that the lack of education of our people was always bound to spell doom for the future of Kano. With the collapse of their patrons all of the hangers-on, workers and employees are on the street begging or doing the same from house to house and office to office. Others have become social miscreants. Kano is paying the price for a lack of focus on the development of its productive forces. The Kano economy is not exactly moribund. Money is still being spent on private education, private medical care, vehicle maintenance, spare parts, building materials, plumbing and electrical works, computer software and technology, etc. Mechanics, carpenters, electricians, IT engineers, doctors, private teachers, etc. all continue to make a good living in Kano. But few of them are Kano indigenes. Opportunities exist for earning a living and adding economic value in Kano, but the indigenes are not qualified to take advantage of these because they have no education, or a wrong education, or the right education but a wrong orientation. We therefore have structural unemployment, where the jobs are there but the people either are unqualified for them or have expectations of compensation or working conditions that are unavailable in the job functions. This compounds the problem already caused by the closure of industries and business bankruptcies.

To address the structural issues above I will make the following recommendations:

The rest of my paper is structured as follows. In the next section I discuss the systemic crisis of the Nigerian economy, its genesis and character. Subsequently I discuss the structural problems that have complicated it with respect to Kano. Finally, I present detailed recommendations and necessary first steps for the resolution of crisis. The paper is then concluded.

To understand where we are and how to move forward, we must first retrace our steps and understand how we got here in the first place. This is usually an uncomfortable exercise for those who would rather not ask difficult questions, especially if they involve pointing fingers at the specific persons and administrations that are responsible for the destruction of this country and everything that was built before they came to power. For some of us, asking uncomfortable questions and pointing accusing fingers is a way of life. I will not even pretend to be sorry that I have to do this, because I am not.

Toward the end of the Second Republic, the government of Shehu Shagari recognized that the economy was heading into a major depression. This crisis was precipitated by falling government revenues, high cost of running government, official corruption and ballooning national debt. The National Economic Commission, under the leadership of Vice-President Ekwueme set up a committee led by the VP’s Economic Adviser, Professor J. S. Odama, to map out directions for the management of the economy. The Odama Report or, as it came to be known in academic circles, the "Green Paper", was adopted by the government as a blue- print for belt-tightening, or austerity measures. The document represents perhaps the best economic prescription for the malaise of the economy, but the government was let down by a lack of political will or capacity to implement the recommendations in view of their adverse impact on vested interests. The economic policies of the Buhari government were, in fact, anticipated by the Green Paper.

The key elements of the austerity measures included a reduction in government deficits, reduction of overheads, ban on importation of non-essential products, allocation of foreign exchange to the productive sector, rapid reduction in foreign debt burden, promotion of non-oil exports, more efficient tax collection and diversification of revenue-base. Foreign exchange was not to be expended on goods and services available in Nigeria and all areas of public waste were to be looked into and plugged. Unfortunately, the system of import licenses introduced in line with the policy of quotas and quantitative restrictions was abused and became an avenue for the enrichment of middle-men. Also, cost-saving could only be achieved at the expense of the luxurious life the elite had become accustomed to, and this met with passive resistance from within the system itself. Shagari’s economic policies failed, not because they were "bad economics" but because they were not properly implemented. This point is important for our analysis.

By the time Shagari was overthrown, a major transformation in the world of economics had taken firm roots. The American government under Ronald Reagan and the British government under Margaret Thatcher had embraced the "supply-side" or "monetarist" economics of Milton Friedman and the Chicago school. This unabashedly capitalist economics set about dismantling all internal and international restrictions on the expansion and increased profitability of multi-national corporations. The right wing governments of the US and UK, later supported by a succession of right-wing administrations in Europe, started preaching a new gospel at variance with everything these nations had done to attain development.

Whereas these countries had protected their infant industries using subsidies, import bans and tariffs, they now preached the virtues of free trade. Whereas each of these countries had built a strong industrial base and recognized the importance of being a producing nation, the new message was that a country did not need to produce goods it could import more cheaply from abroad. The classical theory of comparative advantage associated with David Ricardo was resuscitated under the new name of a neo-classical theory of comparative advantage. In technical terms, the principle stated that a country has comparative advantage (and should focus on) the production of those goods whose production requires relatively more of its relatively more abundant factor of production. In simple English, Nigeria should export garri, amala and miyar kuka to America and import computers, arms, manufactured goods and even stockfish whose production process is capital-intensive. Because the production function for garri and amala is labour-intensive, and because Nigeria has an abundance of Labour relative to Capital, we are better-off economically by devoting our abundant resources to production of garri and amala, and being world leaders in the supply of these goods where we have a "comparative advantage". We are not to ask if having comparative advantage in producing amala or kuka and a comparative disadvantage in producing computers is a good thing to be encouraged.

Through a series of beautiful graphs, the student of international economic theory is taught the meaning of "factor-intensity" and "factor-abundance" and the importance of these concepts in explaining why developing countries should be suppliers of raw materials and a dumping ground of manufactures from the metropolitan capitals of the world. Without sending settlers and colonial officers, the western world was going to find, from among leaders of the third world, those who were gullible enough to buy this theory, and "open up" their economies in a manner not even achieved by colonial powers, sentencing their economies to permanent non-development. To be a "Banana Republic", long considered an indignity in political economy, was being elevated to a great virtue in the new economic orthodoxy. Free trade was an end in itself, de-industrialisation was a progressive step, and the consequences in the long term- in terms of wiping out a productive base, lack of real capital accumulation, increased unemployment and poverty, increased economic inequalities, distortions in patterns of consumption and the resultant political and social instability-all of these were immaterial to the new prophets of liberal capitalism and market efficiency.

The simple uncomfortable questions asked about the nature of this efficiency- such as how about the millions of consumers who cannot afford to pay the equilibrium price? Or how about the thousands of industries who cannot afford to import raw materials at the new exchange rates, and the millions of workers they have to lay off and retrench? Or how about the cost of food in the absence of fertilizer subsidies?- were not to be asked. Any one who asked these questions was a misguided communist, or a "dependency theorist" or, (sacrilege of sacrileges), "development economist" who had little understanding of the latest trends in "economic theory". The debate was not about Keynesianism Vs Monetarism, nor about bureaucracy Vs efficiency. It was, in the final analysis, about our nation, our people, our independence and our dignity. It was, in other words, about preventing this meeting where we are discussing a crisis in the political economy and desperately groping for a solution.

To achieve this, the United States government, working in the interest of international finance capital, used its influence on the IMF and the World Bank to forge a policy blue print that came to be known as the "Washington Consensus". This document was the potion that would intensify the contradictions in the world economy, widen the gap between rich and poor countries, retard the development of poor countries and open up their economies and cheapen their national assets, and reward the accomplices of this policy within these countries by selling off to them valuable national assets cheaply in the name of privatization. Through blackmail of an unprecedented type, nations in debt were compelled by the IMF to adopt the Washington Consensus policies. Joseph Stiglitz, a former World Bank economist has documented for posterity this process and the havoc it wreaked on those countries that, against all advice, accepted them hook, line and sinker. All you need to do is look at all the South Asian countries that flatly refused to implement IMF policies in spite of all pressure and blackmail, and compare them to Nigeria today, to see the extent of the damage done to Nigeria by the Babangida government. Or to look at Botswana, the only African country that had the good sense to tell the IMF to "take a walk", as they say. Botswana is Africa’s fastest growing economy.

After Buhari refused to accept the IMF conditions, particularly devaluation and trade liberalization, he was overthrown by fellow army officers who promptly set in motion the process for compliance. Babangida first set up an economic team spearheaded by a troika of "experts": Kalu I. Kalu, an employee of the IMF, Chu Okongwu, an employee of the World Bank and Olu Falae, (I believe he is referred to as a "fellow" of the IMF). These three set out to implement, with the fanaticism of new converts, the Washington Consensus. IBB then opened up what he called a "national debate" on the IMF loan. It soon became apparent that Nigerians were enlightened enough to see the dangers of the WC policies and the majority opposed it. The government then came out with a verdict that is unprecedented in its sadism: Nigeria would not take the IMF loan, since we did not want it. But the government would implement the harsh IMF conditionalities all the same, and this it proceeded to do with all ruthlessness. Giving the public their say while he has his way underscored the legendary ambidexterity of the "evil genius".

Central to this policy was the massive devaluation of the national currency, in a nation whose exports are priced in US Dollars and whose imports have an inelastic demand. I have in previous papers explained in detail the fallacy of the arguments underlying this policy prescription (see my "Buharism : Economic Theory and Political Economy" and "Buharism beyond Buhari: A Response to Mohammed Haruna").

In short, neo-classical economic theory usually analyses two options for the management of the Balance of Payments deficit. One option is "quotas and quantitative restrictions", and this is what was adopted by the Buhari government through import licenses and exchange controls. There is nothing wrong with this policy if it is accompanied by discipline and harsh sanctions for abuse. The second option is devaluation of the currency, a policy whose efficacy in improving Balance of payments is usually illustrated through the "absorption" or the "elasticities" approach. A nation can improve its Balance of Payments through devaluation of its currency if, and only if, two conditions obtain: 1. Its exports are denominated in its own currency and its imports in the trading partner’s currency; and 2. The sum total of the price-elasticities of demand of both exports and imports exceeds unity. These are called the Marshall-Lerner Conditions for the improvement of Balance of Trade through devaluation. They are necessary and sufficient conditions. Neither of these conditions was fulfilled in Nigeria, as pointed out by the opponents of devaluation. Indeed the Minister of Finance under General Buhari, Dr Onaolapo Soleye (who was not, I gather, an economist) had, almost intuitively, rejected the IMF prescriptions based on similar arguments. On the basis of neo-classical theory itself, devaluation in Nigeria would worsen Balance of payments and only succeed in causing suffering among the people, through a deepening of the economic crisis. Yet we proceeded to implement these policies.

To come to grips with the full import of the betrayal of the Nigerian people by the federal government, please compare our stance above with the position of Malaysia, which was also a beneficiary of the IMF loan. Faced with the barrage of propaganda about the benefits of liberalization, devaluation and privatization to the Malaysian economy, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad had this to say( See Mahathir Mohamad, Globalization and the New realities, p 23):

These are the words of a true patriot, and a true genius committed to the welfare and dignity of his people. These are the words of a leader who said, long before the IMF and World Bank "admitted" that their policies were a mistake: "The fact that globalization has come does not mean we should just sit by and watch as the predators destroy us."

The Nigerian government did not "just sit by and watch". It was an active participant in the destruction of Nigeria. And even today, the Obasanjo government continues to tell us that this process is irreversible. We are desperately trying to sell off the few assets that remain owned by the Nigerian people to foreign corporations. Our country is a patient that insists on taking the wrong medication even after the doctor that prescribed it has declared that the prescription was wrong.

Let me summarize the key elements of the Washington Consensus policies:

This problem is compounded in Nigeria by official corruption, not only in the government of Babangida, but in all successive governments which, incidentally, he had a hand in selecting: Sani Abacha, Abdulsalami Abubakar (both of whom were in his military "camp") and Olusegun Obasanjo (whom he "convinced" to contest). The economic implications for Kano of corruption at the federal level were the following, among others:

We now understand at least part of the reason for our economic crisis: the systemic element that we share with the rest of the indigenous economy, resulting from the implementation of unpatriotic economic programs compounded by the entrenchment and reproduction of the conditions of Primitive Accumulation. I will now briefly recap the structural dimension to this crisis, the specific elements that in my view rendered Kano particularly vulnerable.

I have in my introduction discussed the broad outlines of the structural constraints that in my view increased our vulnerability to the economic recession. I will therefore be brief in dealing with this area here, particularly since it is quite straight-forward.

80% of commercial activity in Kano State is located in three metropolitan local government areas, and practically all industries are located in Bompai, Sharada and Challawa. Also, the markets are traditionally dominated by a small number of key importers with a network of smaller distributors. These two factors exposed the Kano economy to what Risk Managers call a "concentration risk." The result is devastating.

The failure of NEPA to provide regular electricity supply to Kano metropolitan for a period exceeding six years for instance led to the collapse of almost all the industries in the area, due to the impossibility of operating profitably based on generators, especially in view of the epileptic supply of AGO and even then at black market prices. The case of the manufacturers is therefore clear. What is more complex to explain is the failure of commerce.

As far as I can tell, and these views are tentative, commerce collapsed due to a number of factors. First, the general rise in inflation led to reduced purchasing power of consumers and this exerted a downward pressure on margins. Market share moved to players who could compete based on reduced costs and these were mainly large, efficient players with access to substantial bank lines. Such players were able to take advantage of scale economies and sell their consignment profitably. Many of the big traders in Kano were not able to cope with this situation. Some did not have the capital at their disposal to take advantage of economies of scale. But also, many were simply incompetent managers who were used to bloated overheads at a time of healthy margins, when they controlled the market and earned some profit from a market structure of monopolistic competition. When the situation changed, and competition stiffened due to the difficulties associated with manufacturing as an alternative use of capital, they were unable to cut down on inessential, non-business expenditure. Money was expended on consumption based on sales revenues rather than margins, and they soon found themselves unable to honour financial obligations, including to bankers, due to the erosion of net-worth by sustained (and probably untracked) losses.

Second, it seems to me that several top players in commerce were distracted by the fact that a Kano indigene was Head of State for about five years. Many of them moved to Abuja and became government contractors and commission agents, looking for quick money, which they spent on a conspicuous life-style and expensive traditional titles, which had now become fashionable among the rich. By the time Abacha suddenly died they were left stranded. The market had moved on and competitors had taken over the market. The rich men of Kano had spent all their capital on houses, horses, cars and turbans.

Irrespective of the reasons for the collapse of commerce in Kano, the fact remains that its impact was multiplied by the factor of concentration. The complete dependence of an army of smaller traders and employees on the big traders meant that when their businesses collapsed they took a disproportionate number of businesses and people down with them. The lack of education of the workers and the narrow skills base meant that they had no options they could easily move into. Added to this is the traditional segmentation of markets along ethnic lines. An experienced Hausa trader of personal care products for instance finds it difficult to move into the building materials market dominated by Igbos.

I will now turn to the recommendations for resolution of the economic crisis, which will involve the people of Kano and their government.

Many of my recommendations have already been mentioned in the introduction to this paper. It is hoped that the comprehensive analysis above of why we are where we are, provides an insight into the logic of these recommendations.

The principal lesson from our analysis of the systemic dimension of crisis is that it reminds us that the Kano economy does not stand on its own. It is integrated into the Nigerian economy and affected by developments in the macro-economy. We must take an active interest in how the federal government runs the economy, and be a voice of protest and a source of political pressure in a nation that has been completely cowered and compromised by those in power. Some specific uncomfortable questions we must continue to ask are:

These sound like political issues but the answers to these questions go to the heart of our economic crisis. As mentioned earlier, the solutions to our economic maladies are ultimately to be found in a satisfactory transformation of the political. The Kano state government must use every means at its disposal, and our federal legislators must assist here- as well as academics, journalists, unionists, traditional rulers, religious leaders- in forging an opposition to corruption and mismanagement of the economy. The government should demand of its employees, no matter how highly placed, a visible identification with the interest of the people. We must salvage the economy if we are to survive as a part of it. Opposition should take the form of demand for public hearings, publicity, bills for consideration by the legislature, presentations at the Council of State, strikes, public processions and demonstrations and mass action. We need to be a vanguard for awakening the Nigerian people to the task before them of getting rid of leaders that will continue with the sinister project of destroying this nation.

In addition, Kano should stand against the attempt by this group of people to return one of their members to office in 2007. I have been explicit as to whom I hold responsible for the deepening of this crisis and I have no qualms about naming names. Northern leaders have been an important part and parcel of this destruction, but the present government of Kano was elected by the people as an expression of their rejection of that discredited leadership. These issues are not personal, but we must ensure that we give support only to leaders who will serve the interest of this country. Anything short of that from the Kano government will be a betrayal of its mandate. Kano people should, in the manner they stood for change in the last elections, lead the way in the search for change-not of the face or the "zone" or creed or tribe of the president- but of the ideological camp. We need a Nigerian government that is committed to the Nigerian people and Nigerian industry and agriculture, not a comprador state serving the interests of global capital and a corrupt and reactionary domestic elite.

On the structural aspect of the crisis, I have already given my key recommendations. These are a radical review of educational policy to facilitate development of productive forces by giving the population a good and diverse skills base, a return to our nationalist and cosmopolitan identity and rejection of parochial and fanatical tendencies, reconsideration of our attitude to women and defense of their right to aspire to full participation in public space, willingness to examine re-interpretations of religion in line with the present time and redistribution of income by encouraging rural and agricultural development.

The government should focus on developing extension services for rural farmers. This is because even where there are supplies of fertilizers, inputs and implements, farmers need assistance on how to improve yields and protect crops. Other support services include monitoring of the climate and forecasts to determine timing of the farming season. Government should continue the work started by the PRP government of rural electrification and the provision of infra-structure. All of these are standard recommendations.

I will only add here that there is an urgent need for land reform. If there is anything to learn from Hernando De Soto’s The Mystery of Capital, it is that reform of land laws to confer real ownership of land by title holders as capital is a major factor reducing poverty. Countries like Iran have taken on board De Soto’s ideas combined with the Islamic principles of ownership and reduced poverty by 25% according to some sources. The reforms in land ownership coupled with rural development facilitate diffusion of wealth and thus manage the concentration risks both spatially and vertically. They also broaden the economic base by increasing the importance of agriculture, which supports the largest percentage of the population.

On the appropriate model for Islam, let me just say that we do not have to take the extreme route of copying Kemalist Turkey or Pahlavi Iran. But we should not restrict ourselves either to models of reactionary, patriarchal monarchies like Saudi Arabia or religious autocracies like Iran. I would recommend that we look to countries like Malaysia and Indonesia, which offer good models of negotiating the difficult terrain of modernization without losing their Muslim identity, while still respecting their obligations to fellow citizens in a multi-religious society. The Malaysian model not only opens the door to the development of productive forces and economic development generally, it shows us the importance of modern education, the new role of Muslim women, and the promotion of social justice. Mahathir Mohamad should be a good model for Muslim political leaders.

I have in this paper reviewed the economic crisis facing Kano from systemic and structural perspectives. I have tried to give effect to my opening position that economic questions can only be understood by reference to the political. I hope that I have shown the clear link between these two realms, while preserving the primary objective of analyzing the economy. My political economy approach is designed to clarify, rather than becloud, the economic questions under discussion.

I should like to reiterate a theoretical position, as further clarification of this last point. I believe in the ultimately determining character of the economic instance. In other words, the struggle for political power and control of state machinery is driven ultimately by the desire to control the resources of the country and appropriate them in the service of specific economic classes. There can be no change in the living conditions of the poor people of Nigeria (who have so far been the victims of state political and economic violence) unless those who are committed to these people effective mobilize them in a process that leads ultimately to the capture of power. The foreign nations whose interests are served by those who presently control Nigeria are fully aware of this, which is why they can endorse blatant rigging of elections and human rights abuses and corruption in the name of a "learning process". We must also learn this lesson and not shy away from putting immense political pressure that will at least curtail the excesses of the state.

I have tried to show how the crisis in the economy is a product both of the reactionary macro-economic policies of successive federal governments since 1985, which have continued to the present-day, and the structural peculiarities of a Kano economy that is the inheritor to a feudal social formation. My recommendations have followed logically from my analyses and they clearly define the direction in which all of us, under the leadership of the state government, must move if we seek a genuine exit from this impasse.

In my analysis I have tried to draw on my theoretical training as an economist, and my personal observations as a banker and an indigene of the state. For professional reasons, I am unable to give specific instances to substantiate some of my observations, but many in this audience are familiar with some of the cases alluded to, but not mentioned by name. Let me also admit that I have limited experience of how government works in practice and absolutely no experience as a business- man. I expect that, in these areas in particular, this audience will find gaps that need to be filled. In any event, it is my hope that I have made a little contribution that can at least set the debate rolling and provide a framework for discussion. If I have achieved this, then my mission here is accomplished.