Karibi Whyte Vindicates Littoral States Text of the minority ruling on the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court on the resource control

Littoral States Vindicated

This ruling is on the preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of this court in the action brought by the Federal Attorney-General on behalf of the Federal Government against the 36 states of the federation as defendants. The defendants are also contending that the non-littoral states ought not to have been joined with the littoral states as defendants.

The action came up for mention on the 9th April, 2001. Parties were ordered to file and filed their briefs of argument in support of their preliminary objections and plaintiff was also ordered and filed a reply. The court fixed 21st May, 2001 for argument on the preliminary objection. With the exception of the 4th and 12th defendants, learned counsel expatiated orally on their briefs of argument. They urged dismissal of plaintiff's suit. Learned Attorney-General of the Federation opposed. After argument on that day, the court reserved ruling for the 11th July, 2001.

I have read the leading ruling of the learned Hon. Chief Justice. I have found it difficult to reconcile my understanding of the law and the exposition in the decided cases of the accepted, well settled principles of the law as applicable to the factual situation of this case, the constitutional position of the courts and the exercise of the jurisdiction in the determination of the rights granted by the constitution, with the reasoning and conclusions of the Hon. Chief Justice in his ruling.
I have therefore decided to state concisely, even if somewhat in extensor my reasons for holding a different view. The leading ruling has stated the provisions of the statement of claim. I do not want to repeat them. I adopt them.

Applicable rules of practice and procedure
The suit which gave rise to this preliminary objection was brought by the Attorney-General of the Federation of Nigeria as plaintiff in a writ of summons claiming against the defendants jointly and severally for, "a determination by the Supreme Court of the seaward boundary of a littoral state within the Federal Republic of Nigeria, for the purpose of calculating the amount of revenue accruing to the Federation Account directly from any natural resources derived from that state pursuant to section 162(2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999." (underlining is mine).

By section 232(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 suits by the Government of the Federation of Nigeria against any of the constituent states of the federation, or any suits brought by one state of the federation against another state or the Federal Government can only be commenced in the Supreme Court.

The is in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Section 232(1) aforesaid provides as follows: "(1) The Supreme Court shall, to the exclusion of any other court, have original jurisdiction in any dispute between the Federation and a State or between States if and in so far as that dispute involves any question (whether of law or fact) on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends."

The Supreme Court is an appellate court and the final court of appeal - See S.233(1) and S.235 of 1999 Constitution. The rules of procedure applicable to the exercise of this original jurisdiction of the court is provided in Order 3 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1985 as amended in 1999. Order 3 r.1 provides as follows - "In the exercise of the original jurisdiction of the Court, where no provision exists in the Rules, the practice and procedure of the Court shall be conducted in substantial conformity with the practice and procedure for the time being observed in the Federal High Court."

As Order 3 of the Rules of this court has not provided for rules governing joinder of parties to a suit, resort would be to the provision of Order 11 rules 3, and 5(3) of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules which are as follows - "3. All persons may be joined as defendants against whom the right to any relief is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative and judgement may be given against such one or more of the defendants as may be found to be liable according to their respective liabilities, without any amendment."
5(3) The Court may at any stage of the proceedings and on such terms as appear to the Court to be just, order that the name or names of any party or parties whether as plaintiffs or defendants, improperly joined, be struck out."
In accordance with the provisions of Order 3 rr.3, 5(3) of the Rules of this Court, the Plaintiff filed and served his statement of claim. All the defendants have also filed their statements of defence to the claim of the Plaintiff. Eleven of the Defendants names 1st, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 27th, 28th and 32nd have in their statements of defence raised preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of this Court to hear the suit. This they are allowed to do by virtue of the provisions of Order 36 rr.6(1)(2)(3). 7 of the rules of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) which provide, "7. If it appears to the Court that the decision of any question or issue arising in a cause or matter and tried separately from the cause or matter substantially disposes of the cause or matter or renders the trial of the cause or matter, unnecessary, it may dismiss the cause, or make such other order or give such judgement therein as may be just."

Order 36 r.6(1)(2)(3), which enables application to be brought for the trial of issues or questions provides- "(1) The Court may order any question or issue arising in a cause or matter, whether of fact or law, or partly of fact or partly of law, and whether raised by the pleadings or on disagreement as to document that should be put in evidence or otherwise, to be tried before, at or after the cause or matter, and may give directions as to the manner in which the question or issue shall be stated.
(2) An order under this rule may be made on application by a party or by the Court or a Judge in Chambers on its or his own motion.
(3) Application by any party for the Order shall be by Motion on notice stating the question or issue sought to be tried."
All the preliminary objections before us have been raised by way of motion on notice to the Plaintiff and/or stated as distinct averments in the statement of defence. This is in compliance with the provisions of Order 36 r.6 sub rules (1)(2)(3) reproduced above.

It is clear from the words of r.6 (1) that a defendant is not estoppeled from raising a point of law or of fact on which he relies for the dismissal of an issue arising from the action or of fact on which he relies for the dismissal of an issue arising from the action or of dismissing the action because he had already filed his defence as was hitherto the case and held in Aina v. Trustees of Nigerian Railway Corporation (1970) 1 All NLR.281. On the current rules above stated, the court can still peremptorily dismiss the suit even after the close of pleadings without hearing evidence, where the Plaintiff's statement of claim discloses no cause of action. - See Onibudo v. Akibu (1982) 7 SC.60 Onwonta v Minaise (1952) 14 WACA.77.

Consideration of the Preliminary Objections
In my opinion, the proper and most rewarding approach in considering the preliminary objections by the parties and the replies to them by the Attorney-General and the non-littoral states who share his views in the matter in the claim before the Court. First to give a meaningful construction of the claim as endorsed in the writ of summons. Secondly, to consider the propriety of the joinder of the parties. Thirdly, to determine the issue of jurisdiction. I concede that the ideal in any judicial determination where jurisdiction is raised as an issue, is first to determine that issue, which is undoubtedly fundamental to adjudication - See Madukoluy v. Nkemdilim (1962) 1 All NLR.587. But in this case because of the ambiguity in the endorsement of the claim in the writ of summons it is essential for a proper understanding of the claim to begin with and determines that issue first.

I now proceed to analyse the claim before the Court as endorsed on the writ of summons.

Analysis of the Claim in the writ of Summons
The claim as endorsed on the writ of summons is for "a determination by this Honourable Court of the seaward boundary of a littoral state within the Federal Republic of Nigeria, for the purpose of calculating the amount of revenue accruing to the Federation Account directly from any natural resources derived from that state pursuant to the proviso to section 162(2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999" (underlining mine). The endorsement of the claim is in two parts.

There seems to me the first part, which makes a demand only for a determination of the seaward boundary of a littoral state within the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The second part, which follows thereafter, is obviously not a claim since it does not call for a determination but merely the reason for seeking the determination of the seaward boundary of a littoral state.

A claim endorsed on a writ of summons is a legal demand as one's own, the assertion of right for the determination of the court. A court is only interested in and has a duty to consider the claim before it properly framed. It is not concerned with and should not be drawn into consideration of the motives or reasons for bringing a claim before it, which may be diverse and conflicting. Where however, there is ambiguity, it may accept the part of the endorsement, which has meaning and can be construed as a claim. - See Liman v. Mohammed (1999) 9 NWLR.116. The court is duty bound to strike out inappropriate words or sentence - See Omoborimola II v. Military Governor Ondo State (1998) 14NWLLR.89.

It seems to me preposterous to read into the claim endorsed on this writ of summons a claim for the purpose of calculating the amount of revenue accruing to the Federation account directly from any natural resources derived from that State. This, as stated by Plaintiff, being the purpose for bringing the claim cannot in my considered opinion also be a claim. The purpose so stated has not been so indicated as a claim even by the Plaintiff. It is difficult to conceive that this can be done through oral argument without amending the writ of summons. - See Liman v. Mohammed (supra), Onifade v. Oyedemi (1999) 4 NWLR.54. If the purpose for bringing an action is raised for the Plaintiff. -See Liman v. Mohammed (1999) 5 NWLR.54. This will be in conflict with its status and position of an unbiased and impartial arbiter.

The statement of claim of the Plaintiff was relied upon in amplification of the endorsement of the writ of summons and to argue that the purpose so indicated has any relationship with the claim, which is the determination of the seaward boundary of littoral states. I have not found any correlation between the endorsement and a substantial part of the statement of claim with the exception of para.8(b), there is nothing touching on the claim.

There is no doubt the determination of the claim will affect the calculation of federal revenue envisaged. However, that will only be so after determination of the claim. One questions whether such reasoning raises the issue of the purpose indicated to the status of a claim where no legal demand or assertion of right has been made on the endorsement of the writ of summons?

It cannot be too seriously argued that as a matter of general principle, any statement of claim not predicated upon a claim in the writ of summons goes to no issue and cannot be supported by any evidence. It is admitted the statement of claim if related to the claim in the writ, if different amends the claim in the writ of summons. Similarly, the statement of claim in this case which is not referable to any claim on the writ of summons goes to no issue. I therefore, am of the firm opinion that Plaintiff's claim is limited and confined to the determination of the seaward boundary of littoral states. I so hold. Any other consideration will be preposterous and manifestly inconsistent with the fundamental principles of adjudication. The view here adopted is supported by the Plaintiff's answer to the submission of the 3rd Defendant and 32nd Defendant when he stated that "what the president seeks in a pronouncement of the Supreme Court is as to the seaward boundary of a littoral state. It is after a pronouncement is made on this that the issue of natural resource derivation can be determined. Hence, this latter issue could not have been a claim before this court.

I have held that the only claim properly before the Court is the claim for a determination of the seaward boundary of a littoral state. I shall hereafter in all my consideration of the ruling be confined to and limited by the claim as validly endorsed on the writ of summons. I will therefore consider anon whether the non-littoral states joined as defendants can be properly joined in law.

The issue of Misjoinder
I now proceed to consider the joinder of parties to the claim, which in my opinion is not properly before the court.. There is misjoinder of the non-littoral states.
The following defendants have challenged the joinder of the non-littoral states to the claim against the littoral states, on the ground of misjoinder of parties. These are 1st, 3rd, 4th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 27th, 28th and 32nd defendants.
The real object of seeking to join defendants in an action is to facilitate the trial of the claim or claims against them. This is clearly brought out by the provisions of the enabling rules of practice. Order 11 rule 3 of the Federal High Court Rules prescribing the circumstances enabling all persons who may be joined as defendants provides that,

"3. All persons may be joined as defendants against whom the right to any relief is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative and judgement may be given against such one or more of the defendants as may be found to be liable according to their respective liabilities without any amendment."

It is obvious from the above provision that a proper joinder in accordance with the rule requires the Plaintiff to allege the existence of a right to relief against all the persons joined; so that judgement may be given against them, jointly, severally or in the alternative without any amendment. The implication is that Plaintiff must make a claim against all the parties joined, and must seek reliefs from each of them. To be entitled to be joined, the party seeking to be joined should be prosecutable as the defendant in the action. Thus, the object of the rule is to prevent a multiplicity of actions by enabling a Plaintiff to proceed in the same action against all persons whom he alleges he has the same relief - See Ekun & ors. V. Messrs. A. Younan & Sons & Anor. (1959) WRNLR.190. It is necessary for Plaintiff to show that all parties joined in the suit will be entitled to a share of interest in the subject matter of the suit and are parties whose presence is necessary for the effectual and proper determination of the case. - Peenok Investment Ltd. V. Hotel Presidential Ltd. (1982) 12 SC.1 - See JIA Enterprises v. B.C.I.CC. (1962) 1 All NLLR.363. It is not sufficient if all a party has is a mere interest in the result of the action. - See Christopher Okafor v. B. Nnodi (1963) NNLR.42. This is because there must be a dispute between the parties giving rise to the right of action. The fact that a dispute will arise subsequently after the Plaintiff had obtained judgement which will give rise to a cause of action is merely speculative and will not be sufficient reason to enable a joinder - See Okafor v. Nnodi (supra). Awani v. Erejuwa II (1976) 11 SC.307.

A distinction should be made and this counsel for the defendants have also pointed out, between a party who is merely interested in the outcome of the suit against whom there can be no claim or relief sought, See Guda v. Kitta (1999) 12 NWLR.21 Aromire v Awoyemi (1972) 2 SC.1 and a necessary party, against who there can be a claim or relief, and who would be irreparably prejudiced if he is not joined in the action. That is one of the tests in determining whether to join a person as a party to an action - See Oduola v. Coker (1981) 5 SC.197. Whereas the former cannot be joined as a defendant, the latter who is a necessary party is entitled to be joined. Another test for the determination whether several defendants can be joined is that the claims and reliefs against the defendants should be the same, and that the defences to the claim of the Plaintiff against the defendants can be tried together in the same suit. - See Okafor v. Nnaife (1973) 3 SC.85.

The Plaintiff has in the writ of summons and paragraphs 8(b) and 10 of the statement of claim sought only reliefs against the littoral states of Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Lagos,Ogun, Ondo and Rivers States who dispute the averment in paragraph 8 of the statement of claim. By the ordinary principle of construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the rest of the 28 states not mentioned are excluded - See Att.-Gen. Bendel State vs. Aideyan (1989) 4 NWLR (pt.118) African Ivory Ins. Co Ltdd v. Commissioner of Insurance (1998) 1NWLR. 646. Accordingly, the exercise of jurisdiction for determination of the seaward boundary of the littoral states sought can only be limited to the littoral states expressly named in paragraphs 8(b) and 10 of the statement of claim. This is because these are the only states against whom claims have been made and relief was being sought.

It is now fairly settled law that it is the cause of action as endorsed on the writ of summons that determines the proper parties before the Court - See Okoye v. NC & FC (1991) 6 NWLR.501 Afolayan v. Ogunrinde (1990) 1 NWLLR.396. It cannot be disputed that since no claim has been made and no relief was being sought against the non-littoral states, with whom the Plaintiff has no dispute, they cannot be joined with the littoral states - See Afolayan v. Ogunrinde (1990) 1 NWLR. (pt.127) 369. The relief claimed is only against littoral states. It is clear from the statement of claim that the joinder of the twenty-eight non-littoral states against whom Plaintiff has no dispute, has made no claim and sought no relief are not necessary for the determination of the action between Plaintiff and littoral states. The presence of the non-littoral states whose defence to the Plaintiff's action is adverse to the defence of the littoral states is very likely to confuse the trial, make the proceedings uniweldly and cause unnecessary delay.
It cannot be disputed as has been urged by the learned counsel for the defendants that where there is no dispute between Plaintiff and the non-littoral states, there is no legal right which Plaintiff seeks to enforce against them and there is no justifiable dispute. - See Elendu v. Ekwoaba (1998) 12 NWLR.320. In the absence of a justifiable dispute between Plaintiff and the twenty-eight non-littoral states, the Court lacks and cannot exercise jurisdiction over them. - See Adesanya v. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1981) 12 NSCC.146. It was submitted in argument before us that the non-littoral states are legitimately interested in the result of the action by the Plaintiff for the determination of the seaward limit of the littoral states since such a determination was likely to affect the calculation of the revenue accruing to the Federation and to that extent the share to be allocated to the States. The decision of this court in AG. of Bendel State v. AG. of the Federation & ors. (1981) 10 SC.1 was cited in support of the submission. The instant case is clearly distinguishable. In A-G Bendel State v. A-G for the Federation, the distribution of the revenue of the federation in issue was common to all the states ordered to be joined, and the determination of the suit was a matter beneficial to all. The states not joined were therefore necessary parties. In the instant case the issue is peculiar to the littoral states who are necessary parties. The non-littoral states who are not necessary parties will not be affected by the determination.

There is some clement of misconception of the law on the issue relied upon for this submission. It is not disputed that, and of course the 28 non littoral states are interested in the outcome of the litigation between Plaintiff and the littoral states. That however, does not make them necessary parties to the action. There is no direct benefit, which will result from the determination. Plaintiff joining the non-littoral defendants to the suit must show that the defendants have a present direct existing interest in the determination of the suit. - See In re Ojukwu (1998) 5 NWLR.673. A contingent case, which is merely an interest in futuro will not be sufficient. - See In re Yinka Folawiyo & Sons (1991) 7 NWLR.237; Chinweze v. Masi (1989) 1 NMLR.254, Ige v. Farinde (1994) 7-8 SCNL.284, Inane, speculative and hypothetical issues can only but be academic. Our courts are invariably and consistently declined to decide academic constitutional questions - See Atake v. Afejuku (1994) 9 NWLR.379; Nkwocha v. Gov. of Anambra State (1984) 6 SC.362. This is because as I have already pointed out, that Plaintiff has made no claim against them, and the non-littoral defendants. There is clearly no basis for a joinder.

In Nnodi v. Okafor (1963) NNLR.42, Plaintiff applied to join an insurance company as a defendant. The action was against the servant of the defendant who was the driver of the motor vehicle in an action for damages for negligence. The ground for the joinder was that the defendant was insured with the insurance company. It was held that the application must fail because there was no dispute between the Plaintiff and the insurance company and none could arise unless and until the Plaintiff had obtained judgement against the defendant.

The position in this case of the non-littoral Defendants is even weaker. A determination of the seaward limit of the boundary of the littoral states per se cannot confer a right of action on non-littoral states, who do not fall within the same category. It is true that a possible review of the formula for revenue allocation may result from the determination. But that is a speculation which cannot give rise to a cause of action - Ogbuchi v. Gov. of Imo State (1995) 9 NWLR (417) 53 Oyinloye v. Esinkin (1999) 10 NWLR.540. The non-littoral defendants are only nursing a hope, which may or may not materialise. For the reasons herein stated the conclusion is unescapable that the 28 non-littoral state joined in this action are not necessary parties to the action. Plaintiff has conceded that there is no dispute with them, no claim has been made against them. There is no doubt therefore this Court cannot exercise any jurisdiction over them within the meaning of section 232(1) of the 1999 Constitution which provides for the exclusive exercise of jurisdiction "in any dispute between the Federation and a State or between States if and in so far as that dispute involves any question (whether of law or fact) on which the existence of a legal right depends."
There is therefore a misjoinder of parties in this action.

Accordingly, this court is entitled to strike out the 28 non-littoral states from the suit in compliance with the provisions of Order 11 r.5 (3), which provides as follows- "The Court may at any stage of the proceedings and on such terms as appear to the Court to be just, order that the name or names of any party or parties, whether as Plaintiffs or defendants not properly joined be struck out."
Having held that the names of the non-littoral states have been improperly joined, I hereby order that they be struck out from the suit. I resolve this issue in favour of the preliminary objection.

The Issue of jurisdiction
I now turn to the issue of want of jurisdiction which has been the main contention of the littoral states and as I have stated earlier some of the non-littoral states. Several and varied arguments have been put forward ranging from the issue of the locus standi of the plaintiff, non-justiciability of the subject matter of the dispute, to there being no dispute, the action being premature, the precondition for exercise of the right of action having not been satisfied or whether the court was being called to decide a political question.

I have stated already that the exercise of the original jurisdiction of this Court is derived from the provisions of section 232(1) of the 1999 Constitution. Analysis of the section discloses that the original jurisdiction so conferred is with respect to any dispute between the Federation and a state or between states, which involves any question (whether of law of fact) on which the existence of a legal right depends.

The focus of this jurisdiction is on disputes between parties, the Federation and States or between States. It cannot be suggested that the subject matter of the exercise of jurisdiction is unlimited and at large. The expression that dispute involves any question (whether of law or fact on which the extent of a legal right depends, does not enable exercise of jurisdiction in every matter whatsoever. Accordingly, Section 232(1) only enables the exercise of jurisdiction vested in the Courts. Hence there can be no jurisdiction in respect of matters excluded by statute or constitution expressly - See Barraclough v. Brown (1897) AC.615. Accordingly, there must be:

1) A justiciable dispute between the parties.
2) The dispute must be between the Federation and a State or between States of the Federation.
3) The dispute must be that in which the existence or extent of a legal right of the Federal Republic of Nigeria or legal right of a state is involved.
4) The claim must relate to the establishment of such rights which have been violated or a threat to their violation.

The exercise of this jurisdiction invariably involves the exercise of the judicial powers of the 1999 Constitution. Hence a proper construction of the amplitude of the exercise of the original jurisdiction of this Court requires a reading together of section 232(1) and section 6(6)(b) of the 1999 Constitution. Thus constructed, it is confined to the exercise of jurisdiction within the judicial powers of the Constitution.

The contention in this case is whether this court has jurisdiction to hear the claim of the Plaintiff against the defendant? To answer this question, it is necessary to show that the claim must disclose a justifiable dispute between the parties, and a relief against the defendants. This will depend also upon the claim disclosing a cause of action in the Plaintiff giving rise to a locus standi. The 1st, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 16th, 27th, 28th and 32nd defendants have in their briefs of argument, and oral argument listed and relied on a varied catalogue of grounds taken together or separately why this court cannot exercise jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the Plaintiff against the Defendants.

The grounds for the preliminary objection raised fall into two categories - There are grounds which raise the issue of the competence of the court to hear the action, such as relating to the subject matter of the action namely: (I) The subject matter being a boundary dispute; (ii) the subject matter pertains to international law; (iii) the subject matter within the competence of the legislature; (iv) the subject matter involves the determination of political question.
Issues concerning competence of the Plaintiff to bring the action are that: (I) there is no locus standi in the Plaintiff to bring the action; (ii) there is no cause of action in the Plaintiff (iii) the action is premature; (iv) the action is frivolous, speculative and an abuse of the judicial process.

I have already discussed the objection relating to grounds of joinder of the non-littoral states as parties to the action. The ensuring discussion is concerned with the issue of the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. I have confined my consideration of the objection to jurisdiction to the claim before the court and the relief sought in the statement of claim.

The jurisdiction of the Court
a) Whether there is a justiciable dispute
The contention of the eleven defendants in this case is that the exercise of the original jurisdiction of the court is founded on the existence of a justiciable dispute between the Federation and the State or States or between two states. Again such dispute must involve determination of any question of law or fact on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends. They contend that there is no dispute in the averments in the statement of claim to support the action, accordingly the Court lacks he requisite jurisdiction.

The submission of Plaintiff is support of jurisdiction is that the statement of claim and the relief sought clearly show that the court has jurisdiction. Counsel relied on Adeyemi v. Opeyori (1976) 10 N.S.C.C.455 at P.464 and Ezenkwe v. Nnadozie 14 WACA.361 for the submission. Plaintiff argued that the dispute or controversy relied upon for this action relates to the discharge of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of responsibilities under Section 162 of the Constitution 1999. The averments in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the statement of claim touch on the principal of derivation under section 162(2) of the Constitution 1999.

It was submitted that, There is a very serious dispute between the Federal Government and some of the State Governments as to the seaward boundary of those littoral States. It was argued that in turn creates a controversy as to whether natural resources located offshore the Nigerian coastal belt must be treated as Federal or belonging to littoral States. A combined reading of paragraphs 8 and 10 of the statement of claim establishes the dispute between the Federal Government and the states challenging the jurisdiction of the court.

I have already outlined the essential ingredients for the exercise of the original jurisdiction of this Court. It is important for a determination of the issue to consider the meanings of the expression "dispute" and "existence or extent of a legal right within Section 232(10 of the Constitution 1999. The word "dispute", and expression "extent of a legal right" in section 232(1) in pari materia with section 212(1) was the subject matter of the construction in Att- Gen. Of Bendel State v. Att-Gen. Of the Federation & ors. (1982) 3 NCLR.1 at p.56 where the word dispute was construed to mean a justiciable dispute. A justiciable dispute must involve any question of law or fact, on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends.

Again, in Att-Gen. Of the Federation v. Att-General of Ondo State & ors.(1982) 13 NSCC.567, it was stated that to invoke the original jurisdiction of this court, there must be a justiciable dispute between the Federation and the defendant State or States, and that the dispute must involve the determination of a legal right.

The matter was further explained in Att-Genreal of Ondo State v. Att. Gen. of the Federation (1983) 14 NSCC.512 at p.521 where it was stated, that the state which complains right (either based on the constitution, statute law or some other law) which is injured or threatened."

These decisions clearly establish the well settled law the only a justiciable dispute between the Federal Government and State, or between State will enable the invocation of the original jurisdiction of this court. It is important to point out that in Att-Gen. of Bendel State v. Att.Gen of the Federation & ors. (supra)the court accepted the distinction between justiciable dispute or controversy which gives a right of action from a mere dispute of a hypothetical, academic or abstract nature which does not. A justiciable dispute must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of a specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character. This is to be distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be in a hypothetical situation.

It is now appropriate to examine the writ of summons and the statement of claim of determine from them whether a justiciable dispute is disclosed.
The word jurisdiction means the authority the court has to decide matters before it or to take cognisance of matters presented in a formal way for its decision. See Ndaeyo v. Ogunnaya (1977) 1 SC.11. National Bank v. Shoyoye (1977) 5 SC.181. Plaintiff has submitted, relying on the averments in paragraph 10 of the statement of claim that there is dispute between Plaintiff and the 3rd, 6th, 9th, 10th, 24th, 27th and 28th. Defendants on the facts averred in paragraphs 8 to 10 of the statement of claim which read as follows: -

"8. By reason of the facts pleaded in paragraph 5,6 and 7 of this statement of claim, the Plaintiff states that for the purpose of calculating the amount of revenue accruing to the Federation Account directly from any natural resources derived from any State or territory pursuant to the provision to Section 162 of the Constitution: -
(a) The natural resources located within the boundaries of any State are deemed to be derived from that State;
(b) In the case of the littoral States comprised in the Federal Republic of Nigeria (i.e. the States of Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo and Rivers) the seaward boundary of each of the said States is the low water mark of the land surface thereof or (if the case so requires) the seaward limits of inland waters within the state;
(c) The natural resources located with the territorial waters of Nigeria and the Federal Capital Territory are deemed to be derived from the Federation and not from any State;
(d) The natural resources located within the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of Nigeria are subject to the provisions of any treaty or other agreement between Nigeria and any neighbouring littoral foreign state, derived from the Federation and not from any state.

9. In further support of the averments in paragraph 8 of this statement of claim of Plaintiff will contend at the trial of this action that under the provisions contained in the Constitution it is only the Federal Government of Nigeria and not the Government of any of the States comprised in the Federal Republic of Nigeria that has power to: -
i) exercise legislative executive or judicial powers over the entire area designated as the "territorial waters of Nigeria" pursuant to the provisions of the Territorial Waters Act, Cap.428, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990, as amended.
ii) Exercise any of the sovereign rights exercisable by Nigeria over the entire area designated as the "Exclusive Economic Zone" pursuant to the provisions of the Exclusive Economic Zone Act, Cap.110. Laws for the Federation of Nigeria, as amended.

10. The States of Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Ogun, Ondo and Rivers dispute the averment of the Federal Government of Nigeria as pleaded in paragraph 8 hereof and claim that natural resources located offshore ought to be treated or regarded as located within their respective States.

Whereupon the Plaintiff claims:-
A determination by this Honourable Court of the seaward boundary of a littoral State within the Federal Republic of Nigeria for the purpose of calculating the amount of revenue accruing to the Federation Account directly from any natural resources derived from that State pursuant to the provision to Section 161(2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999."

It is a fundamental principle of law that the claim of the Plaintiff determines the jurisdiction of the court, and not the defence of the defendant. - See Adeyemi v. Opeyemi(1976) 9-10 SC.31, Izenkwe v. Nnadozie (1953) 14 WACA.361. The claim of the Plaintiff is for a determination of the seaward boundary of the littoral States. The only averment in the statement of claim which relates to this claim is paragraph 8(b) which states that the seaward boundary of each of the said states is the low water mark of the land surface thereof or (if the case so requires) the seaward limits of inland waters within the State." All the other averments, apart from paragraph 9 which aver the powers of the Federal Government and, 10 which is the relief are averments concerning the location and control of natural resources.

There is accordingly no averment of a dispute between the parties, the existence of right in the Plaintiff and the violation of such right by the Defendant which gives right to an action. -See Aromire v. Awoyemi (1972) 1 All NLR (pt.10 101, Ume-Ezeoke v. Makarli (19820 3 NCLR.662, Emiator v. Nigerian Army (1999) 12 NWLR.362, Ogunmokun v. Military Administrator, Osun State (1999) 3 NWLR.261. No relief has been claimed against the non-littoral states in the statement of claim having been excluded in paragraphs 8 and 10 of the statement of claim as the states with which Plaintiff has no dispute. The Court can therefore not in the absence of any dispute exercise jurisdiction - See Badejo v. Federal Ministry of Education (1996) 8 NWLR (pt.464) 15, Aromire v. Awoyemi (1972) 1 All NLR (pt.1) 101; Kalio v. Daniel-Kalio (1975) 2 SC.15.
b) The existence of a legal right

It is also relevant for the determination of this preliminary objection to determine the existence or extent of the legal right of the Plaintiff in the claim. This is a requirement of Section 232(1) of the 1999 Constitution. As I have already stated, the claim before the Court is the determination of the seaward boundary of the littoral states. The reasons for bringing the action, not being a claim, is not subject matter for determination.

There are no averments in the statement of claim of the existence or extent of the legal right of the Plaintiff in the determination of the boundary of the littoral states. The averment in paragraph 9 which claims exclusive legislative, executive ad judicial authority of the Federal Government over the territorial waters of Nigeria and the Exclusive Economic Zone has not averred that the littoral States are not an integral part of the Federation of Nigeria. The legal right of the Plaintiff in the relation to the claim against the defendants has not been averred. These averments are therefore not relevant.

Plaintiff claims and avers a dispute with the littoral states. There is nothing in the statement of claim which shows the nature of the dispute, the injury to Plaintiff, resulting from the acts of the Defendants or any threat to the enjoyment of such legal right. The rights claimed to be threatened is that of share of the revenue from the Federation Account. What is before us is an entirely different matter, namely the determination of the seaward boundary. A dispute will only arise when the littoral States perform acts affecting the constitutional right of the federal government with respect to the seaward boundary of their states. No such situation has arisen. - See Governor of Oyo State v. A-G of the Federation (1983) 4 NCLR.495.

In my opinion founded on analysis of the claim of the Plaintiff and the averments in the statement of claim there are no facts disclosing a juticiable dispute. There is undoubtedly a disagreement between the parties on the issue of the seaward boundary of the limit of littoral States. This mere disagreement of parties per se does not confer a justiciable dispute on the court - See A-G. Eastern Nigeria v. A-G. Federation (supra). The Plaintiff is required to establish a legal right by the Defendant. Plaintiff having failed to establish any of these essential requisites has not shown the existence of a dispute. -See Att-Gen Ondo State v. A-G of the Federation (supra).

I shall now consider the specific issues concerning the subject matter of the claim relating to jurisdiction.

(I) Determination of Boundary: The issue of the determination of the seaward boundary of littoral States, has given rise to a lot of legal issues which bristle with subtleties. The contention of the Defendants in this case is that Plaintiff lacks the requisite jurisdiction to determine the matter because there is no justiciable dispute between Plaintiff and the Defendants giving rise to the claim to the determination of the boundary. Arguing that the power to delimit boundaries having been vested in the Executive or the Legislative through the Agency of the National Boundaries Commission, the courts will be violating the letter and spirit. It was also submitted that there is no jurisdiction because this is a matter of the separation of the exercise of constitutional powers and functions. The exercise of the jurisdiction will tantamount to the usurpation but the court of the exercise of the powers vested by the constitution in the Legislature and the Executive. It was also submitted that there is no jurisdiction because the determination of coastal boundary touches on the law of the sea and therefore within the subject matter of International Law and falls under the realm of International Law.

In answer to these submissions Plaintiff submitted that States are made up of the areas stated against them in accordance with section 3(2) of the Constitution and the second schedule. These include the local governments in the littoral States, the areas of which do not extend to the high seas. There are no local governments in the High Seas. The inference that the Constitution has created local governments without boundaries was rejected as untenable. The court is now called upon to determine the seaward boundaries of the local governments of these littoral States. It was submitted that this can be done by examining the provisions of the Constitution.

The claim of the Plaintiff is for the determination of the seaward boundary of the littoral States. This undoubtedly is the subject matter before the Court. The Plaintiff has in paragraph 8(b) of the statement of claim averred that "the seaward boundary of each of the said States is the low water mark of the land surface thereof or (if the case so requires) the seaward limits of inland waters within the State.

Defendants deny this averment. The contention of the Plaintiff that the determination of the seaward boundary of littoral states is an interpretation of provisions of the Constitution is fairly difficult to comprehend. The relevant provisions of the Constitution sought to be construed in relation to the claim has not been referred to and there are no averments in the statement of claim of the issue to be construed. It is well settled that a pleading must be sufficient, comprehensive and accurate - See James v. Midomotors Nigeria Co. Ltd. (1978) 11 & 12 SC.31 at p.63. Plaintiff having not averred sufficient facts in support of the claim cannot be allowed to raise and rely on the issue contended. Indeed Plaintiff has admitted that there is a very serious dispute as to the seaward boundary of the littoral States, but that the determination of the boundary was being sought because of the matter of the sharing of avenue. Obviously, this is an admission of a boundary dispute.

In the determination of the objection the Court takes into account the subject matter which is the adjustment of the boundary of littoral States. Section 8(2) of the Constitution 1999 has vested in the Legislature matters relating to boundaries. For the purpose, the Legislature has enacted the National Boundary, etc. Commission Act Cap.238 with the specific functions of determining and intervening in any boundary dispute that may arise between Nigeria and any of her neighbours or between any two States of the Federation with a view to setting such a dispute - Section 3(a). It cannot be disputed that the adjusted of boundaries, being sought in the instant case, is a boundary dispute.

It is important to take cognisance of the fact that the extent of the Territorial aters and of the Exclusive Economic Zone were fixed by Acts of the Legislature - See Territorial Waters Act Cap.428 and Exclusive Economic Zone Act. Cap.116 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1999. Why then not the Boundary of littoral States? The section did not provide for boundary disputes between the Federation and any state or states. Accordingly the National Boundary Commission is the only competent body to determine boundary disputes between States of the Federation. In Adesina v. The Commissioner Ifon/Itobu Boundary Commission, Osogbo (1996) 4 SCNJ.112, 120, Adio JSC held that a High Court has no jurisdiction to determine boundaries between two communities under the Local Government Law, Cap.69, Laws of Western Nigeria. It is pertinent to state that there can be no Federation with littoral State and seaward boundary in the absence of the littoral States.
Understandably, since the Federation is constituted by all the 36 States of the Federation, there cannot be a dispute between the Federation as a whole and any of the States, all of who are integral and inseparable parts and are co-owners of the Federation.

By analogy with the ownership of communal land by all members of the family who are co-owners, as a claim for declaration of title is not maintainable against a member of the family in respect of family land, so the Federal Government cannot maintain an action for the determination of the boundary of a State - See Salawu Yoye v. Olubode (1974) All NLR.657. Implicit in the concept of co-ownership is the presumption that all the co-owners are as of right part owners of the whole.
The Federal Government which represents all the constituent States of the Federation holds in trust and exercises the powers of the Federation for and on behalf of all the states. It can therefore not bring an action against any of the parts of the Federation.

I am unable to accept the contention that the determination of the "seaward boundary" of a littoral State is a matter of international law and within the jurisdiction of international courts. It is well accepted that only Nation states are subjects of international law and subject to the jurisdiction of international Courts. - See The Reparation of Injuries Case ICJ Reports (19499), 179. However, the component states of a country has these defendant states, are integral part of the country and are subject to the municipal laws and the domestic courts of the country. accordingly, where the subject matter before the court can be shown to be justiciable the fact that it has an international flavour will not deprive the Courts of the country of their jurisdiction Unfortunately the claim in this case has not been shown to be justiciable.

The subject matter being for the determination of the seaward boundary of a littoral State has no nexus with international law. The claim is merely for a determination of the "seaward" "boundaries" of littoral States. That is the true territorial boundaries seaward of the country.

(ii) Political Question: It was submitted by the 9th Defendant that the case raises a political question. These are question which are thorny in nature and could be better resolved extra-judicially by agencies constitutionally vested with jurisdiction to do so. Plaintiff submitted that the statement of claim did not raise a political issue. It was contended that the claim was justiciable and satisfied the criteria laid down in A-G of Ondo State v. A-G of the Federation & ors. (supra). The consensus is that any attempt by the courts to exercise jurisdiction in political issues would lure it into a political thicket from which it will be difficult to extricate itself. Finkelstein in an article in 37 Havard Law Review (1924) 338 at p.344 has suggested that Political questions are those matters of which the Court at a given time, will be of opinion that it is impolitic or inexpedient to take jurisdiction. The Courts have traditionally refused to exercise jurisdiction where they have felt that the exercise of judicial power was inappropriate - See Attorney - Gen. of Eastern Nigeria v. A-G of the Federation (1964) in All NLR.224. The dispute in the instant case relates to a matter vested in the legislature. Our system of government and our constitutional structure entrenches the exercise of separation of constitutional powers among the three equal ands separate departments of the Constitution. The exercise by usurpation of one of the constitutional functions of the other is very likely to result in conflicts and productive of a constitutional crisis. - See Attorney-General of Anambra State v. Okafor (1992) 2 NWLR.396 Garba v. FCSC. (1988) I NWLR.449 Musa v. Hamza & ors. (1982) 3 NCLR .299.

In determining whether the matter before the court involves a political question it is important to consider the appropriateness under our system of government of attributing finality to the action of the political departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination. The Constitution has in the instant case vested the determination of boundary disputes in the political departments,. By the obvious absence of a legislative provision governing any boundary dispute between the Federation and the states, it has left that issue for political determination through appropriate legislation and executive action. "The Constitution has" as stated by Justice Franfurter in the United States, decision of South v. Peters 339 U.S.276 (1950) "left the performance of many duties in our governmental scheme to depend on the fidelity of the executive and legislative action, and ultimately on the vigilance of the people in exercising their political rights." This is the position in this country and backed by our Constitution. Besides, the courts are ill-equipped to engage in the question of determining boundaries when they have no materials for the exercise. Courts are only equipped to determine disputes where the lines of contention between parties have been drawn. Its machinery is not designed to find its solution in an uncharted sea. Hence in such situations of the exercise of jurisdiction which are not judicial there must be some tolerable level of judicial self-limitation in the cases which trench upon the exercise of the constitutional powers of the legislature and the executive. I agree with the Defendants that the determination of the subject matter of this action is the circumstances will involve taking political decisions. These are decisions which the courts have neither the experience, wisdom, facilities, nor responsibility to undertake. The decision even if embarked upon will be academic- See Onuyoha v. Okafor & ors. (1988) 2 NWLR.105.

Competence of Plaintiff to bring the action
I now turn to the question of the competence of Plaintiff to bring the action. I shall consider in this part of the question whether Plaintiff has a cause of action, the issue that the action is premature, locus standi of the Plaintiff and whether the action is an abuse of the judicial process.
It was the contention of the and 6th Defendants that the action of the Plaintiff does not disclose a reasonable cause of action. It was also submitted that Plaintiff has no locus standi and that the action abuse of the judicial process. Plaintiff in answer contended that the submission is misconceived. The learned Att-General submitted that Plaintiff that Plaintiff had locus standi under the Constitution to initiate the suit and that the statement of claim disclosed a real and justiciable dispute. I shall now consider the question whether there a cause of action.

Whether there is a cause of action: The competence of the Plaintiff to institute the action lies entirely on their being a cause of action. A cause of action has been defined in several decisions of this Court. Concisely put it has been defined to mean the aggregate of fact or facts which gives to the Plaintiff the right to a judicial relief. See Egbe v. Adefarasin (1987) 3 NWLR.480; Patkum Industries Ltd. v. Niger Shoes Mfg. Co. Ltd. (1988) 5 NWLR. 138.

What are the factual situations as averred in the statement of claim which gives to Plaintiff a right of action? The averments in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8(a)ªb)(c)(d), 9, 10 of the statement of claim, which are all that was pleaded did not refer to the factual situation which has given rise to the action. They also do not give to Plaintiff a right to relief. Accordingly Plaintiff's writ of summons and statement of claim have not given rise to a cause of action.- See Ogbimi v. Oloto (1993) 7 NWLR (pt.304) 128 Akintola v. Solano (1986) 2 NWLR (pt.24) 596, Kwara State Ministry of Agriculture &n ors. v. Societe Generale Bank & ors. (1998) II NWLR.574 at p.578.

Learned Attorney-General of the Federation has argued that since there is an existing law on the subject matter in the Federation has argued that since there is an existing law on the subject matter in the Allocation of Revenue (Federation Account, etc.' (Amendment) Decree (Act) 1992 No. 106 of 1991, the fact that the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is yet to present a Bill to the National Assembly on revenue allocation in accordance with the provisions of section 162(2) of the 1999 Constitution did not render the action premature.
With the greatest respect, this seems to me a clear misunderstanding of the claiming the writ of summons. The claim is not for the interpretation of the formula for revenue allocation and does not concern any determination of that issue which was not a claim before the Court. The question whether the action is premature, should concern the claim before the Court. The question whether the action is premature, should concern the claim for the determination of the seaward boundary of the littoral states which was the claim before the Court.

A dispute as to the seaward boundary of the littoral states can only properly arise after the National Boundary Commission vested with jurisdiction to determine the issue had so determined; and if the determination is subject matter of dispute between Plaintiff and the littoral States. At any rate, section 3(a) of the National Boundary Commission Act has not provided for the determination of boundary dispute between the Federal Government and any of the constituent States. The action is therefore premature and is incompetent. - See Adesola v. Abidoye (1999) 14 NWLR (pt.637) 28. The action is obviously premature and not ripe for litigation.

Whether Plaintiff has Locus Standi
The objection of lack of locus standi has been raised by the 4th and 9th Defendants on two different grounds. Whereas the 4th Defendant relies on the fact that Plaintiff who had sued in a representative capacity, had not been shown to have obtained the consent of the other arms of the Government and accordingly had not complied with the provisions of Orders 3(1) 5(1) (a) of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1985. The 9th Defendant contends that Plaintiff has not averred in his statement of claim how his civil rights and obligations with regard to his share of Revenue (Federation Account, etc.) (Amendment) Decree. No. 106 of 1992.

The learned Att-General for the Federation in reply contended that Plaintiff has locus standi. He relied on Section 232(1) of the Constitution 1999 which vests special jurisdiction in this Court with respect to disputes between the Federation and a State or States. This case is between the Federation and States and not between individuals. It was submitted relying on A-G. of Ondo State v. A-G. of the Federation & ors. (1983) 2 SCNLR.269 that once a real dispute between the parties is established, there is locus standi.

The locus clusicus of locus standi in actions before our courts in the decision of this Court in Adesanya v. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1981) All NLR. (Reprint).

1. Locus standi is defined to mean the legal right of a party to an action to be heard in a litigation before a court of law or tribunal. The expression encompasses the legal capacity to institute, initiate or commence an action in a competent court of law or tribunal without inhibition obstruction or hindrance from any person or body whatsoever including the provision of any existing law. The locus standi raises the question whether the person whose standing is in issue is the proper person to seek an adjudication of the issue. It is not whether the issue itself is justiciable; or whether the case was likely to succeed. The issue is whether the Plaintiff has sufficient legal interest, that is, whether there is a breach of the civil rights and obligations of the Plaintiff. - See Ogbuchi v. Governor of Imo State (1995) 9 NWLR. (pt.417) 53; Adesanya v. Shagari (1981) 2 NCLR.358 Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) I All NLR.587. There is no issue more fundamental in the entire process of adjudication than that of access to justice.
The twin factors to be considered in determining locus standi, are that (i)Plaintiff must be able to show that his civil rights and obligations have been or is in danger of being violated or infringed, and (ii) Plaintiff must have a justiciable dispute with the Defendant. These two factors must co-exist to establish the locus standi of the Plaintiff.

In the instant case it has not been shown that the civil rights and obligations of the Plaintiff have been violated or infringed or are in danger of being violated or infringed. I have been unable to find the wrongful act committed by the Defendants against the Plaintiff which will give Plaintiff a right of action. It is also difficult to conceive how the determination of the seaward boundary of a littoral State, can violate or infringe the legal right of the Plaintiff. I have not found any civil right of the Plaintiff in the averments in the statement of claim. I have already held that the Plaintiff, the littoral States, and the non-littoral States, are integral members and co-owners of the Federation of Nigeria which Plaintiff represents. Plaintiff therefore has no locus standi and cannot therefore bring any action for a declaration against the littoral States for the determination of the subject matter of the co-ownership-See Yoye v. Olubode (1974) All NLR. The Plaintiff therefore lacks the locus standi to bring the action.

Necessity of Consent
On the submission of the 4th Defendant that Plaintiff needs the consent of the other departments of the Constitution for the validity of the action, section 20(a) (b) of the Supreme Court Act, Cap.424 is a complete and conclusive answer. It provides :-
"20 Any proceedings before the Supreme Court arising out of a dispute referred to in section 212(1) (now section 232(1) of the Constitution and brought by or against the Federation or a state shall
(a) in the case of the Federation be brought in the name of the Attorney-General of the Federation;
(b) in the case of a State being brought in the name of the Attorney-General of the State."

The abuse of the judicial process
The 1st Defendant has submitted that the action of the Plaintiff against the Defendants is frivolous, academic, vexations and speculative and that it is an abuse of the judicial process. Analysis of the writ of summons and statement of claim and the trend of the action appears to justify the criticism.

The critical factors in the determination of whether an action is an abuse of the judicial process are considerations of the circumstances for bringing the suit, the reasons for doing so, the grounds relief upon for instituting the action and the desirability for instituting the action. The endorsement on the writ o summons and the averments in paragraphs of the statement of claim demonstrate unequivocally the academic nature of the claim in the writ of summons, and the lack of bona fides of the Plaintiff in respect of the claim. The claim ostensibly is for the determination of the seaward boundary of the littoral States, whereas the real purpose which is speculative is for the subsequent calculation of the formula for the allocation of revenue. This latter and actual purpose for instituting the action has not been put forward as a claim.

The Plaintiff is aware and has admitted that there is no dispute with the non-littoral States and no relief was being claimed from them. Nevertheless Plaintiff insists on joining them as parties to the action and of prosecuting the non-existent claims against them. There can be nothing more vexations and frivolous.
Plaintiff has no separate and independent civil rights and obligations from those of the littoral States who are co-owners in the determination of their seaward boundary. The insistence of Plaintiff on prosecuting the claim in the absence of any enabling law, and the fact that the defendants littoral States are minority co-owners of the seaward boundary sought to be determined in the action clearly demonstrate a vexatious attitude in asserting in the suit an imagined and non-existent right of action. One of the factors which qualifies an action as an abuse of the judicial process is the absence of an iota of applicable law supporting the court process. - See Sakari v. Kotoye (1992) 9 NWLR. (pt.264) 156 at p. 189.

It is an abuse of the process of the Court when a party improperly uses the machinery of the judicial process to the irritation and annoyance of his opponent and the efficient and effective administration of justice. - See Olutinrin v. Agaka (1998) 6 NWLR. 367. The abuse lies in the intention, purpose and aim of the person exercising the right to harass, irritate and annoy the defendant and interfere with the due administration of justice. - See Sakari v. Kotoye (1992) 9 NWLR (pt.264) 156, 188. The abuse does not lie in the exercise of the right of action per se which is constitutionally guaranteed. It is in the improper, irregular and unconscionable manner of the exercise of the right, which is oppressive, reckless and vindictive. - See Gomwalk v. Military Administrator, Plateau State (1998) 6 NWLR.653. In essence, it seems to me the overriding consideration is the complete absence of a right and the inconveniences, inequisities involved in the aims and purposes for the institution of the action which constitutes the abuse. Otherwise, where there is a right to bring an action, the state of mind of the Plaintiff exercising the right cannot affect the validity or propriety of its exercise - See Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles (1895) AC.587. The facts of this case and the circumstances surrounding the prosecution of the claim, demonstrably and without doubt is a veritable abuse of the judicial process. There cannot be a more appropriate example.

Conclusion
I am satisfied and for the reasons I have given in this ruling that the grounds on which this Court should decline the exercise of its jurisdiction in the subject matter of this action are valid and overwhelming. It seems to me unnecessarily ambitious for this Court to assume jurisdiction where the law has not vested any. The thirst to assume jurisdiction should be prudently controlled by the reasonableness and propriety of its exercise. The watch-word in the situation is caution. It is preposterous to assume jurisdiction where there is no cause of action. Similarly indiscreet to do so in a factual situation fraught with dangerous political consequences and fit only for political resolution. This is because the court will by so doing be sowing seeds of inevitable recurring political disputes with their attendant imminent social conflicts. To assume jurisdiction in such circumstances is like sailing on an uncharted sea without a compass or driving to an unknown destination without a road map. As Angels of justice, the courts should avoid treading dangerous alleys.

It is hardly disputable that where there is no cause of action, there cannot be a justiciable dispute. The court should not be overly anxious to expand its jurisdiction in situations where the law has granted none. I find the preliminary objection substantiated. In Mills v. Renner (1940) 6 WACA. 144 at p.145 the West African Court of Appeal counseled that "It would be manifestly absurd to suggest that a court was bound to proceed with the taking of lengthy evidence of the parties to a suit where it appeared that the whole suit could be decided upon the pleadings without any evidence being called." This dictum made more than sixty years ago is still valid and properly applicable to the facts of the instant case.

This Court should strike out the claims of the Plaintiff. The duty of our Courts in the exercise of the judicial powers of the Constitution vested in them involves limiting the exercise of such powers to the case made by the parties, and not go to outside the claim validly and properly made to consider reliefs not claimed - See Jatau v. Mailafiya (1998) 14 NWLR (pt.338) 682. It is the sacred duty and binding obligation of our courts to determine only the case validly and properly made before them by the parties. - See Rockonboh Property Co. Ltd. v. R.C.C.(Nig) Ltd. (19980 2 NWLR.683. In the instant case Plaintiff is seeking the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court on speculation of a right in futuro, i.e. a non existing right and not a right in fieri. The exercise of jurisdiction on such a claim will result in violation of one of the fundamental principles of adjudication. - which is that the Court should confine its decision to the claim properly made before it. If it is otherwise, the court may be seen, or appear to be seen, as the invisible and unseen third party in the litigation. It will be invidious and odious to speculate on the inclination of the side of the litigating parties of the third party. This is a deleterious insinuation which the fragile and thin image of the Judiciary can ill afford to incur in the face of the whirlwind of adverse public criticism. Our Judiciary, the last hope of the common man deserves to be protected by the justice of the decisions of our Courts.

I accordingly uphold the submission of the Defendants who have filed the preliminary objections and hereby strike out the action of the Plaintiff against the Defendants in its entirety.
I make no order as to costs.