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Neither a Candidate nor an Office Holder be! (11) Level Playing Field, is the Solution to Fears over Self-Succession in 2003. By In part 1, I dealt with the basis of fears over an office holder doubling as a candidate and pleaded with the President that he could take one. Certainly he could not function in both capacities without doing damage to the political order and to his legacies. In this part, i.e. part 11, I shall be further arguing that the only solution to the imminent crisis over the 2003 is for the President and the current office holders to guarantee a level playing field for all competitors that would include them. I was not surprised that the President expressed the fear of some Nigerians when he said that some Nigerians are asking, "What does Obasanjo want again?" This should not be new to him as he too expressed this same fear when General Yakubu Gowon wanted to run on the platform of the National Republican Convention in 1993. In preparation for the 2003, those who raised this fear are of three kinds.
1. ONE TERM FOR ONE ETHNIC GROUP There are some Nigerians who genuinely believe that a President should go round. Consequently, one term of four years would be enough for any group in Nigeria of 250 ethnic nationalities. The Nigeria’s talk of rotation, zoning and power shift flows from this feeling. They say these things without the political parties. Is there a law that would mandate all the six political parties to nominate the Presidential candidates from one region, zone, or ethnic group?
What we note is that all the various accusations of President’s favoritism shown to the Yorubas by the north and Igbo are too loud for the President to ignore at his peril. They are responsible for the demand that the office of the President should go elsewhere.
There is the psychological explanation why the office of the President should go round. Professor Ben Nwabueze supplied this on why the Igbo want to be President. According to him: The legitimacy of the Igbo Presidency must be considered from the standpoint of thedegrading effect on the personality and psyche of N’Igbo by the exclusion from the office for so long.
He made a distinction between those who want more amenities for the Igbo states now such as the Governors and those who want the Presidency for the sake of the Igbo personality. According Professor Nwabueze, The degradation cannot be made good by the provision of more roads and other social amenities in Igbo land.
It is the provision of amenities that President Obasanjo could offer and if at the end, he is not winning the support of the Igbo leaders what should he do? President Obasanjo cannot solve the deprivation that Igbo suffered as a result of the Civil War. This is too fundamental. The message for the President from the commitment of the Ndigbo to seek the office of the President in 2003 is that the 2003 election should not be taken lightly.
The position of the Governors who recently secured some road contract from the President may not satisfy the Ohaneze. What they need is a level playing field for all. It is no longer the usual argument of marginalization. The matter lies far deeper than that. Laying down the law, Professor Nwabueze said: It involves issues of psychology and the perception of Ndigbo that they really belong to the Nigerian nation that they are mere onlookers.
Professor Nwabueze is aware that NdiIgbo may not win but running and being allowed to run is good for the psychological health of the NdiIgbo. According to him: A President of Igbo extraction may well not be able to do much to redress the years of neglect and marginalization of NdIgbo yet his presence in that office will go along way to lift up the degraded and depressed personality, psyche, and morale of NdIgbo in Nigeria, especially their youth and the coming generation.
For Professor Ben Nwabueze’s elucidation of the Igbo Presidency Project, see Professor Ben Nwabueze "Igbo Have a Right to Presidency" in This Day July 26, 2002.
One hopes President Obasanjo is aware of the reason why the Igbo people want to compete and would allow for a level playing field. This is fundamental to the 2003 affair. It is this determination of the Ndi Igbo that is called by Professor Nwabueze as the "irrevocable commitment of the NdIgbo".
Professor Nwabueze in 2002 is appreciating the harm done to the NdIgbo personality not just by the Civil War, but also by what happened to the Igbo since then by shutting them out of the Presidency. Who did this, he did not say? Certainly it was not by the Yoruba and certainly not by President Obasanjo. Who caused the Igbo deprivation was absent in the statement of mission by Professor Nwabueze.
Professor Nwabueze and CO thought that they found a solution in 1977 as the country was preparing for the transition from military to civil rule. In the Constituent Assembly in 1977 where Nigerians from different ethnic nationalities were meeting for the first time to bargain on how to take over from the military in 1979, the Igbo leaders were of two camps. One group felt that Igbo should work with other Nigerians and compete for the number one. That group worked with the minorities and later formed the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP). The other group believed that Igbo should look for a "northerner" undefined and asked to be apprenticed to a northern ruler. This group joined the National Movement that later became the National Party of Nigeria (NPN). Chief Sam Mbakwe belonged to the former group, which I coordinated and Professor Ben Nwabueze belonged to the latter group.
Those who went to the NPN including Professor Nwabueze accepted in the past the feeling that an Igbo man and woman can only produce a number two to an Hausa man. His present position laced in psychological jargon is intriguing. He should have said where some of them blundered in the past.
Professor Nwabueze was one of the NdIgbo intellectuals who opposed Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe in 1979 and accused him for sabotaging the Igbo project. They believed that that Igbo Presidency was not a feasible project just after the Civil War. This was the message they took to Dr. Azikiwe in 1978 and pleaded with him to take them or follow them to the NPN. This was where Dr. Azikiwe broke with them.
Dr. Azikiwe listened to the Igbo leaders that came to him that wanted him to team up with the northern led National Party of Nigeria(NPN). They told him that was the most feasible method of reintegrating the Igbo into the political mainstream after the Civil War. A partial recount of this debate is in the memoir of Alhaji Shehu Shagari, Beckoned to Serve. I also tried in my book, Beyond the Tripod in Nigerian Politics to provide a detail explanation of why Dr. Azikiwe decided to team up with the Fourth Dimension floated political party the NPP and reject the NPN in 1978. I shall address later the Shagari’s mischaracterization of Dr. Azikiwe’s decision to turn down the invitation of the NPN to address the NPN Convention.
The Owelle of Onitsha addressed what Professor Nwabueze is talking about today, Dr. Azikiwe in 1978 even though people like Professor Nwabueze disagreed with him. For the information of readers, Dr. Azikiwe decided to run as the NPP Presidential candidate in 1978 as a way of promoting the reentering of the Igbo into the political mainstream of Nigeria after the Civil War. This is what Professor Nwabueze is saying today as if it is original to him. Professor Nwabueze and others who supported the idea of an Igboman serving as an apprentice under an Hausa man and went to the NPN literally terrorized Dr. Azikiwe for his decision. All the intellectual and economic power in Igboland deserted him and the NPP was made up of the common folks and old people to whom Zik'’ name meant something. I saw this in many campaign rallies in villages in Anambra and Imo. He had to be addressing curious young men and women who just wanted to know if the Jesus-like of a man was still alive. Of course, the very old men and women came in large number just to touch him and see whether the man they knew about in the past still had the magic. He never disappointed them. All the former NCNC leaders in Igboland went to the NPN.
Those who went to the NPN believed then that after the apprenticeship for an undefined period, the Hausa man would call on the Igbo to produce the President of Nigeria. This was their view of zoning which to them meant rotation but which to the Hausa overlord did not mean rotation. How they thought that one-day the Hausa would make the Igbo the master of the house built by and for the north was one aspect of the visionlessness of this group that went to the NPN. Master in what country, certainly NOT in the house where the original master, the Hausa still owns! This was the explanation for the number two mentality in Igbo land in 1979. How many Igbo leaders still recall that in all the political parties, (NPN, GNPP and PRP) that had a northerner as the number one, Igbo produced the number two? They even played this role to the Yoruba man in the UPN with a Yoruba man as the number one. They would be surprised to read in Shagari’s memoir that there was never a time the number two was zoned to the Igbo as a right. They would be surprised that the number two was a toss up between the minorities in the southeast and the Igbo woman he actually wanted who incidentally was a colleague of ours in the Constituent Assembly. Finally he picked Dr. Alex Ekwueme who was not part of the leadership that was floated in 1978. Suddenly this same group went round the Igboland that a new leader had emerged and should be embraced as such. They even wanted Dr. Azikiwe to accept the new leader, created for the Igbo people by the conservative northerner. I have gone this far not to denigrate my good friend, Ben , but to let readers especially those who did not follow what happened in 1978 to know the genesis of Igbo problem. I really thought that by now an Igbo Agenda shall have been thrashed out. May be it is the Presidency Project. President Obasanjo should take it seriously.
For the record, only the NPP had an Igboman as the number one in the past. What did Professor Nwabueze and the Igbo NPN do to the old man? They used the Nigerian Television at Enugu to sing with Dr. Azikiwe’s name for not allowing the Igbo vice-president to be the Igbo leader. Finally the same Igbo clique brought Chief Emeka Ojukwu from exile. That further complicated the life of the old man in Enugu.
What Professor Nwabueze is saying in 2002 is not new to me or to those in the NPP associated with the Owelle of Onitsha, Dr. Azikiwe, such as Chiefs Sam Mbakwe and Jim Nwobodo. I still recall an incident in 1979 in a campaign rally in Imo. Dr. Azikiwe had to confront the issue of Igbo as the professional number two. He told the crowded rally in Igbo language that "Igbo man or woman could also "mate" and produce Igbo children who can also grow up to be President in Nigeria". Dr. Azikiwe conveyed this in Igbo language to Igbo people especially the women in various parts of Igbo land. How effective, it was. This is what Professor Nwabueze is saying in 2002 as the reason why the Igbo person should run for the office in 2003. According him, …..there is no going back on it, whatever the prospects for success or failure may be. If it succeeds, fine but if it fails, we will nonetheless have forced our demand upon the attention of the nation and the international community.
What a goal! I thought that Professor Nwabueze should have started his statement of mission with a tribute to Dr. Azikiwe who abandoned his well-earned retirement to be used as an instrument to work for the reintegration of the Igbo into the political mainstream in 1979. In fact, Professor Nwabueze should have also apologized to Dr. Azikiwe and the NPP for what he and those leading the Ohaneze then did to the old man in 1979. Professor Nwabueze should paid tribute to the followers of Dr. Azikiwe who felt this way and went to the Igbo voters with that feeling in 1979 and 1983. Dr. Azikiwe was not that politically naïve to know that he would not win the election in 1979 and 1983 in the sense of becoming the President of Nigeria. His concept of winning was in terms of the psyche of the Igboman and woman. I saw this in various locations in Igboland during the campaign. He genuinely thought that the NdIgbo’s spirit must be lifted up. Trust Zik, he did. I will not say more.
2. AS A NON-PARTISAN "BRIDGE" TO DEMOCRACY There are those who genuinely initiated the emergence of President Obasanjo for one and only one reason alone. They thought that he would rule as a non-partisan person for a period of one term of four years or so to serve as a "bridge’ between the past misrule of the military and the future democratic order. I belong to this class of Nigerians. In my appreciation of his election in 1999, I counseled him to be a non-partisan President. I assured him that Nigerians and the international community that supported him did not do so because of his membership of the so-called PDP.
To me, I believed and thought that President Obasanjo’s only job in 1999 was to spend a term of five or six years and lay a sound democratic foundation for Nigeria. This was what Nigerians with no partisan position but their patriotic concern wanted him to do. Let me name a few that include Chief Emeka Anyaoku, Chief Rotimi Williams, Chief Ola Vincent and Alhaji Babatunde Jose and even the Traditional Rulers led by the Oni of Ife. He turned down the plea of this people. He even told the country that he was the "Sovereign" by the fact that he was elected by the Nigerian people in 1999. He even told the country that he and the National Assembly would between them review the Constitution as the basis of laying the foundation for sustainable democratic political order. Did he succeed so far in laying a foundation, I’d leave this to another occasion to discuss this.
I always opposed to "self-succession" in Nigeria when the lingering political problems since 1993 remain undiscussed and unresolved. A "Self-succession" for and by President Obasanjo in an atmosphere of lingering political problems should be reconsidered for two reasons: President Obasanjo and his handlers should appreciate the politics of ethnicity and religion that would be involved in his bid to fight to succeed himself. President Obasanjo and his handlers ought to or should appreciate that he, not being a politician, would not be able to handle the "politics of self-succession" in an ethnically divided society.
Since he announced his bid for a second term, we are beginning to see the manifestations of these two issues today. They could derail the nascent democracy. This is why I making a passionate plea that a level playing field for all candidates including President Obasanjo and his challengers must be seriously considered as the only panacea to the politics of ethnicity. At the moment it does not exist.
3. AS A BREATHING SPACE FOR THE NORTH The advocates of one term from the north argue that when they invited him to be the President, they wanted him to be a breathing space for the north, another notion of a "bridge". They wanted him to stay for one term. I later realized that the idea of one term in the north was pretty flexible that could mean five or six years. This was why President Obasanjo wanted to review the Constitution to extend his term to five or six years. Here he mismanaged the plan. This self-succession through election was an afterthought. Can he still go back to his original understanding with his sponsors?
The view of those who masterminded his emergence thought that within the period of one term, the Yorubas and in fact, Egba people (Chief MKO Abiola’s home) who felt aggrieved by the June 12 would have forgotten the injustice of the past. This group still believes that at the end of the first term, the north would be allowed to take their thing back. The northern leaders genuinely believe that the Presidency is their thing. Whatever one may say today, there was an understanding between Chief Olusegun Obasanjo and certain elements in the north at the time Chief Obasanjo was approached to change his mind. We should consider three issues during this period.
One was that this group made him change his mind about politics after his release from Abacha’s Gulag. It is a fact that he originally told the Nigerian people and the world that he was not interested in an elective public life after his release from Abacha’s Gulag. Some of Dr. Alex Ekwume’s campaign leaflets during the nomination battle carried his statements after his release from Abacha’s Gulag. Dr. Ekwueme did not know how he had to change his mind. Dr. Ekwueme did not know that the new leaders of the north who masterminded his rejection at the Jos convention of the PDP did not recognize the apprenticeship he served under Alhaji Shehu Shagari.
Blaming Dr. Ekwueme’s rejection on Chief Obasanjo or on the Yoruba was unfair instead of blaming the north. I used to tell my Igbo friends in the NPP that Igbo should not blame Chief Awolowo and the Yoruba for all Igbo political impotence after the Civil War. At the root of this is the lack of an Igbo Political Agenda that was not developed before the Igbo commenced the transition program in 1977, again in 1992/3 and in 1009. Do they have one now? Maybe this is what Professor Ben Nwabueze calls the "NIgbo Irrevocable Commitment". There should have been a seminar on the project. Some of us non-Igbo who genuinely believed that there was an "Igbo Question in Nigerian Politics" that should be discussed and resolved, if the country was to move forward would have liked to participate. I worked with them in the past and I have my views where they made mistakes and I would have been able to share them with them.
Two was that one of the conditions for agreeing to be the Presidential candidate on the ticket of the northern clique in 1998 was that he would stay for one term. Did he actually say so?
Three was that this same pact was used in 1976 when the northern political generals made it possible for him to be the successor to the slain military ruler from the north in February 1976 on a condition that he would hand over to a northerner. There is element of truth in this.
The President never addressed these three issues. From what I knew as the real reason for the annulment of June 12, Chief Obasanjo was seen as a solution to the fears of the north. They did not want an "autonomous southerner" i.e. a southerner that would be independent of the north because he has his people behind him. The northern leaders who made President wanted somebody from the south that would not be dependent on his people for coming to office.
May I also add that this was why the same people opposed Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and Chief Obafemi Awolowo in the distant past. Of course, we knew that these two political leaders commanded support from their respective ethnic nationalities in their political venture. Chief MKO Abiola did and Chief Obasanjo did not. This is an answer to the question some people kept asking me where I go, what did Chief Obasanjo have in 1999 that Chief Abiola did not have in 1993?
May I also add that Dr. Alex Ekwueme and Chief Olu Falae in the immediate past who were actively supported by the Ndi Igbo and Yoruba ethnic groups respectively posed threat to the north as Chief Abiola was imagined would. They could not therefore be the ideal southerners that the north could support. I hope the southerners especially the Igbo presidential candidates or aspirants who are parading their ethnic support for their ambition should appreciate that they pose a threat to the northern hegemony.
The northern clique that engineered the emergence of Chief Obasanjo believed that Chief Obasanjo from his past dealings with the Yorubas he would not be able to secure their support. He was the ideal President they would want as a "breathing space".
What one notices today is that the northern leaders are gradually beginning to see him differently with the number of Yoruba leaders planning to support him. They are scared of the prospect of the real or authentic Yoruba political leaders rallying to the support of President Obasanjo. The day the Afenifere as the authentic political group in Yorubaland decides to throw its support behind Chief Obasanjo that day would lead to a realignment of political forces in Nigeria.
The northern leaders genuinely thought that by making Chief Obasanjo the President just as they did in 1976, President Obasanjo would implement the pact or understanding between him and the northern leaders in 2003. What were the "fine prints" of this pact we may never know. What we know is the tenure.
It is true that they were expecting him to act the same way as he did in 1979. He did not sit tight in 1979. They thought that he would not seek a second term, which amounts to a sit-tight when they convinced him to be the candidate in 1998/99.
It was the Kano Senator-elect, Senator Ibrahim Kura Mohammed who on March 2, 1999 in the Post Express who first told the Nigerian people and the international community of the pact. This was immediately after the Presidential election. Apparently to put the minds of the apprehensive northerners at rest, he made a public statement that the north and Chief Olusegun Obasanjo reached a deal in 1998 on tenure. According to Senator Ibrahim Kura Mohammed, "General Obasanjo promised to serve for only one term". He went on with the blackmail, "that he would honor his pledge as he did in 1976".
This press statement was and is still in the Nigerian newspaper, the Post Express of March 2, 1999. It was posted in the WWW. The Senator is still alive. Incidentally no Nigerian took notice of this public disclosure. I was surprised.
When I read it in March 1999, I raised pertinent questions in my essay and lectures after the election. I asked the President to tell the Nigerians outside the north what he actually agreed to with his sponsors. I never got answers until the brother-in-law of General Babangida (Chief Sunny Okogwu) came on the air to say what the "Pact" contained. According to him, under the pact, President Obasanjo was to hand over to an N’Igbo President in 2003. I discover that some Igbo writers even accuse President Obasanjo that his decision to seek a second term is in violation of the 1999 pact that power should shift from the southwest to southeast in 2003.
What shocked me and I am sure those who believe in the efficacy of political parties was that there was no mention of political parties in the discussion of pact. Was it going to be implemented through the PDP or through some combination of parties. If it was going to be through the PDP, it means that there was a tacit understanding that Nigeria was going to be one party state.
SOURCES OF CHALLENGERS TO PRESIDENT OBASANJO Whatever the reasons President Obasanjo might have in his decision to seek a second term in 2003, he should appreciate that he would have formidable opponents, individuals and groups that would not accept a micro-managed "self-succession" election by a President who too is a candidate. I shall identify the sources of competitors for the Presidency without naming names. Is he going to ignore them? That would be at the risk of destroying his legacies. This is why he should do everything to guarantee a level playing field for all them. For the attention of President Obasanjo and his handlers let me name some.
One, there are elements in the north that would want to chase President Obasanjo out of office through the electoral process on the premise that he reneged on the original deal to stay for one term. This group is from the PDP. How the group is planning to do this is not made clear.
Two, there are others in the north who would want to base their challenge to President Obasanjo on the premise that President Obasanjo "betrayed the trust of the north". Again this group is planning to operate through another political party outside the PDP such as the ANPP, UNPP and NDP.
Three, there are others in the north who would want to cash in on the Sharia issue by the faithful. They would want to campaign for candidates who would ensure that Sharia forms an integral part of the federal judiciary. The party or parties that would be used have not been made clear.
Four, there are other candidates in the country at large who genuinely believe that President Obasanjo is a disaster as President, Commander in Chief since 1999. To this group the party should seriously look for another candidate on the ground that Obasanjo does not deserve a second term from his record since 1999. From this group are some members of the party who would want to offer their vision for the Nigerian people to evaluate. How these people would want to do it through the PDP or through other parties is yet to be seen.
Five, there are candidates in the southeast (N’Igbo) that supported President Obasanjo in 1999. They now come to the conclusion that President Obasanjo marginalized them since 1999. They feel that another four years of President Obasanjo would be disastrous to their people. For the solution the leaders of the southeast are torn between three positions.
Camp one is made up of those who want to renegotiate a deal with President Obasanjo like the Ndi Igbo Governors who got some roads project awarded to contractors even though these roads would not be commenced during the rainy season. According the Governors, this is what they need as they want something to show their people as the basis for campaigning for him in 2003.
Camp two is made up of those who base their decision on the fact that Obasanjo hates the Igbo people from his past and since he assumed office in 1999.
Camp three wants an Igbo President as a solution to the Igbo Question in Nigerian Politics" since the end of the Civil War.
How the Igbo leaders want to implement their political agenda is still fluid. One section wants to work with others in the country to push President Obasanjo out and substitute him with some one amenable to them in 2003. And another wants the NdIgbo to run because it is good for the Igbo personality and psyche.
Again all these debates are carried out outside of the known political parties.
Six, there is the confusion in the south-south that cannot parade an agenda even on the resource control. They have no political party that they could call their own. They have no visible leadership that can sell himself to the Nigerian people. Their fears about Obasanjo 2003 depends on who you talk to.
Seven, there is the unknown arising from the ghost of General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida popularly known as IBB. There is an IBB mania in some sections in the country. There is no week that his name is not mentioned as a candidate and challenger to President Obasanjo even though he seriously denied that he would ever challenge Obasanjo "as long as he is a candidate".
Eight, there is the fluid situation created by the fact of six or more political parties. Is Nigeria going to have six candidates at all levels? This is a frightening proposition?
Nine, there is the fact of three political groups that tend to represent the interest of the tripod. I am referring to the Arewa Consultative Forum, the Ohaneze and the Afenifere for Hausa, Ndi Igbo and Yoruba respectively. They all have different views of President Obasanjo are not positive. Would they wish for another candidate? The answer is yes.
The President should understand that in order to make the 2003 contest a credible affair with him as a Presidential candidate in the context of perceived fears of the foregoing challengers, something would have to be done. It must start with the person of the President as President, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria and President Obasanjo as a Presidential Candidate. It should be obvious to President Obasanjo and the Nigerian political class that President Obasanjo as a Presidential Candidate would not be able to provide a level playing field for all candidates in 2003. This is what we need in 2003 if we are to have not only a free and fair but also one that is seen to be so. This will be developed further later.
NEW FEAR OVER "SELF-SUCCESSION": JUBRIL AMINU’S POSER There is a genuine fear in Nigeria that "self-succession" had never ended well from the two cases in the past. Nigerians of my generation know that "self-succession" had led to political disaster and the collapse of the democratic order. The two examples in Nigerian history that ended in political disaster are the 1964 Federal Elections and the 1983 Presidential election. Those who are managing President Obasanjo have personal and selfish reason to argue that President Obasanjo’s "self-succession" would not be like the ones of 1964 and 1983. They should not experiment with the future of Nigeria. They do not mean the President well and they do not mean the country well.
It was Ambassador Jubril Aminu, the Nigerian Ambassador to the US who came up with an angle that I never thought of before when I raised alarm about imminent crisis of "self-succession" in my essay in November 2001. Ambassador Aminu is an astute politician with a knack for appreciating the political dynamics in Nigeria since I knew him as a colleague in the NPC Club at the University of Ibadan. He is not given to flippant talk. He is an insider who is a position to know the thinking in the north.
Jubril’s analysis and his question struck me. I was surprised that he even called for more Presidential candidates even though he is supposed to be a member of the PDP that has virtually been taken over by the President. He is rumored to be an aspirant and when asked about that at Gombe, he did not answer one way or the other. But he is aware of the crisis over "self-succession" by the government or party in power and a candidate at the same time. For the first time, he called the 1964 and the 1983 elections the "unsuccessful elections". With t he power of hindsight and with what he knew of the consequences of a failed election under the military in the past and what could happen under the civilian today, he posed the million dollar question, suppose the election does not go well, what would the President do?
May I also add what would logically follow from Jubril’s question. What would the various interest groups and challengers identified above in the country do? I am scared! Let me pose some pertinent questions from Ambassador Aminu’s million-dollar question. What would President Obasanjo do if he were the beneficiary of the disputed and contentious election? Can President Obasanjo behave like the military that could cancel the election and do it again? Would he still be using the same instrument that produced the disputed results ? Would President Obasanjo’s action be accepted and how would he enforce it? Would those who are disputing the election accept President Obasanjo’s assumption of office on the basis of the disputed election? Ambassador Aminu answered the questions thus: If the 2003 election were to be conducted by a military government and there is trouble, cancellation will be the only option and that government will conduct another election. He added "that is not possible now".
What Jubril was saying was that the 2003 election would likely be inconclusive and would be seriously challenged, unless it was done to the satisfaction of all challengers. For this to be achieved, Ambassador Aminu called on the wrong agency, the INEC instead on the President and his handlers.
The question that Ambassador Aminu was asking is whether President Obasanjo who might have been declared the winner would behave like the "winners" of 1964 and 1983 ask his opponents to go to Court or "Go to Hell"? Let me ask some pertinent questions: Would the opponents go to the Court? Would they in fact decide to send Nigeria to hell, if President persists as the "winner". Would President Obasanjo now President-elect be able to cancel the election? Would he still run after canceling the election? What would his handlers who do not believe in a free and fair election advise him to do?. Would he resign as President or as President-elect? Would he drop the latter and use his position as the President to resolve the fall out from the election? Would he be able to persuade Nigerians to go back to the poll again with or without him as a Presidential Candidate? What would be the attitude of Nigerians supporting those who felt cheated in the election? Would Nigerians realize that the time has come to renegotiate the conditions of keeping Nigeria one? Would Nigerians instead of going to "Hell" decide to the convocation of a Sovereign National Conference? What would be the attitude of the military? What would be the attitude of the international community that invested too much to the Obasanjo Project?
The foregoing questions are raised from Ambassador Jubril Aminu’s poser. For the full press report of Ambassador Jubril Aminu’s visit to Gombe see "My fears over 2003 Polls" in This Day July 25, 2002.
It is from hindsight that Nigerians are raising questions about the plan of the current leaders of the PDP. They point to all the signs today that the election is being micro-managed by the President and his handlers to the President favor. Depending on who is complaining, they refer to the way the Electoral Act was distorted, the frequent meeting the President holds with INEC, the flip-flop over the ID Card and election, the role of his Ministers and the role of the Government media. All these they argue tend to remind them of the same signs leading to these two elections in 1964 and 1983 and the political disaster that followed. This is where President Obasanjo as a candidate and as the President of Nigeria should take some actions to have a level playing field for all in 2003.
This was why I wrote an essay in December 2001 asking the question whether the President Obasanjo could be trusted with an election in which he would also be a candidate? I answered this question in the negative and I made suggestions as to what should be done. I argued for the internationalization of the Nigerian 2003 election. Nigerians might resist this as savoring of a colonial mentality. That was the way I felt then. It should be obvious to Nigerians today that with the best will in the world there are problems ahead of a President who is also a candidate in Nigeria today. Even if President Obasanjo wants to have a free and fair election, he just would not succeed within the political environment in which he finds himself.
Definitely President Obasanjo and the PDP cannot be trusted to be organizers of the elections while as candidates and office holders and at the same time provide and guarantee a level playing field for all contestants. This has nothing to do with the person of President Obasanjo.
One should appreciate his feats in the past in 1970, 1976, 1979 and 1999. He could add a successful transfer of power from civilian to civilian in 2003 to the list of feats. Does President realize that micro-managed "Self-Succession" election would dent this lofty record.
ONE-PARTY DOMINANCE IS IMMINENT AND FRIGHTENING President Obasanjo is a good man but he is surrounded by Nigerians from their past who do not believe in a multi-party democracy. They do not want a free and fair election and do not believe that the President or the PDP could lose. The President might be a democracy loving person from 1999, but those around him are believers in a one party regime, who reminded Nigerians that there would be no vacancy in the Presidential Villa in 2003. President Obasanjo who never distanced himself from this view should from 2002 free himself from his handlers. He should do everything to avoid the emergence of a one party dominance of an artificial nature. Maybe one should ask the President some questions about the logical consequences of over dependence on the one party.
Does President know that a one party rule will develop into a one-man rule in Nigeria? Does the President know that a one-man rule would be dependent on the armed forces as we are beginning to experience in Nigeria today? Does he know that a one-man rule or a one party rule would eventually lose touch with reality? Does the President know that with little protest, the one party regime would become too unduly dependent on security agents? Does the President know that a one-man rule that is too dependent on the military would eventually lead to the eventual collapse of the democratic order?
I am glad that the President is aware of the danger in a disputed election. That was why in announcing his intention to seek a second term, he alerted the Nigerian people and the international community that there is a clear and present danger and expressed it as follows: The general apprehension is because of the high record of failure with most previous civilian-to-civilian electoral transitions. We have witnessed that it is this point of transition that our electoral processes are tested to the limit.
What President Obasanjo should appreciate is not just to raise these issues and fears but one would be asking, what does he plan to do about them? Now that the President is aware of the fears of Nigeria, one would hope that he would be willing to support my advocacy that would take him out of contention and build "friends" for the election from home and abroad.
I am referring to President Obasanjo’s statement of advise as follows: We must never try to bend the rules; if we resort to such dishonorable tactics, the process would no longer be free and fair and the results would neither be respected nor acceptable here at home and abroad.
The ascent is "the result that would be respected and accepted at home and abroad". This is at the root of credibility. Nigerians are already noticing the bending of the rules from the actions of the President.
Nigerians are apprehensive; hence they are asking some pertinent questions such as: Should the current President be allowed to preside over the election? He should not be, if he is a candidate.
Can the other candidates trust President Obasanjo as a candidate to preside over a free and fair election? Nothing that this administration had so far done will make other candidates trust him. Nigerians do not believe that President Obasanjo could be trusted to provide a level playing field for all. NOTE: The first two parts of the essay dealt with the complex issues in the 2003 project. I am working on a third part that proffers suggestions on how to achieve a level playing field for all political contenders including candidate Obasanjo in 2003. August 2002
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