Following my previous article regarding the northern counter-coup of 1966, I have received a number of e-mails, and most recently a "rejoinder" from a "Mr. Arthur Unegbe" who disagreed with many matters addressed in my original article. As a person who does not want to leave Nigerians with misconceptions about Nigeria’s history, I feel duty bound to respond to Mr Unegbe. In doing so, I will respond only to those points that are directly relevant to my original article.

IBADAN HAD AN "INDIFFERENT" POPULATION DURING THE COUNTER-COUP

Mr Unegbe queried what I meant by saying that Ibadan had an "indifferent" local population during the counter-coup. By "indifferent", I was referring to the west’s politically neutral stance to the ongoing feud between northerners and Igbos. The Western Region sat on the fence during the Eastern-Northern stand off. The west was in a difficult position because it had lost people in both the January (Ademulegun, Akintola, Shodeinde,) and July (Fajuyi) coups. Added to that, the West was unnerved by the presence of a large contingent of northern troops stationed at Ibadan. Evidence for this can be found by the fact that Obafemi Awolowo later accused the north of exploiting its military and political stranglehold on the country, and demanded that soldiers of northern origin be removed from Ibadan.

THE HANDOVER OF POWER FROM CIVILIANS TO THE ARMY

Mr Unegbe claims that "Ironsi and (Senate President) Nwafor Orizu "conspired cunningly to end civil rule under the guise of putting down the mutiny". He cites Shehu Shagari as a source for this argument. While this issue was not addressed in my original article, I shall respond for the sake of historical accuracy. After the January 1966 coup succeeded in the North but failed in the South, Major Nzeogwu threatened to march to, and capture the South in order to complete the coup. On the day following the coup, Ironsi (accompanied by the head of the navy – Commodore Joseph Wey, and the Inspector-General of Police – Kam Salem) met with the surviving members of the shaken Federal Cabinet. Ironsi informed them of Nzeogwu’s plan to attack the south and said that given the cataclysmic events that had just occurred, he could no longer guarantee the loyalty of the armed forces to the Federal Government, nor could he guarantee the safety of civilian politicians. At this point it must be recalled that public disgust was so great that the majority of Nigerians would probably have voted for senior politicians to be publicly executed – had a plebiscite been held on the issue. Thus the anger of northern officers was caused more by the murder of senior military officers, than by the murder of politicians.

At the tense meeting between senior security officers and the surviving members of the Federal cabinet (at which former President Shagari was in attendance), the Federal Cabinet handed over power to Ironsi. Several northern politicians were present at that meeting and some of them later claimed that Ironsi seemed genuinely upset by, and wept at the death of his military colleagues (see Luckham: "The Nigerian Military").

The cabinet ministers signed a document which vested governmental authority in the military. Among those present at the "handover" was a gentleman named Shehu Shagari who later became Nigeria’s president. I do not see conspiracy there. Only hindsight.

WAS THE JANUARY COUP AN "IGBO COUP" INVOLVING IRONSI?

Once again, the tired old argument that the January coup was some gigantic Igbo plot to "dominate" the rest of the country has been wheeled out. Although I am tempted not to respond to this analysis (which is banal and shows only rudimentary understanding of Nigeria’s political problems), I must respond in the pious hope that sanity will prevail regarding this issue.

Mr Unegbe claims that "Ironsi definitely knew of the plot and planned to exploit it without actually being in it". I invite you to cite a source for this assertion. Failing that, please be aware of Ironsi’s view on military governance. Shortly after being appointed as the Nigerian army’s first General Officer Commanding in 1965, Ironsi was asked about the proper role of the Armed Forces vis-à-vis a democratic government. He replied "the army supports the government that is".

Shortly after becoming Nigeria’s first military Head of State in January 1966, he was asked whether the army would remain in power after the explosive political situation in the country had subsided. He simply gave a terse reply of "I hope not". These are strange words for a supposed ethnic power grabber. If Ironsi really was part of the January coup plot, he certainly behaved in bizarre manner following it. It was Ironsi that rallied loyal troops around the country to stop the January coup. Why would he, at great risk to himself, stop a coup that he was part and parcel of? The words of Major Nzeogwu in the week following the coup are also instructive. Nzeogwu said of the coup plot: "We got some but not all. GENERAL IRONSI WAS TO HAVE BEEN SHOT. But we were not ruthless enough. As a result he and the other compromisers were able to supplant us" (Daily Telegraph, 22^nd January 1966). If Ironsi was part of the coup plot, why would the Majors plan to kill him?

Ironsi’s survival in January owed more to good fortune than to him being privy to the coup plot. As the GOC, he was tipped off that in the early stages of the coup, and was informed something unusual was occurring via a telephone call from Lt-Col James Pam. Shortly after he replaced the receiver, the coupists arrived at Pam’s house and shot him dead.

THE FATE OF THE JANUARY BOYS

Mr. Unegbe accurately stated that the southern officers who took part in the January coup were imprisoned (albeit on full pay). However, his assertion that some of them "got promoted while in jail" is patent falsehood. All promotions during the regime of Ironsi would have been recorded in the nation’s official gazette. No such promotions were gazetted. If you are aware of the names of these mysterious soldiers that were promoted without official gazetting, please let us know and cite your source.

In the absence of the vibrant and instant news media of today, an information chasm existed as the Government (for fear of increasing tension in the country) made little or no comment about the events of January. Thus conspiracy theorists had a field day. The claim that the January Majors were promoted was one of the fantastic and mythological stories being thrown around at the time. Although it caused rancour, Ironsi could not legally stop the pay of the January mutineers. They were held on suspicion of committing a crime, thus their benefits could not be legally stripped from them until they had been convicted of an offence meriting the removal of their remuneration. Simple legal principle.

While on the subject of matters legal. We are constantly told that Ironsi did not place the January Majors on trial. That is not exactly true. The truth is that the Supreme Military Council had taken the decision to place the January Majors on public trial. This decision was recorded in the minutes of the SMC and was confirmed by no less a person that then Military Governor of the Northern Region: Major Hassan Katsina (See Ruth First: "The Barrel Of a Gun"). Of course, the death of Ironsi prevented us from seeing Nigeria’s own "trial of the century". Ironically, after complaining that Ironsi did not place the Majors on trial, the officers who toppled him did not do so either. If this really was such an explosive political issue, why did the successor regime to Ironsi (backed up by the northern officers of the army) not try the Majors (their surviving members were still in prison when Gowon took charge).

THE UNIFICATION DECREE

Mr. Unegbe states that Ironsi "was about to send military prefects to rule the provinces" via the Unification Decree of 1966. That may sound a revolutionary concept, but what is the difference between a "military prefect" and the gang of "military administrators" that terrorized, and looted the Nigerian treasury during the days of Babangida, Abacha and Abubakar? Sending a "military prefect to a province is no different than sending a "military administrator" to govern over a state over which he has no mandate or political support. Once again Mr. Unegbe has showed a limited understanding of the decision that was actually taken and has succumbed to the mass hysteria that was prevalent at the time.

Has Mr. Unegbe actually taken time to read Decree No.34 of 1966? It has been claimed that this degree so offended northerners, and posed such a threat to their existence, that they had no option other than to remove Ironsi. Let us analyse this argument in more detail. If the Unification Decree was such an affront to northern sensibilities, why have successive northern Governments operated a system of governance more unitary than anything Ironsi ever envisaged?

IGBO PROVOCATION

I agree with Mr. Unegbe that the anti-Igbo pogroms of mid to late 1966 were in part motivated by the insensitive jubilating of some southerners following the January coup. Most Nigerians have a selective memory and only remember events in isolation. So that only those events in which they were the victims, rather than the aggressor, are recollected. Such is evident in the manner in which Igbos believe that northerners rose up and massacred them for no reason in 1966. Forgetting that northerners may have been hurt by the manner in which Igbos behaved following the murder of northern political and military leaders in January 1966. On the other hand, many Nigerians believe that the Eastern Region seceded for no reason in 1967. Conveniently forgetting that people from Eastern Nigeria may have been a little upset at seeing tens of thousands of their brothers, sisters, wives, husbands, parents, and children slaughtered in 1966.

BRIGADIER MAIMALARI AS GOC?

Once again, Mr Unegbe displays his unlimited and psychic knowledge of the Nigerian military hierarchy by stating that Brigadier Maimalari was the preferred choice of the British to head the Nigerian Army (he cites no source for this assertion). Utter nonsense. While it is true that Maimalari was an officer of high calibre, he was considered too inexperienced to head the Army and was being groomed for the top job in the future.

Maimalari had been a notorious disciplinarian who "would brook no insubordination". For this reason, he "exacted unqualified discipline from all his subordinates" (See Gbulie: "Nigeria’s Five Majors").

Maimalari’s personality was in contrast to that of his peers. Before indigenous soldiers took control of Nigeria's army, the four most senior officers of Nigerian origin were Brigadiers Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, Samuel Ademulegun, Babafemi Ogundipe, and Zakariya Maimalari (in that order). When it was announced that the British soldiers would soon depart, it became obvious that the veteran trio of Ironsi, Ademulegun, and Ogundipe were favourites to land the job of GOC.

Ironsi was the most decorated of the three. A tall and physically imposing man – he looked like a soldier (a stark contrast to the pot bellied Generals of later generations) yet was easy going and spoke in a slow, measured tone. He had been the premier soldier of his generation and was considered good enough to command a United Nations peacekeeping force (the first African to do so) in the Congo – twice. While Ironsi was in the Congo, he took on the rank of Major-General, but reverted to Brigadier when he returned to Nigeria. During the Congo peacekeeping mission, Ironsi sent Maimalari (who was then two ranks below him) home to Nigeria after a disagreement over military tactics. The words of retired Maj-Gen Ike Nwachukwu (then a second lieutenant) give an indication of Ironsi’s stature at the time. Nwachukwu said that the first time he saw Ironsi "it was like seeing a God....he was the God of all us soldiers".

Brigadier Ademulegun was another sticker for discipline, and was the most controversial of the Brigadiers. While acknowledged as "a first class soldier" (see Gbulie) he was personally unpopular in the army – especially among junior officers. His open friendship with the Sardauna of Sokoto won him few friends in the military. His name was also mentioned in passing during the infamous Awolowo treason trial. Ironically, Ademulegun felt that his political links would land him the job of GOC. For this reason, he may have been a little overconfident about his chances of securing the job. Thus when he did not get the job, he became jealous of the new GOC and was not shy about pointing out the inadequacies of the man picked in preference to him.

When recommending his successor, the departing British GOC, Major-General Welby-Everard said that Maimalari "was younger and considerably more junior to the others (Ironsi, Ademulegun, Ogundipe) and I also considered him to be militarily immature. He never entered seriously into my considerations". Straight from the horse's mouth. In the light of that comment, I would like Mr Unegbe to explain how the "British wanted the Sandhurst trained Maimalari to be the first Nigerian GOC".

Everard went on to recommend (without success) Brigadier Ogundipe as his successor. Everard regarded Ogundipe as "A very capable and efficient officer…Unlike Ademulegun he was very popular within the Army and greatly respected both as a senior officer and as a man. He was also noticeably non-political" (the quotes of Maj-Gen Welby-Everard are reproduced in Chuks Iloegbunam’s "Ironside"). The Federal Government ignored the advice of its GOC and gave the top job to Ironsi.

SHITTU ALAO AND BENJAMIN ADEKUNLE

Mr Unegbe went into a detailed but irrelevant analysis regarding the birthplace of these two men. As interesting as the maternal origins of Alao and Adekunle may be to him, I do not propose to respond as such matters are not relevant to the subject matter of my original article.

THE DIMKA COUP OF 1976

Mr Unegbe correctly pointed out that this was in 1976 not 1975. I am of course aware that General Murtala Muhammed was killed in an abortive military coup led by Lt-Col B.S.Dimka on Friday 13^th February 1976. The "1975" was a typographical error for which I apologise.

WILLIAM WALBE

As a fan of hair splitting, Mr Unegbe points out to me that William Walbe was General Gowon’s ADC, not his bodyguard as I claimed. It is true that Walbe subsequently became Gowon’s ADC, but in the immediate aftermath of the July 1966 counter-coup, he was originally Gowon’s bodyguard (see Elaigwu: "Gowon: The Biography of a Soldier-Statesman").

MAJOR EKANEM WAS NOT IGBO

My thanks to Mr Unegbe to pointing it out although I am not sure why he did as my original article did not claim that Ekanem was Igbo.

I hope that I have sufficiently responded to Mr Unegbe’s arguments, and I urge contributors of articles to cite sources as unverified historical "facts" tend to mislead the Nigerian public.

November 2001