Obasanjo as "Conqueror"

by

Professor OMO OMORUYI, mni

IN RESPONSE TO DEMANDS THAT I SHOULD WRITE ABOUT OBASANJO

I can understand why some Nigerians are asking me to write about Obasanjo and leave the Buhari and Ojukwu alone. I agree with them in one respect. Having successfully demonstrated to the Nigerian people how they should see General Buhari and Dim Ojukwu as co-conspirators to undermine the democratic order, I can now move on. Nigerians including retired and serving military officers, traditional rulers, students and workers are seeing them for what they are, anarchist, annullist and anti-democratic elements in our midst.

One hopes the Ndigbo commentators on what I said about the Stalemate Strategy of Dim Ojukwu would appreciate how and why Daura few miles to the Nigeria-Niger Border is the new base of Ojukwu and Okadigbo to launch their anti-Nigerian war. One would have thought that the meeting of Buhari-Ojukwu anti-Nigeria War Committee would have been at Abuja. No, it was at Daura, the home of General Buhari. Isn’t the symbolism clear? I hope those who took exception to my essays on the Stalemate Strategy and the Annullist of 2003 should read the Daura Declaration or Communiqué. The Daura Declaration or Communiqué is a declaration of war against the democratic order of Nigeria.

Buhari-Ojukwu released their two-prong tactics: (a) go to the tribunal to fulfill all righteousness not that they believe in it and (b) with or without the verdict from the tribunal adopt the policy of non-recognition of the government of Obasanjo from May 29, 2003. What is bothering me is the complete silence of the stakeholders of the parties that nominated them in the first place. Is the Daura Communiqué the position of the two political parties, ANPP and APGA or it is the plank of the duo of Buhari and Ojukwu?

In respect of the ANPP I once called on the ANPP owners and the ANPP Governors to rescue their party from Buhari because after May 29 with the current Buhari’s posture taken as the ANPP position the party would be dead in most southern states. The stakeholders should speak out.

I have also argued elsewhere that General Buhari should formally resign his membership of the Council of State because his participation in the Council to be summoned by the new President from May 29, 2003 is inconsistent with the position he assumed on Nigerian national security.

OBASANJO: POLITICIAN OR MILITARY OFFICER?

I am not trying to invent any images and myths about Obasanjo that he had to overcome during the election. I am only taking words and expressions from politicians and contestants to write this essay. First, I shall identify three images of the man that he would have to labor to overcome.

One is the image of a military officer who defines the situation as a battle in a war and his opponents as his enemies who must be conquered or captured or overwhelmed.

The second is the image of "a northerner in southwest/Yoruba clothing". He hates this image that many leaders of the north over emphasize between 1999 and 2003.

The third is the image of one who is not loved by his people, the Yoruba nation. It is precisely for this image that the second image has relevance.

It is the first image, the image of the "military man" or of the "conqueror" that I shall deal with in this section of the essay and would address the others in subsequent essays.

Those who see him in the image of a military man want to contrast him with the image of "a politician" or of one who "accommodates" his opponents. Generally one is seeking the nomination of a political party to run for office he cannot be called by any other name other than a politician. A politician in a democracy is one who would not take his opponents as his enemy to be eliminated like in a battle in a war.

Some politicians hold different views about Chief Olusegun Obasanjo depending on how they are affected by his action. Who said that Chief Obasanjo is not a politician, but a military man? One read all the time, Obasanjo is not a politician; he is a soldier. Who is a politician? I once ran a Five-series essay (1-5) "Generals Are Coming and Should They Be Welcome". The series can still be accessed from the www.Nigerdeltacongress.com. 

IMAGE OF A POLITICIAN: HE ACCOMMODATES OPPONENTS

The dictionary meaning of a politician is simple; one that is in the business of government or actively in politics. It further begs the question what is politics? It means what those who call themelves "politicians" do? What do those who call themselves "politicians" do? We can list them. They show interest in political matters; they show interest in who governs; they join others to pursue what they believe in politics; and sometimes they want to be part of the government. They join others to form a political party with the sole purpose of wanting to take over government through election. A politician must appreciate that in election, the politician’s activities must involve others who are equally interested in that same government. The politician must not be expected to win everything except if the other opponents just could not muster enough power to compete.

Those who say that Chief Obasanjo is not a politician hold the view that Obasanjo is not part of a team of fellow politicians. They hold the view that Obasanjo is not willing to accommodate others and that he sees his opponents as enemies in the military sense that must be "destroyed", "conquered" at all cost or "captured" if need be. This is the image that he would try to overcome during the election and from the results of the election. How would he behave during his second term with such massive support? Nigerians are apprehensive as to what he would do with the massive political support for his tenure on the one hand and what the country would expect from the massive support the PDP has throughout the country on the other in the next four years. These are valid fears and it is for the new President to address these fears.

OBASANJO AS A "CONQUEROR"

I shall take the image of Chief Obasanjo as a "conqueror" from two spokesmen of two ethnic nationalities who had something to do with Chief Obasanjo during this period. I am referring to Senator Abraham Adesanyan and Dim Emeka Ojukwu, the leaders of Yoruba and Igbo respectively. They were of the opinion that candidate Obasanjo adopted the military style of "conquering" as distinct from that of a politician who would share with others even with his enemies. They called him "a conqueror" in the sense that he would settle for nothing less than 100% of everything.

They might be right because of candidate Obasanjo total domination, like a colossus of the political scene of the southwest and the southeast where these two tribal leaders thought that they held sway. Furthermore, they could not envisage how an unknown political party the PDP that is associated with an unknown name in politics like candidate Obasanjo could wipe them out of political existence after the series of April/May 2003 elections. This was the feeling at all levels. It was this feeling of total take over by candidate Obasanjo and not necessarily of his party that is the source of concern in the future.

Nigerians are worried that the PDP that is associated with candidate Obasanjo might be ruthless in subsequent elections. They are worried that there would be no level playing field for all parties in subsequent elections at all levels. This is making some people to talk of a ONE PARTY REGIME in Nigeria for many years to come.

This feeling is more pronounced in many States that could rightly be called "a one party state" with both elective bodies, Governor and State Assembly in the hand of the PDP, especially in the south-south, in the southwest and in the southeast. In some of these States in the south, the PDP controls both the executive and legislative bodies 100%. This is a source of problem.

It would appear from the results so far from the election that competitive politics seem to be most evident in the middle belt and somewhat evident in the far north compared with the southern states especially in the south-south and southeast where competition is almost absent. Who and what is responsible for this development? Do we blame this development on candidate Obasanjo? Was this as a result of the image of Obasanjo as a "conqueror"? Was this as a result of the relative impotence of the opposition parties? These are questions that would have been the preoccupation of politicians instead of the usual recriminations.

In Nigeria it is unusual for candidates in an election to lose election because they do not work had or because the voters do not like them or because of what they stand for. I have never seen where losers of elections in Nigeria ever hold party meetings to examine why they fail. Party meetings after the election are usually dominated with the cry of "rigging", "rigging" and of how they were robbed of victory that rightly belongs to them even if they did not work for it. This is the tragedy of Nigerian politics. We must change this, if democracy is to survive in Nigeria.

I and my colleagues in the Centre for Democratic Studies (CDS) worked hard to change this mentality in Nigerian politicians. I call it one of the political pathologies in Nigeria. Otherwise why should Buhari or Ojukwu talk of being robbed of victory in an election where each was concentrating in one section of the country as a basis of getting support that would be used to deny the credible party and candidate victory in the first ballot?

Could Nigerians imagine if Obasanjo had not won in the first ballot? I can say categorically Nigeria would have been in flame by now.

Let me use the words of Dim Ojukwu and Senator Abraham Adesanyan to illustrate the image of Obasanjo as a "conqueror".

OBASANJO ACCORDING TO DIM EMEKA OJUKWU

Dim Ojukwu, a former military officer knows how a military officer behaves. He offered an apt description of a military officer in politics. He accused Chief Obasanjo that he adopted literally the military method to the practice of politics. According to Ojukwu:

Obasanjo had allowed his military upbringing to influence his style of leadership in a democracy.

How Obasanjo did this, Dim Ojukwu had this to say:

His (Obasanjo) first act of governance was to conquer his party. Having conquered his party in an imaginary war he had set up in his mind, he moved ahead and conquered his own government because everyone in his government is a captive.

Dim Ojukwu went on:

His (Obasanjo) government cannot accommodate any free spirit.  Here again is a man who has moved ahead and he is trying everything to conquer the whole country without declaring a war.

How did Obasanjo do this, Dim Ojukwu offered this apt description?

Look at the man, he cannot brook any contrary opinion. That is why the rigging this time did not suffice in just pushing him into the seat of Aso Rock, he had to take over completely (conquer) the whole country.

He concluded:

It was hard to believe that the PDP would sweep the whole of the southwest geo-political zone…….Guardian April 18, 2003

SENATOR ABRAHAM ADESANYAN CARICATURE OF CHIEF OBASANJO

Senator Adesanyan is a seasoned politician who has a notion of how politicians of his generation of over fifty years should behave. But what he saw in the former military officer turned politician (Obasanjo) who was acting in political role shocked him. He could not quite explain the way Obasanjo, a retired Army General was dealing with them who called themselves professional politicians and completely overpowered them. This was why he was forced to accuse the PDP led by Chief Obasanjo for adopting the military style of "conquering" the southwest. He was reported to have told the President that

You (Obasanjo) used military tactics to deceive us (AD) into entering into an agreement such that it would  be easy for your party to deal deadly blow on the opposition in the election.

To Senator Adesanyan, a military officer’s first assignment is to deceive his enemies before "conquering" them. In his views, Obasanjo applied this to the AD/Afenifere and "conquered" them.

This was why he reminded his interviewer that he knew of the President’s trick of deceiving them and finally taking them over meaning deceiving them before conquering them. According to Senator Abraham Adesanyan,

The PDP had been boasting even before the election that they would "capture", they used the word "capture" the whole southwest and devised their own method  of "capturing". Senator Abraham Adesanyan added a new term to the one adopted by Dim Ojukwu, "capturing". Vanguard April 20, 2003

What Ojukwu and Adesanyan were saying was that Obasanjo did not behave like a politician who would leave the opponents with something to take home at the end of the day. They accused candidate Obasanjo of adopting an unfair tactics of a military kind to "conquer" his opponents and to "capture" political power. This is the coup notion of taking over power.

This was why General Buhari and Dim Ojukwu first instinct after their electoral debacle was to declare a war against the Nigerian government. In their press conferences of April 23, 2003 at Abuja and Enugu respectively they acted as retired military officers. They categorically declared their intention to shun the Tribunal. As former military officers they were aware of military tactics to take over of government. It was obvious from their pronouncements that they did not have faith in the use of the tribunal for meeting the injustice from military "conquest" of their territories by another retired military officer, Obasanjo. The response of Buhari and Ojukwu if they had the troops would also have been to use force to overpower the democratic order. God forbids, they do not have hence they are calling on the masses to defend their political rights through massive demonstration against the democratic order.

It is in this sense that one should interpret Buhari’s comparison of rigged election and a coup d’etat. To Buhari whose vision in life does not include one person one vote or the sanctity of the ballot box, "a rigged election is worse than a coup d’etat". Is this not a betrayal of his lack of faith in the Constitution and in the process of meeting grievances in the Electoral Act? Buhari comparison of rigged election and coup was unfortunate and was a direct response to other retired military officers including such democracy advocate as Col. Dangiwa Umar and recently by the apolitical/professional General that the Army ever produced, Lt. General Salihu Ibrahim that rigged election is better than military coup.

Are they right in applying the military notion of conquest to what took place in April-May 2003? In my view, this is a mischaracterization of what actually happened before the election and during the election.

HOW OBASANJO WAS UNDERESTIMATED EVEN BY ME TOO IN THE PAST

Many Nigerians underestimated candidate Obasanjo’s capacity to be a politician. In fact, I once said to him in an essay that the President should be a politician in the following spheres of activities:

Maybe this was what he manifested when he decided to seek the second term. This decision posed challenges to his image as a politician. Why should his opponents underestimate him? Why should his opponents mischaracterize his method and the results? It is the new President who would have to cope with this image during his second term that that because he received such massive support does not mean that he would abandon the areas that did not vote for him. Areas that he could not "conquer are still part of Nigeria. He should rule with justice so many traditional rulers such as the Emir of Kano and Ndigbo traditional rulers and the political leaders such as the former President, Alhaji Shehu Shagari advised him to do. I join these revered national leaders in appealing to the winner that he should manage Nigeria as one entity.

THREE MYTHS THAT HE HAD TO COPE WITH IN 2003 AND BEYOND

When he decided to commence his quest for a second term, he faced certain myths that he would try to overcome. For Obasanjo, the problem he faced in days leading to April 2003 was not the image of him as a conqueror but of certain myths. These were the obstacle he faced and he was bent on dealing with them in a military fashion, "conquer" them or "capture" them. Was this a physical conquest or takeover through attitudinal changes? I thought it was of the latter.

Maybe what we should be analyzing is not the physical take over of the territory of the southwest or of the southeast from Afenifere and Ohaneze respectively. It was the change in the mind set in the people in these two geo-political zones. Unfortunately the leaders of these areas in the past still believe that attitudinal changes have not occurred in the people in the southwest and southeast. They are wrong.

The difference between the Yoruba and the Ndigbo is obvious. It would appear that the leaders of the Afenifere/AD are coming to terms with the fact that their people of the southwest might have reason to jettison the AD for the PDP in April. The crisis in the southeast is the conflict of orientation between so many elements posing to be the leaders in Ndigbo land. This is part of the part of the "Ndigbo Question in Nigerian Politics" that only the Ndigbo leaders could solve.

Let me deal with the certain myths that candidate Obasanjo had to deal with in April 2003. I can identify three.

Myth Number One:

That the myth that civil rule to civil rule transition would not end well in view of what happened during the 1964 and 1983 elections.

Nigerians of my age are quick to recall how the regime in office massively rigged the self-succession election.

They are quick to recall that the aftermath of these elections triggered military take-over in 1966 and 1983 respectively.

Nigerians are quick to recall these coups commenced two long periods of military misrule in Nigeria (!966-79) and (1983-99).

There is nothing new in this myth. President Obasanjo knew of this as soon as he became the President in 1999, hence he proposed a one term of five or six years and wanted an amendment to the 1999 Constitution. But the political class failed him and instead they wanted it through the National Conference.

Later as part of the politics of second term in various quarters in Nigeria there was a renewed call for an amendment to the Constitution after the process of second term election had commenced. This was mischief.

I saw the difficulties that would arise if the man in office was also a candidate. It was a common sense that there would be issue of credibility in the process leading to the election and the in the election proper. I made many proposals in my three part essay "Neither an Office Holder Nor a Candidate Be" in 2003 and I followed this with an address to the Nigerian community in Austria in August 2002. Politicians who are crying today would have done what the Bangladeshi political parties did in 1991 when they got together to effect the famous 13th amendment to the Bangladesh Constitution that would deny office holder any part in the election process. That still remains the best hope for future elections in Nigeria.

Myth Number Two:

The second myth is that no elected civilian ruler had survived a full second term. This myth is based on the way the political life of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and Alhaji Shehu Shagari ended in 1966 and 1983 respectively. This fear was attributed to General Buhari who promised that based on this myth, if he was elected he would only stay for one term. Is the fact of a second term the issue? What he did not say was more than what he said. It was a Freudian slip!

General Buhari was actually insinuating that Chief Obasanjo’s second term would end abruptly or in a disaster or violently as that of Balewa or Shagari in 1966 and 1983 respectively. This is why he is seeing his defeat at the polls as if it were the defeat of the north that the north must massively resist. Since he has a collaborator in Dim Ojukwu who sees any Yoruba ruler as death for the Ndigbo that he manifested during his anti-Abiola campaign in the past, Buhari and Ojukwu seem to be coordinating their plan in furtherance of the Daura Declaration that there should be a massive resistance from the north and from the southeast to the swearing-in of the winner on May 29, 2003. They would be disappointed that they do not have control over these law abiding Nigerians who are itching for a change of administration through peaceful means.

How does a massive resistance be restricted to the north and the southeast? Is this not a plan to secede? Buhari should tell his supporters in the far north that this is his plan. But can Dim Ojukwu go to the Ndigbo a second time and call out the grand children of the Ndigbo of the 1960s to embark on a collective ethnic suicide? The traditional rulers from the north and from the southeast had since the election paid congratulatory visits to the winner of the election and in effect rejected the call of Buhari and Ojukwu to war over their loss in the April election.

From the utterances and demeanor of these defeated candidates after the election it should be obvious to Nigerians that left with them, the election should be violently annulled. This is the implication of their total rejection of the election results in most States of Nigeria and of their refusal to acknowledge that there was a winner. This was why they refused to leave the final verdict of their protest to the election tribunal. When Buhari made the insinuation that no elected head of government had ever survived the second term, Nigerians should have asked him if he was calling on the military to do what he did in December 1983.

General Joshua Dogonyaro spoke for Retired Army, Navy and Airforce Officers that would include General Buhari and Dim Ojukwu as the National President of RENAO. He called on all politicians who lost the election "to drop their threats of fire and brimstone". Referring to the indirect call for a military intervention, General Dogonyaro said that "politicians should know that Nigerians have gone beyond military coups as solutions to their political problems". He therefore advised the defeated politicians in the following words:

Pick up the courage and confidence to face the tribunals after which you look forward to the next elections.

He further advised:

The job of building Nigeria is too much to be reduced to a four-year-term matter. Nigeria must grow, will grow and is growing. So, let us all unite and give peace a chance.

One hopes Buhari and Dim Ojukwu would listen to the spokesman of the retired military officers who saw it all in the past military coups and in military governments. Buhari would recall how this distinguished military officer announced his removal in August 1985.

I am glad to be associated with RENAO in the past. I still recall the workshop the Center for Democratic Studies (CDS) under me organized for those who were planning to enter politics at Ibadan in 1992. The CDS called this workshop

"From Khaki (Military) to Agbada (Politics): the Conversion Process".

This is the kind of political education that retired military officers like Buhari and Ojukwu desperately need today. I can see why they are where they are today. I can recall why and how Dim Ojukwu failed twice in the past to secure elective offices in 1983 and 1992. What made him fail in the past is still there today. He made no effort to overcome it. And instead he is blaming his defeat on Obasanjo and INEC. Dim Ojukwu should start with himself. A life unexamined the saying goes is not worth living!

If Buhari and Ojukwu would sit down and examine why and how they failed in 2003, they would be in a position to advise others after them. I wish I could help them go over the sources of their defeat with them. I would start with their motive. Would they be able to volunteer five reasons why they entered politics? This is the toughest part in planning to seek elective office. I doubt if their motive was pure!

Incidentally I have a monograph with the above title in circulation in reputable universities in the world that I could recommend to them. I am planning to revise and reproduce it for future military officers planning to enter politics.

There are good ones who had made the conversion smoothly such as Senators Tunde Ogbeha, David Mark and Ike Nwachukwu and General David Jemibewon. President Obasanjo is trying hard.

For General Dogonyaro’s advice see The Guardian, May 13, 2003.

I would also call the attention of these two retired military officers to a word of wisdom from the former Chief of Army Staff, Lt. General Salihu Ibrahim who had this to say:

The only way democracy can survive in this country is through eternal vigilance and that aggrieved politicians should not allow emotions to override their reasoning.

On the call for the cancellation of elections (annulment) General Salihu who saw it all in 1993 had this to say:

Previous attempts to cancel election brought nothing but doom to the country and all of us will pay dearly for it.

Paying tribute to what Obasanjo had done for the military since 1999, General Salihu had this to say:

The military had been restructured to encourage strict professionalism and had become responsive and appreciative of the need to sustain the democratic institution in the country.

He concluded:

They know what is honorable and what is not and they also know that it is imperative for the country to join the globalization nurtured under democratic institution. See The Guardian, May 22, 2003.

Nigerians would recall that the regime of Sir Abubakar was terminated in a bloody military coup in January 1966. That military intervention in politics ended not just the life of the regime but the life of the Prime Minister and many political and military leaders. That event commenced the first long period of military rule from 1966-1979 under four political generals (Ironsi, Gowon, Muhammed and Obasanjo). That period witnessed a thirty-month Civil War 1967-70). Incidentally the secessionist leader was one of the presidential candidates today Dim Ojukwu.

Incidentally, the secessionist troop surrendered to then Col. Olusegun Obasanjo, then GOC 3 Marine Division of the Nigerian Army. The aftermath of the Civil War still lingers till today.

What General Buhari did not say was that the long period of the military misrule was brought to an end by General Obasanjo who then handed over to a democratically elected President, Alhaji Shehu Shagari on October 1, 1979.

General Buhari would have been reminded of the tragic irony that it was he, General Buhari, a born-again democrat today that used the military clique to terminate the second term of Alhaji Shehu Shagari in December 1983. Nigerians that he is talking to today acknowledge that it was General Buhari that commenced the longest period of military misrule in the nation’s history (1983-1999) under four political generals (Buhari, Babangida, Abacha, Abubakar).

What General Buhari did not say was his disdain for the politicians and his high-handedness with the way he dealt with the former President and the political class. What was their crime? Because they were politicians!

What General Buhari did not say was how the long period of military misrule was brought to an end. Nigerian knew that this was when Chief Obasanjo agreed to be used by the intellectually bankrupt and visionless military class to bring about a civilian rule in 1999.

Where was General Buhari under the third military ruler, General Abacha? Nigerians were shocked when for the first time the first military ruler, 1983-85 turned a staff of the third military ruler as an Executive Chairman of the Petroleum Trust Fund. Nigerians should have been surprised that leaders of Abacha Self-Succession Team in the north such as Wada Nas and Sule Hamma are also members of Buhari organization today.

Myth Number Three

The third myth derives from the British Design as to who should rule Nigeria. In accordance with the British Design since 1960, the presidency was reserved for the north and denied the south. It is part of this myth that where a southerner became the Head, like in 1976 and 1999, it would have to be at the pleasure of the north.

The northern political-military leaders loved Obasanjo then partly because of his record of the way he dealt with them in the past and partly because they erroneously believed that his people in the southwest hate him. Those who worked with Buhari thought that they could demonstrate to the northern voters that he Obasanjo could not be trusted again in 2003 because he betrayed the trust of the north since 1999. It was in the second issue that they blundered. This would be dealt with in a separate essay later.

Of course, when someone (MKO Abiola) said to be loved by his people got that office as an autonomous Nigeria with massive support from his home along with other Nigerians, he was denied that office.

In the April 2003 Presidential election, the geographical spread of support that Obasanjo had can be compared with the kind of geographical spread of support that MKO Abiola had in 1993. Just as Obasanjo did not get the minimum support from Sokoto, Kebbi and Zamfara, the northwest, Abiola also did not get the minimum support from the same area. This is not all.

In 1993, Abiola got massive Yoruba support in the 80s; but in 2003, Obasanjo got more in the 90s. Dr. Victor Omololu Olunloyo provided what he called a mathematical argument why MKO Abiola’s mandate based on massive home support was unethical and therefore unacceptable. Of course, Dr. Walter Ofonagoro took advantage of Dr. Olunloyo’s argument and conclusion. One would recall that Dr. Ofonagro was an Abacha staffer and the Director of Tofa Presidential Campaign organization. He never hid his contempt for the Yoruba. He displayed this in many ways. For this essay, it was the way he Dr. Walter Ofonagoro used Dr. Olunloyo’s mathematical argument that is critical to today’s politics. One is waiting to read of the conclusion that such a home support that Abiola had in 1993 and which Obasanjo had in 2003 is a political crime.

For Dr. Victor Omololu Olunloyo’s argument see, "June 12: Mandate and Ethnic Stigma" in Tribune, October 4, 1993.

For Dr. Walter Ofonagoro’s use of Olunloyo’s mathematical analysis, see June 12: The Future of Nigerian Democracy no date published by the Federal Ministry of Information.

Massive home support was a political crime that justified annulment and sustenance of annulment of the June 12, 1993 Presidential election that MKO Abiola won. What shall we call the super massive Yoruba support that Obasanjo had in April 2003? One would want to read a comparative mathematical analysis from Dr. Olunloyo.

These three myths are at the root of Obasanjo’s behavior in the days leading to April 2003 election. He desperately wanted to resolve them. How he coped or how he is coping with these three myths is not the subject of this essay. This would be left to further analysis and essay.

WHAT OBASANJO ACHIEVED WAS ATTITUDE CHANGE

The subject of this essay has to do with how he tried to change the character of politics in the southwestern Nigeria. Unlike what Ojukwu and Adesanyan alluded to, Obasanjo did not set out to physically conquer or capture the territory of southwest. His plan was to win the hearts and soul of the Yoruba people that there was another way out of their fear from the past short of the siege or enclave mentality foisted on them by the Afenifere.

Chief Obasanjo wants Nigerians in general and the Yoruba in particular to appreciate that he is not a politician in the mold of the 1999 transition. There were two notions of him in 1999.

One was that he was the lackey of the north or a friend of the north depending who is doing the characterization. This was the image of him that the northern political/military leaders used to campaign for him in 1999. He detested this. But there was nothing he could do to change that during the first term.

The second image was as an enemy of the southwest and as one who let down his people in the distant and immediate past. This was what the Yoruba leaders used against him in the 1999 elections and in the ensuing years.

How candidate Obasanjo overcame these two images in Nigeria in general and in the southwest in particular and turn the southwest into a PDP terrain would be the subject of the next essay in four parts with the title: OBASABJO, A NEW PDP, and A NEW SOUTHWEST AFTER APRIL ELECTIONS (1), (2), (3) and (4). That would end my comments on the election and its aftermath.

May 2003