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Orizu Ironsi and 1966 - a rejoinder to Siollun's rejoinder by In the article “The Northern Counter-Coup of 1966 – A Rejoinder to a Rejoinder”, Mr. “Max Siollun” describes himself ‘as a person who does not want to leave Nigerians with misconceptions about Nigeria’s history’ yet he is at risk of doing just that by not bothering to confirm the veracity of the contents of some of his sources, misunderstanding the contents of others, and selectively quoting from some while ignoring other references. And now to his rejoinder to my rejoinder.
IBADAN HAD AN “INDIFFERENT” POPULATION DURING THE COUNTER-COUP Mr. Siollun now says that by “indifferent”, he was referring “to the west’s politically neutral stance to the ongoing feud between northerners and Igbos. The Western Region sat on the fence during the Eastern-Northern stand off. The west was in a difficult position because it had lost people in both the January (Ademulegun, Akintola, Shodeinde,) and July (Fajuyi) coups. Added to that, the West was unnerved by the presence of a large contingent of northern troops stationed at Ibadan. Evidence for this can be found by the fact that Obafemi Awolowo later accused the north of exploiting its military and political stranglehold on the country, and demanded that soldiers of northern origin be removed from Ibadan.”
I was slightly amused by his response. Neutrality and indifference are not necessarily the same. In any case, this is what he actually wrote originally: “Thus northern soldiers decided to deal with Ironsi when he arrived in Ibadan (where a large contingent of northern soldiers was based, and which had an indifferent local population) for the western leg of his nation-wide tour.”
I am not sure that this is correct at all, since what transpired on July 29 was actually an accident, following unplanned events at Abeokuta on July 28, which Siollun himself has acknowledged. However, this original comment by Siollun is specifically set against the period of July 1966. The rationalization in his subsequent rejoinder takes events of 1967 and uses them to justify a comment about what he wrote regarding July 1966. Awolowo was not released from Jail until early August 1966 and the question of the West sitting on the fence during the ‘Eastern-Northern standoff’ did not arise until Ojukwu refused the authority of Gowon after the coup and during the subsequent crises after Aburi. The request to remove northern troops from the West came in 1967 although it is true that Adebayo had expressed unease in late 1966.
THE HANDOVER OF POWER FROM CIVILIANS TO THE ARMY Once again Mr. Siollun has not bothered to cross-check the essential details of the events on January 1966 from multiple sources. I will do so for him only to use his own preferred method of sourcing. I really do not have to because I was in a position to know most of what transpired back then. Reading the various accounts and distortions over the years has caused me great pain. As far as Siollun is concerned, Luckham’s book represents “historical accuracy”. Did Luckham speak to all who were involved?
Siollun claims that “Major Nzeogwu threatened to march to, and capture the South in order to complete the coup.“ With which troops? Ironsi had the loyalty of Lt. Col. Ojukwu in Kano, Lt. Col. Nzefili in Ibadan along with Lt. Cols Njoku and Gowon in Lagos, not to mention Major Obienu of the Recce squadron at Abeokuta. The battalion at Enugu (commanded by Lt. Col. Ejoor) was also pro-Ironsi. Was Major Nzeogwu of the NMTC going to use borrowed soldiers in Kaduna supported by Lt. Amuchienwa of the pupil airforce? By that time the northern NCOs he had deceived into participating via Exercise Damissa already knew what had transpired. Nzeogwu himself later acknowledged that he did not want to risk splitting the loyalty of his men.
In Madiebo’s account of the crisis and war he also explains how he made it clear to Nzeogwu in Kaduna that he could not possibly win a confrontation with Ironsi, who could also call on the British if he wanted. Numerous other accounts have stated that Ojukwu did not support Nzeogwu against Ironsi. This was a source of friction between both men which lasted until Nzeogwu died under mysterious circumstances in July 1967. Ojukwu has confirmed this publicly. Indeed in his first broadcast to the nation Ironsi said that the vast majority of officers and soldiers had stood by him during the mutiny, which was a different picture from what he presented to the remnants of Balewa’s government as he extracted a “hand-over” from them.
Let me now share Shagari’s account since Mr. Siollun refuses to do so. But I hasten to add (for those who mistrust any source merely because it is northern) that Chief Richard Akinjide (who is still alive and was present during that event) has clearly stated publicly during an interview in the Vanguard last year that the civilians did not voluntarily hand over to Ironsi in 1966. In fact, in one of his few public comments before he was executed by Ojukwu, late Col (ie Brigadier) Victor Banjo, who was not originally part of the Ifeajuna-Nzeogwu coup, admitted responsibility among other senior officers along with Ironsi in Lagos who took the decision to “accept responsibility for Nigeria” in January 1966. In fact Banjo claims he was the chief spokesman for that decision, presumably made in the Army headquarters. Banjo said ”…I spent a considerable time in an effort to urge the late Major General to assume responsibility for the state with the support of the Army to ensure that the Nigerian nation remained together and was protected from national collapse. It was then my view that any attempt to use the Nigerian Army for any military action within Nigeria would only have the effect of breaking the Army into its tribal components of which the Northern component would represent the lion’s share. This northern component, effectively under the control of Northern feudalists, would then inevitably be employed to impose on the rest of Nigeria the most repressive feudal domination” [See Brigadier Banjo’s Broadcast to the Midwest on 14 August 1967 BBC ME/2544/B3]
In other words, to avoid restoration of northern civil rule, Ironsi was urged to take over. Unfortunately for the rather naïve Banjo, he was arrested the day after Ironsi assumed control, accused of plotting to kill Ironsi!
And now to Shagari’s account: “…....there had been a lot of noise around my home that evening; with Tiv music blaring at a send off/welcoming party Brigadier Zakari Maimalari, the Commander 2nd Brigade headquarters, was holding for his officers at his 11 Thompson avenue residence. Later in the small hours, I heard some gunshots but somehow thought they were part of the revelry by the officers. So I returned to my sleep. But moments later my steward woke me up to say Alhaji Ahmadu Kurfi, deputy permanent secretary at the Ministry of Defence, wanted to see me urgently. Coming down the stairs, I noticed there was no electricity, which I attributed to the usual power failure.
Alhaji Kurfi informed me there had been a mutiny in the army and some rebels had abducted the PM and Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, the Minister of Finance. Okotie-Eboh, was also the NCNC federal parliamentary party leader, and a key link in the NPC-NCNC alliance. Kurfi said he understood Major-General JTU Aguiyi-Ironsi (Welby-Everard’s Nigerian successor as GOC) was trying hard to organize a counter-action. (Maimalari it later emerged, had been alerted before the rebels reached his home. While walking to nearby Dodan Barracks, he spotted the car of Major Emmanuel A Ifeajuna, whom he beckoned to stop. Ifeajuna came out, and calmly shot him dead.) Kurfi then advised me to take care and left.
…………………………………….At about 7.00 am, I returned to Dipcharima’s residence to meet with some NPC ministers who had gathered there. Dipcharima was then the most senior NPC minister available. We received the latest reports on the situation, first from Alhaji Maitama Sule, Minister of Mines and Power, who had visited the PM’s residence by bicycle! We then heard from Alhaji Ibrahim Tako Galadima, the acting Minister of Defence, who had brought along with him Chief Fani-Kayode.
Chief Fani-Kayode said he had been fetched from Ibadan early that morning by rebels and locked up at the Federal Guard Officers Mess in Dodan Barracks, where the mutineers initially made their headquarters. Disguised in army uniform, loyal troops handed him over to Alhaji Galadima, who had called in at the barracks, which was a stone’s throw of his residence…………….The acting Minister of Defence assured us that Major-General Ironsi was doing his best to arrest the situation.
Maitama Sule and I were separately detailed to explore with our absent NPC and NCNC colleagues the possibility of naming someone to stand in for the PM. I was consulting with NCNC ministers at Dr. Mbadiwe’s residence when we heard that the Northern and Western premiers, Sir Ahmadu Bello and Chief Akintola respectively, had been assassinated. Hence I rushed back to Dipcharima’s residence, where I found my colleagues in a state of shock and desperation.
However, we decided to recognize Dipcharima, a Kanuri from Bornu, as our interim leader; and to ask the acting President, Dr. Orizu (President Azikiwe was away on leave), to appoint Dipcharima acting Prime Minister. WE ALSO SUMMONED MAJOR GENERAL IRONSI AND GAVE HIM FULL AUTHORITY TO USE EVERY FORCE AT HIS DISPOSAL TO SUPPRESS THE REBELLION. HE MOVED HIS HEADQUARTERS TEMPORARILY TO THE POLICE HEADQUARTERS AT MOLONEY STREET TO FACILITATE EASY COMMUNICATION WITH ARMY UNITS IN THE REGIONS. (capitalization is mine)
While at Dipcharima’s residence, we contacted the British High Commission and requested for military assistance in the event that our loyal troops should require any. The response was positive, but the British insisted that the request must be written by the PM; or, in his absence, by a properly appointed deputy. We, therefore, drove to the residence of Dr. Orizu, and requested him to appoint Dipcharima acting prime minister. Dr. Orizu requested to see our NCNC colleagues to confirm whether they supported our proposition, and they joined us soon afterwards. They had apparently been caucusing at Dr. Mbadiwe’s residence. He (Mbadiwe) was their choice of acting Prime Minister. This was naturally unacceptable to us since the NPC was the major governing party.
WHILE WE WERE AT ORIZU’S RESIDENCE, MAJOR-GENERAL IRONSI, WHO HAD SEEMINGLY SECURED LAGOS, CAME IN WITH SOME ARMED ESCORTS. HE REQUESTED FOR A TETE-A-TETE WITH ORIZU. THE TWO HAD A 40 MINUTES DISCUSSION IN ANOTHER ROOM, WHILE WE WAITED ANXIOUSLY IN THE SITTING ROOM, WITH THE ARMED SOLDIERS STANDING AND STARING AT US. WHEN MAJOR-GENERAL IRONSI FINALLY EMERGED, HE TALKED TO DIPCHARIMA SOTTO VOCE; AND THEN DROVE OFF WITH HIS TROOPS. DR. ORIZU THEN JOINED US, REGRETTED HIS INABILITY IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES TO OBLIGE OUR REQUEST. HE SUGGESTED WE ALL RETURN TO OUR HOMES AND WAIT UNTIL WE WERE REQUIRED. ALL EFFORTS TO GET ANY CLARIFICATION FAILED, AND WE LEFT IN UTTER DESPERATION. (capitalization is mine)
I was about to break the Ramadan fast on Sunday 16th January, when all ministers were asked to report to the Cabinet Office at 6.30 pm. The whole premises was surrounded by soldiers in battle order that some of us initially hesitated to enter. In the Cabinet chamber were Major General Ironsi, Bukar Dipcharima and Ibrahim Tako Galadima. There were no officials present.
Major General Ironsi admitted to us that he had been unable to suppress the rebellion, which he said was getting out of hand. He stated that the mutineers were in control of Kaduna, Kano and Ibadan, and had killed two regional premiers, Sir Ahmadu Bello and Chief Akintola. They had also murdered a number of his best officers, including Brigadiers Maimalari and Samuel Adesujo Ademulegun, the Commander 1st Brigade Headquarters in Kaduna. Ironsi was full of emotion and even shed some tears. When we asked him about the whereabouts of Sir ABubakar and Chief Okotie-Eboh, he said he still did not know but averred efforts were being made to locate them. At this stage Mbadiwe broke down and kept crying: “Please where is the Prime Minister?”
WHEN WE REMINDED MAJOR-GENERAL IRONSI IF HE NEEDED TO AVAIL HIMSELF OF THE BRITISH PLEDGE OF ASSISTANCE, HE REPLIED IT WAS TOO LATE AS THE ARMY WAS PRESSING HIM TO ASSUME POWER. INDEED, HE CONFESSED HIS PERSONAL RELUCTANCE TO TAKE OVER BECAUSE OF HIS IGNORANCE OF GOVERNMENT; BUT INSISTED THE BOYS WERE ADAMANT AND ANXIOUSLY WAITING OUTSIDE. HE ADVISED IT WOULD BE IN OUR INTEREST, AND THAT OF THE COUNTRY, TO TEMPORARILY CEDE POWER TO HIM TO AVERT DISASTER. ACCORDINGLY, WE ACCEDED TO HIS REQUEST SINCE WE HAD NO BETTER ALTERNATIVE. IRONSI THEN INSISTED THAT THE UNDERSTANDING BE WRITTEN.
Surprisingly, there was no stationery to write the agreement; and all the offices were locked while no official was around. Alhaji AGF Abdulrazaq the Minister of State for the Railways (former NPC legal adviser), managed to secure a scrap paper on which he drafted a statement, which we endorsed. That was the so called voluntary hand-over of power by the Balewa Government to Major General Ironsi! It was agreed that the statement would be typed and Dipcharima would sign it on our behalf. We were then advised to return home and await further instructions. I only got to break my Ramadan fast around 9:30 pm.
LATER AT 11.50 PM, DR. ORIZU MADE A TERSE NATIONWIDE BROADCAST, ANNOUNCING THE CABINET’S VOLUNTARY DECISION TO TRANSFER POWER TO THE ARMED FORCES. MAJOR GENERAL IRONSI THEN MADE HIS OWN BROADCAST, ACCEPTING THE “INVITATION”. HE SUSPENDED CERTAIN PARTS OF THE CONSTITUTION; SET UP A NATIONAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT, WITH THE OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNORS IN EACH REGION; AND BRIEFLY OUTLINED THE POLICY INTENTIONS OF HIS REGIME. NIGERIA’S FIRST DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT WAS EFFECTIVELY OVER. AND ALTHOUGH THE MUTINY HAD BY THEN PRACTICALLY COLLAPSED, MILITARY RULE HAD ARRIVED. IT WAS A FACT.
The following morning, 17 January, Alhaji Kam Salem, the Deputy Inspector-General of Police (then also doubling for the Inspector-General, Mr. Louis Orok Edet, while on vacation), called at my residence to confide that both the PM and Chief Okotie-Eboh had been confirmed killed. He then hinted that Major General Ironsi was still negotiating with the rebels in Kaduna, led by Major Patrick Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu…………………………………
That same day, Dr. Orizu sent for me. I drove myself to his residence, where I also met Mr. Dan O Ibekwe, a man of reassuring belief in federal Nigerian unity. Dr. Orizu offered his condolences on the death of Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, and asked me to convey his sympathies to people in the North, particularly those in Sokoto. He urged me to explain to them on my return that the coup was a purely military affair, which had nothing to do with the Igbo as an ethnic group. Orizu pointed out that Major Nzeogwu, the most prominent of the mutineers, was “an unknown entity among the Ibos (sic) in the Eastern region”.
WAS THE JANUARY COUP AN “IGBO COUP” INVOLVING IRONSI? First let me state that I dislike the concept of generalizing the actions of a few and holding an entire tribe responsible. I do not think the Igbo tribe was accountable. But critical components of the political leadership, military and press certainly were.
Mr. Siollun wants my source for the comment that “Ironsi definitely knew of the plot and planned to exploit it without actually being in it. My source is the Police Special Branch and I would like Mr. Siollun to know that special branch reports are not routinely published publicly, although an incomplete version of the report which was leaked (or released) after Gowon came to power, is available publicly.
And then Siollun goes on to tell me of Ironsi’s view on military governance. What does that mean? Is there any Army Chief in History who would publicly state his preference for military rule while still serving under a civilian government? Mr. Siollun goes on to say that ‘Shortly after becoming Nigeria’s first military Head of State in January 1966, he was asked whether the army would remain in power after the explosive political situation in the country had subsided. He simply gave a terse reply of "I hope not".’ Again, how Ironsi felt is revealed by his actions, not words. Someone who was planning to stay for a short time does not venture down the kind of fundamental and serious structural changes of Nigeria Ironsi planned to institute such as abolishing local police and unitarisation of the whole country. Transitional governments do not unilaterally engage in such pursuits. In any case Ironsi was one thing. His coterie of “kitchen cabinet” hangers on and advisers was another, which proved to be his undoing. Then Mr. Siollun goes on to use Ironsi’s role in crushing the plot as evidence that he was not part of it. Again Mr. Siollun failed to read my rejoinder carefully. I did not say Ironsi was part of the plot. I said that Ironsi knew of the plot and planned to exploit it without being in it. This is not a difficult concept to follow. It happened in Nigeria and other countries before and after Ironsi. Siollun asks: “If Ironsi was part of the coup plot, why would the Majors plan to kill him?” The answer is that the problem with the January 1966 coup was that there were several factions within it. And different factions had different agendas. As Ojukwu has correctly observed, Nzeogwu was not the leader of the coup. Ifeajuna was the leader. The only reason Nzeogwu made the radio broadcast as an afterthought in Kaduna was because Ademoyega failed to do so in Lagos. While Nzeogwu was dreaming in Kaduna about who and what would be killed in Lagos, Ifeajuna had other ideas and contacts, including many civilians. Some prominent Igbo politicians (like Ajuluchukwu) have since confessed in Nigerian newspapers that even President Nnamdi Azikiwe was tipped off about the plot by his cousin Ifeajuna and that is why he was away from Nigeria – an odd absence for the President during the Commonwealth Prime-Ministers conference hosted by his country. Final decisions about who was to be killed or not killed were left to theater commanders in each region. Nzeogwu had no say outside the northern region. THE FATE OF THE JANUARY BOYS Siollun said: “Mr. Unegbe accurately stated that the southern officers who took part in the January coup were imprisoned (albeit on full pay). However, his assertion that some of them “got promoted while in jail” is patent falsehood.” Again, Mr. Siollun should read more widely. Shagari made reference to it in his biography on page 123. “ALTHOUGH NZEOGWU WAS THROWN INTO DETENTION ON ARRIVAL, HE AND HIS FELLOW DETAINED FELONS WERE ACCORDED VIP TREATMENT. IN FACT THEY WERE BEING PAID THEIR FULL SALARIES AND ALLOWANCES, AND SEVEN OF THEM WERE EVEN PROMOTED FOR GOOD MEASURE!” (capitalization is mine) I must also let Mr. Siollun know that there are other sources that corroborate this story. Max Siollun knows or should know that government gazettes often trail Army Council, Cabinet office and Military Council decisions by several months. These days, decisions sometimes do not appear in gazette for a whole year or more! Even then a subject matter may be gazetted and then backdated several years. In 1966, many decisions awaiting gazette publication were overtaken by the events of July. Siollun should not be misled by what did or did not appear in available gazettes. Siollun claims “Ironsi could not legally stop the pay of the January mutineers. They were held on suspicion of committing a crime, thus their benefits could not be legally stripped from them until they had been convicted of an offence meriting the removal of their remuneration. Simple legal principle.” Mr. Siollun should get more familiar with Nigerian military law and the Army Act in particular. Officers and men held on suspicion of treason or murder are entitled only to 50% pay with no allowances while the investigation and trial continues. If cleared, they get their allowances in arrears. Ironsi ignored this basic military law and played the crafty game of claiming that although they had been arrested, they had not been charged. If they did not commit any offence why were they detained? Some of them, like Nzeogwu, had already granted International Press interviews openly admitting their role in various murders. Siollun goes on to say that “the Supreme Military Council had taken the decision to place the January Majors on public trial. This decision was recorded in the minutes of the SMC …………………….. Ironically, after complaining that Ironsi did not place the Majors on trial, the officers who toppled him did not do so either. If this really was such an explosive political issue, why did the successor regime to Ironsi (backed up by the northern officers of the army) not try the Majors (their surviving members were still in prison when Gowon took charge).” Again, Siollun recalls bits and pieces of partial truth. After the May riots Ironsi set up a panel of inquiry to probe the disturbance. Faced with complaints which were first publicly articulated by Alhaji Suleman Takuma earlier on that the January mutineers had not been tried, he belatedly ‘declared an intention’ to do so in late June to countermand those who did not want the May riots probed, claiming the precedent set by Ironsi's handling of the events of January. By then the horse had already left the barn. How could Gowon have placed the January Majors on trial in August 1966? Most of them were (conveniently) detained in the East. The eastern regional government of Ojukwu did not recognise Gowon. In fact, Ojukwu later released them all after demonstrations by students of the UNN Nsukka. Those detained in Benin were sprung from jail in mid–August 1966 and executed by mutinous soldiers from Ibadan’s 4th battalion. Even then in January 1970 after the end of the civil war, Gowon established a Board of Inquiry to ascertain the role of officers in the coup of Jan 15, 1966 and the Midwest occupation of August 9, 1967 which he considered a coup against that region's government. The same Elaigwu book Mr. Siollun selectively quotes listed those detained until October 1974. That Gowon did not have them court-martialed and possibly shot is because in 1970 he had pledged a policy of no victor no vanquished and no “Nuremberg type trials” to the international community. Nevertheless, nearly all were eventually dismissed. THE UNIFICATION DECREE It is not correct to say that successive northern governments have operated a system more unitary than anything Ironsi ever envisaged. Nigeria since July 1966 (whether military or civil) has not had a single civil or public service, nor has it has a single judicial service. University Lecturers in Nigeria are not on the same system as the military nor are the military on the same system as workers for federal parastatals. In the process of unifying the civil service, the Nwokedi proposal was to rank civil servants from different parts of the country not just according to date of appointment but ACCORDING TO THEIR EXISTING REGIONAL PAY. The northern region being the region that paid the lowest salary found that all their civil servants would be at the bottom of the new seniority list. This was not helped by the influx of young school leavers from the East rushing northwards to take up jobs. Even as a southerner, at that time it was not really clear to me why Nigeria which had long since embraced federalism should now unify its civil and public services. The unitary appearance of Nigeria during military rule derived from the unitary nature of the Military Services. Even then there were many non-unitary aspects of the Gowon era which were abrogated by Murtala/Obasanjo between 1975 and 1979. Since then, such principles have been codified in our various constitutions which, if we choose to be honest, can hardly be said to be exclusively northern in conception. As we speak the greatest obstacle to restructuring Nigeria through constitutional reform is President Obasanjo. IGBO PROVOCATION There is no disagreement between Siollun and myself in this section. I commend Mr. Siollun for agreeing with me on one point. He wrote: “I agree with Mr. Unegbe that the anti-Igbo pogroms of mid to late 1966 were in part motivated by the insensitive jubilating of some southerners following the January coup. Most Nigerians have a selective memory and only remember events in isolation. So that only those events in which they were the victims, rather than the aggressor, are recollected.“
Excellent. That pretty much explains why I felt from the beginning that events must always be placed in context. In addition to the events of January, and the fears raised by the unification decree, promulgated without adequate consultation, the June 1966 edition of Drum magazine, which hit news stands in late May, contained an insensitive article by Nelson Ottah on “Why Nigeria exploded”. The most provocative article, however, was written by one Coz Idapo titled “Sir Ahmadu rose in his shrouds and spoke from the dead.” The article had a fake picture of the late Sardauna placed on a bier before Idapo. It illustrated Sardauna ‘confessing’ his ‘foolish’ misdeeds to Idapo with a crowd watching. The caption read that Sardauna was asking Idapo for ‘forgiveness’. The arrival of the magazine on May 28 in several northern cities turned what began as a peaceful protest by northern civil servants against civil service unification into a violent anti-Igbo riot.
BRIGADIER MAIMALARI AS GOC? Yes. Brigadier Maimalari as GOC. I repeat my assertion that the British wanted Maimalari as the successor GOC. (See diplomatic cables of that era recently shared with me by an old British colleague) Numerous books have clearly indicated that Ogundipe was not in serious contention. Even Madiebo wrote that the final contest was between Ademulegun and Ironsi. Balewa favored Ironsi. The NCNC favored Ironsi. Welby-Everard opposed Ironsi (see Shagari). Sardauna favored Ademulegun. The army favored Maimalari (see Joe Garba). Eventually Balewa chose Ironsi over the objections of his own party and the Akintola group. And guess who advised Balewa to do so: Brigadier Maimalari himself! (See Madiebo, page 13, second paragraph).
In outlining the impressive credentials of Brigadiers Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, Samuel Ademulegun, Babafemi Ogundipe, and Zakariya Maimalari, Siollun fails to appreciate one key factor in military hierarchy and command decision making. It is the concept of commission. In other words what type of commission does an officer hold? Of the four, the only one with a regular combatant commission was the Sandhurst-trained Maimalari. The others rose from the ranks.
If Max Siollun has any doubt about the attitude of regular commissioned officers toward Ironsi he need only read Major Nzeogwu’s last public interview in 1967 (Ejindu) where he described Ironsi as a man who joined the Army as a Tally clerk and remained a Tally clerk throughout his career. I am not supporting Nzeogwu’s harsh and perhaps unfair characterization of the late General but merely pointing out the reality of the “caste” system within the military. Such considerations may have influenced the outgoing British General who opposed Ironsi’s appointment.
SHITTU ALAO AND BENJAMIN ADEKUNLE Siollun says “Mr. Unegbe went into a detailed but irrelevant analysis regarding the birthplace of these two men. As interesting as the maternal origins of Alao and Adekunle may be to him, I do not propose to respond as such matters are not relevant to the subject matter of my original article.”
There he goes again. In his original article Siollun said, under the section titled THE ROLE OF SOUTHERN OFFICERS: “ The counter-coup was carried out almost exclusively by northern officers. However, consternation at Igbos was so great that a few southern officers also participated. Six Yorubas are known to have taken part. Of these, four were northern Yorubas from the Ilorin and Kabba provinces of the northern region. One of them (Major Shittu Alao) later became the head of the Air Force.” The point, therefore, of my detailed rejoinder was to correct the impression that Shittu Alao was from either Ilorin or Kabba. Again, Mr. Siollun swallows information from uninformed foreigners hook, line and sinker. His reference this time is Robin Luckham who can hardly be blamed for not knowing that Ogbomosho was not in either Kabba or Ilorin.
THE DIMKA COUP OF 1976 I acknowledge and accept Mr. Siollun’s apology for the typographical error. WILLIAM WALBE Merely quoting Elaigwu’s book and repeating his mistake does not make a point accurate. Walbe was never Gowon’s “bodyguard” in the sense in which that term is usually used. Yes, all those military personnel who assist a commander will guard his person if attacked, but not that they are per se ‘bodyguards’. Gowon was Chief of Staff (Army) just prior to and during the coup. In that position he was already entitled to an ADC and a military assistant, quite separate from a batman or other bodyguards. Immediately after the coup, he became the Supreme Commander or Commander in Chief. Lieutenant William Walbe was a commissioned officer and could only have been functioning as the officer commanding Lt. Col. Gowon’s guard detail, his ADC or military assistant, not his personal bodyguard. Hair splitting? Perhaps. But sometimes these details are important.
MAJOR EKANEM WAS NOT IGBO In Mr. Siollun’s original message he wrote: “Later on, simply being Igbo became reason enough to be killed. As Gowon struggled to stabilise himself in power, random murders of Igbo soldiers continued to occur. The army's Provost Marshal, Major Ekanem, was shot dead on Carter Bridge by Sergeant Lapdam while en route to an errand for Gowon.” Is Mr. Siollun not implying by the lead-in sentences that Major Ekanem was Igbo?
IN CONCLUSION Finally let me credit Mr. Siollun for his painstaking research and commitment to find the truth. I can appreciate the difficulties of relying on references about which one has little direct personal knowledge. I apologize if I have sometimes come across as harsh and hair-splitting. After all I have also made typographical and material errors myself, including a miscalculation of the late Colonel Shodeinde’s son’s age. But the facts have to be correctly stated so that Nigerians are not left with misconceptions about Nigeria’s history.
If the rule of law had been followed consistently in our country, no matter who gained or lost in the short term, we would not be where we are today. The events of 1966 were avoidable. December 2001 |