The Politics of Force Deployment and Nigeria

The Politics of Force Deployment and Nigeria ’s National Security

Odi will continue to haunt Nigeria , particularly the armed forces. When President/Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, Defence Minister Lt. Gen. Theophilus Danjuma (rtd.), Maj. Gen. Victor Malu (now rtd.) and other top leaders of the nation met secretly and established Operation Hakuri II, little did they know that they were setting a very dangerous military precedent. When they approved the decision to launch a conventional military attack against Odi, on the grounds of attempting to apprehend those who had killed 12 police officers, they set up a precedent that a whole community could be punished for the actions of the few. When they decided to regionalize the Odi operation by removing soldiers of Niger Delta origin, particularly from the Ijaw ethnic group from the units that were supposed to carry out the operation while transferring troops from other regions or zones of the country into the units that carried out the operation, they laid the golden egg for future instability of the armed forces and the country.

It should be recalled that it was widely reported that before the plan to attack Odi was finalized, troops from the Niger Delta, particularly from Ijaw areas were removed from the units that were supposed to go to Odi and troops from the Non-Oil Producing regions were put in the units that were supposed to go to the town. The reason for this tactical move was to prevent soldiers indigenous to the area from sympathizing and or identifying with the aspirations and concerns of the people of Odi and the Niger Delta generally. The precaution was supposedly taken after earlier military encounters in which some soldiers from the Niger Delta actually joined armed youths to resist federal security operations. It should be recalled that during a military operation in Bayelsa State in which Okpoama youths launched attacks against security forces, a former colonel from Okpoama known as “Akono” or by the nickname of “ Oslo ” was supposedly alleged by federal authorities to have supplied arms to the youths. Likewise, two soldiers were reported to have left their units and probably joined the youths. P.M. News (1999, January 8) reported:

“ According to a report circulating in high military and police quarters, the soldiers vanished last Sunday when Okpoma youths attacked a team of soldiers sent to the area. One source told P.M News that the men actually abandoned fellow soldiers, opting instead to team up with the Ijaw youths.”

It should also be recalled that when troops were deployed after the launching of the Kaiama Declaration, many soldiers from the Niger Delta sympathized with the youths and tactically refused to cooperate in manhandling the youths. This being the case, the political and military higher-ups in Nigeria decided to regionalize the attack on Odi by removing troops from the area and replacing them with troops from other regions. That action, no doubt, has contributed immensely to the politicization and destabilization of the armed forces. That action will continue to haunt the nation in many ways. Senior military officers would have vehemently opposed the idea of invading a Nigerian community with a conventional military force, for the unbelievable purpose of apprehending suspects when the police could have been summoned to investigate and carry out the arrests.

Why is the regionalization of soldiers-in-action a very dangerous practice?

Five very strong arguments are made here. First, the tactical deployment of soldiers to fighting units based on their ethnicity or region of origin is a very destabilizing approach in solving conflicts in Nigeria since it tends to create the feelings of “we vs. them” and “you kill my people and I will kill your people” among the soldiers. Second, the excessive use of force and unnecessary killings of Nigerians by Nigeria ’s security forces during security operations to control communal uprisings are engendered by the need to retaliate for previous actions. In other words, when political and military leaders dispatch security forces to clamp down on a trouble spot and in the process, people are unnecessarily killed, the sons and daughters from that community, who are in the armed and police forces, eventually retaliate when they are sent to other communities to maintain order, as a form of payback for the destruction and killing of their own people. This accounts for the frequent excessive use of force by some soldiers, naval personnel, and police officers. Third, the argument often made by members of the security forces that they were simply “obeying orders” is merely a smokescreen for retaliatory action. Fourth, since power seems to gravitate towards the power-wielders, Nigeria ’s security forces tend to be deployed quite easily and encouraged to shoot on sight in politically powerless regions of the country while regions with great political influence rarely experience military deployment. Five, the wide margin between senior military officers and the noncommissioned officers in terms of benefits leads to frustration and the need to destroy. The following reasons explain the positions taken in the arguments.

1. The drawbacks of deploying soldiers based on their ethnicity or regions of origin:

(a) Assigning soldiers to certain operations based on their ethnicity or region or community creates the impression that the armed forces are regionally and ethnically structured. It turns soldiers against their comrades based on ethnicity and or regions of origin.

(b) The political and military higher-ups who approved the regionalization of soldiers-in-action policy during the Odi operation ignored the fact that such a strategy can tremendously contribute to ethnic and regional hatred. In other words, if soldiers from other parts of Nigeria are sent to the Niger Delta for security reasons and they behave brutally against the indigenes, Nigerian soldiers from the Niger Delta would most definitely pay back in kind if sent to other regions to keep the peace. Due to the short-sightedness of Operation Hakuri II against Ikenya, Opia, and Odi, it did not take long before a crisis in Benue State resulted in the deployment of Nigerian troops in the region under “Operation Mesa.” As things turned out, the crisis was in the vicinity of Maj. Gen Victor Malu’s community. Maj. Gen. Malu was the Army Chief of Staff during the Odi operation. The soldiers inflicted extensive destruction and death on his people. Surprisingly, Gen. Malu could not accept the destruction and death inflicted upon his people but tolerated the destruction and killings inflicted upon Odi people. On the Odi operation, Malu stated: “ I did a professional operation at Odi and if the occasion warrants I will do the same thing. I have no cause to apologise to the people of Odi” ( Ozi-Usman, 2002, May 28). However, on the army operation in his own community, he stated: “My conclusion on the incident is that the army had specific instructions to… destroy the whole of my village.” (Reuters, 2002, May 27). Lt. Gen Malu forgot that the troops sent to destroy Odi had revealed that they were ordered to do so by the higher-ups. It can also be recalled that Lt. Gen. Danjuma (rtd.) justified the Odi operation on the grounds of securing oil facilities. He did not regret the unnecessary lost of lives and property at Odi but regretted the Middle Belt counteraction by the Nigerian military. After the Benue attack, Danjuma reacted “The most difficult time in my life was when I was accused of masterminding the Benue State killings where scores of residents died after a bloody clash with security operatives” (Olise, 2003, May 21). Gen. Malu could not understand why his uncle, who was the chief of his place, was killed but forgot that Nigerian soldiers had killed the chiefs of Ikenya in Delta State and Kaiama in Bayelsa State , during the Nigerian military efforts to stop demonstrations in support of the Kaiama Declaration.

(c) It seems that Nigeria ’s political and military leaders did not learn from the Odi and Benue fiascos. As a result, they are making the same mistakes again by regionalizing the components of forces trying to keep the peace in Delta State . Although, not authoritatively verifiable, it has been alleged that most of the soldiers sent to keep the peace in Delta State , under the Joint Task Force, Operation Restore Hope, particularly around Warri, are from other regions. Recently, Nigerian soldiers were said to have invaded Ohoro Town in the Ughelli North Local Council Area. The soldiers were alleged to have overreacted and killed about twenty people over the disappearance of some cows ( Ogefere & Olise, 2004, February 20). In Warri, in late February, 2004, two Itsekiri citizens were shot on flimsy reasons, one died while the other recuperated. The dead man, known as ‘Prince” died in the MacIver area while the other, a teenage boy, was shot at in the Polokor Market area by alleged men of the Joint Task Force, Operation Restore Hope. Itsekiri youths have vowed to retaliate against the soldiers who took the action (Okhomina, 2004, March 2). A major reason for the soldiers’ overreaction is based on the theory that most of them in “Operation Restore Hope” in the Niger Delta are from other regions of the country and they find it difficult to relate to the communities in which they are sent to maintain security. According to the Guardian,

“investigation revealed that more clashes between the soldiers and the host

communities would continue since a majority of military men deployed to the

Niger-Delta are northerners who may not be ready to build good relationship

with them” (Ibid.).

If Niger-Deltans were to feel that their fathers, mothers, sons and daughters were being tortured or killed due to lack of insensitivity by members of the armed and police forces, then the authorities should not be surprised if the sons and daughters of the Niger Delta who are also in the armed forces attempt to pay back in kind if sent to other regions of the country.

(d) The regionalization of soldiers-in-action approach to solving conflict contributes to the polarization of the armed forces. Since a large proportion of soldiers stationed in the Niger Delta, particularly around the Warri area are not from the region, Nigerian soldiers from the region would watch very interestingly on how the soldiers stationed in their communities behave toward their kith and kin. There is no doubt that Nigerian soldiers from the South East zone too are probably watching with keen interest over the political developments in Anambra state concerning the Chief Uba/Ngige affair. If these soldiers were to feel that their kith and kin in Anambra were being treated unfairly by the police and soldiers stationed there, they might be forced to react if sent to other regions to pay back in kind. Likewise, soldiers of Northern origin, particularly from the Islamic North, might also be watching very keenly to see how the federal government responds to Sharianization and Islamic activities in the Islamized states of Nigeria . Soldiers and police officers of Tiv extraction too might be silently fuming and watching to make sure that the Benue fiasco is not repeated in their communities again.

(e) The regionalization of soldiers-in-action policy tends to generate anger and the feeling that people are being ‘Militarily Occupied’ by outside forces. A feeling of occupation can easily generate militant reaction as those bearing the brunt of the military occupation try to resist. It is an acceptable psychological fact that when people feel militarily occupied, they tend to react militantly toward the military, thereby increasing tension unnecessarily. Military occupation cannot in any way lead to peaceful resolution of conflicts in the country. At most, it offers only a temporary solution to any conflict.

It is understandable, sometimes, why it is necessary to send soldiers from other regions to a particular hotspot in the country. For example, in Warri, it makes sense to send troops who are not connected to the conflict area. In short, it makes a whole lot of sense not to send soldiers of Ijaw, Itsekiri, and Urhobo ethnicity to Warri since there is a conflict involving the three ethnic groups. Security would be severely threatened if there were many Ijaw, Itsekiri, and Urhobo soldiers among the units sent to Warrri. They can easily turn their guns against each other and citizens of the competing ethnic groups. However, it does not make a strategic sense to deploy mostly troops from the North or from the West or from the Middle Belt. A regionalized deployment could force the citizens of Delta State to feel that they are being militarily occupied to make way for the continuing exploitation of oil resources in their region by outsiders who do not care about their plight.

For national security reasons, it is much preferable to send military and police forces of mixed ethnicity and regions, so that a counterbalancing view can take place among the soldiers, navy personnel, and police officers (between those who want to brutalize and those who do not want to brutalize). It is necessary to send security forces made of all Nigerians, including those from the North, Middle Belt, South-West, South-East and South-South (especially from the Cross Rivers and Akwa-Ibom States toWarri). A force made up of troops from all ethnic groups and regions would help tremendously to minimize brutalization since those security personnel who want to brutalize would have to realize that the unit is also made up of the sons and daughters of the area. If the sons and daughters of the area are removed and replaced by troops from the outside, there will be no hesitation for those who want to brutalize to do so.

(f) Deployment of troops based on regions of origin tends to lead to a general distrust of the armed forces and the magnification of conflict. If soldiers are made to feel that they are deployed in certain regions because of their regions of origin, they can easily become distrustful and angry. For instance, if suddenly, there is a crisis in the Islamic North and soldiers from that part of the country are tactically removed from the units that are sent to keep order, Northern soldiers would feel very unhappy and angry. In the event of any reported brutalization by Southern troops in the North, soldiers of Northern origin, who are stationed in the South, would look for ways to brutalize their host communities in the South, to pay back for the Southern brutalization of their people in the North.

Conflict is magnified because the strategy compels soldiers and police officers to align and form unofficial groups based on their regions of origins. It tends to divide the armed forces and make them incapable of transcending tribal and regional tendencies. It increases the level of brutalization of the civilian population by security personnel.

It is not surprising that military/police-civilian encounters continue to be a very brutalizing experience for the civilian populace of various communities in Nigeria . After the Odi and Benue fiascos, the armed and police forces have not changed tactics in dealing with members of the public. The inhabitants of the Odajie and Idum communities in the Ogoja Local Government Area of Cross Rivers State had to flee their communities in April 2003 when the police was alleged to have beaten one Joe Obang, thereby igniting a militant counteraction. Later, it was alleged that the police sent three truck loads of mobile policemen to carry out Odi-like operation in the area by burning and looting properties ( Uneze, 2003, May 1). While the people of the two Ogoja communities were reeling from their hellish encounter with the police, the members of Umunumo and Umuokiri communities in Imo State were reported to have been brutalized in a retaliatory action over the death of a police officer, resulting in the deaths of some innocent people and the destruction of over 40 houses in the area (Ogugbuaja, 2003, May 3). On September 3, 2004 , security personnel of the Joint Task Force Operation Restore Hope attacked the Fenegbene and Awor communities of Delta State , resulting in the deaths of scores of innocent people (Tuodolo, 2004, march 12). The Ijaws of Warri are constantly attacked at the slightest encounter. These are only a few of the numerous incidents of excessive force used by security personnel to brutalize various communities in Nigeria .

(g) Separating soldiers from their units in order to make sure that there is no military rebellion during a security operation in any part of Nigeria is a very dangerous strategy or tactics to accomplish a military goal. Having learned from the Odi fiasco, Ijaw fighters are now improving their ability to confront the military than before. In the ongoing Warri crisis, learning from the destruction and deaths inflicted upon their kith and kin at Odi, Ijaw fighters around Warri have been able to mobilize and reinforce their positions during military confrontations. Itsekiri fighters too have upgraded their capabilities, hence, like their Ijaw counterparts, are able to reinforce and fight back. This is a major development in the annals of military confrontation between the civilian population and the armed forces in the country, apart from the civil war. During the Odi operation, the youth fighters simply dispersed and did not counterattack the Nigerian troops. In the Warri theater, the fighters are fighting like well organized forces. There is no doubt that other armed groups in the country are also mobilizing and upgrading their reaction capabilities. The implication, coming from the Odi invasion, means that a time may come, in the nearest future, when armed groups in the country would be able to take on Nigerian forces without fear of total annihilation. It also means that a time may come when Nigerian troops would find it exceedingly difficult to defeat armed groups since both would be using sophisticated weaponry at each other. The Republic of Columbia has already experienced a military situation in which the national armies are unable to defeat the guerrilla forces of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) and the National Liberation Force (NLF). Countries like Indonesia , the Philippines , Nepal. , Sri Lanka , Russia , Britain , etc. have been fighting to eradicate guerrilla forces for decades without succeeding. Nigeria could experience a similar fate if it continues military and police tactics and actions that are abusive to the rights of the people, thereby, forcing them to take up arms against the security forces of the state.

2. Excessive use of force and unnecessary killings engendered by the need to retaliate: Nigerian political and military leaders seem to forget that every member of the armed and police forces belongs to a certain community within the country. They are also ignoring the fact that every Nigerian community has someone who is either in the armed or police forces.

There is a very high probability that the Odi, Benue, Ogoja, Okigwe , Fenegbene/Awor etc. fiascos are the results of troops and police officers wanting to retaliate for the killings of their relatives and the destruction of their communities in previous engagements. Some of the actions are engendered by ethnic animosities. When leaders send security forces to attack a community, they are creating opportunities for those in the forces whose communities have been ravaged during previous security operations to hit back. Unfortunately, Nigeria ’s political and military leaders do not seem to perceive the link between the need to retaliate and the excessive use of force by security forces sent to hotspots in the country. By failing to connect the link, Nigerian leaders are assisting immeasurably in destabilizing Nigeria through unnecessary deployment of security forces.

3. Simply Obeying Orders: Whenever a Nigerian community has been ravaged by members of the armed or police forces, those who partake in the orgy of destruction and death always try to justify the excessive use of force and massive destruction on the grounds that they were simply carrying out orders. To a certain extent, they are right in justifying their actions as ‘simply carrying out orders.’ The reason for this agreement is based on the fact that senior military or police authorities rarely court-martial or try any officer for violations of rights. Maj. Paul Okuntimo, the leader of the Internal Task Force on Security in the rivers State got promoted to the rank of a colonel after terrorizing the Ogoni people. Col. Agbabiaka also got promoted after inflicting death and destruction on the people of Odi under Operation Hakuri II. It wouldn’t be surprising that the officer responsible for the Benue operation too might have been promoted. The actions and inactions of senior military and police officers tend to support the view often expressed by members of the security forces that they were ‘simply obeying orders.’ A time may come when aggrieved Nigerians might have to take some high-ranking military and police officers to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for serious violations of human rights since both the military and police establishments are not willing to discipline their officers over violations of human rights.

The other aspect of ‘simply obeying orders’ is that it enables those who have an axe to grind to do so without being punished. In other words, if any member of the armed or security forces has any axe to grind, the best way to accomplish such a goal is during an operation directed at a community in which the person has some hatred for.

Thus, ‘simply obeying orders’ is a very convenient way for Nigeria’s political, military, and police leaders to sow seeds of discord or teach various communities a lesson for political disobedience or disloyalty. In the Ogoni situation, the power-wielders wanted to teach the Ogoni people a lesson about the futility of challenging the authority of the power-wielders and the oil companies. In the case of Ikenya, Opia, Odi, Okerenkoko etc., the action was most probably intended to teach the Ijaws a lesson for trying to stop the oil barons from continuing to amaze personal wealth. The Benue fiasco was probably intended to teach the Tivs a lesson for territorial reasons in the Middle Belt. The people of the Niger Delta are being taught a lesson for getting too smart about oil revenue sharing. Governor Ngige is probably denied security protection in order to frighten him and other governors in powerless regions so that they do not get too smart and become independent in their actions toward the PDP.

4. Quick deployment of security forces to politically powerless regions: A careful analysis of the politics of deployment tends to show that Nigeria ’s security forces are easily deployed to regions that do not command political influence in the country while there is an unwillingness to deploy security forces to regions which command much political influence. Another observable tendency is that security forces that are deployed to powerless regions are encouraged to shoot on sight at the slightest pretext while those deployed to regions of influence are discouraged from shooting on sight. A writer commented:

“Many who have contributed critical appraisals of the president’s Odi debacle

have drawn parallels between it and other recent communal violence in Ketu

( Lagos ) and Sagamu (Ogun), both in Obasanjo’s ethnic Yorubaland, and Kano

in the powerful northern Nigeria . The views of some critics with minorities’

sympathies are unanimous that the president in reacting to the Odi crisis, showed

unacceptable bias” (Nwajah, 1999, December 6).

The South-South is the most powerless region in the country today, even though it has the most strategic economic asset. Nigeria ’s political and military leaders have tended to deploy security forces to the region at the slightest provocation. Security forces deployed in the region tend to use excessive force, regardless of the gravity of the situation. Among the ethnic groups in the South-South, during the middle 1990s, the Ogonis were the game for the picking. The Ijaws are now the main targets of security operations. In fact, throughout Nigeria today, the Ijaws are bearing the greatest brunt of military and police high-handedness. It can be said that there is no legal, political, and financial cost for killing an Ijaw person today in Nigeria .

The South-South is followed by the South-East and the Middle Belt. On the other hand, the Islamic North and the South-West are the last resort areas. Security forces are sent to these two regions only as a last resort, after a very careful analysis of the situation. Likewise, when deployed, security forces are encouraged to shoot only as a last resort. As a result, even when more Nigerians are killed in crises that involved these powerful regions, security forces are deployed very cautiously. On the other hand, in the South-South, security forces are deployed and encouraged to shoot without thinking about the impact of such actions on the people.

There is indeed an historical pattern to these observations. In the 1960s, the Tivs were the targets of security forces since they vehemently opposed the status quo in Nigerian politics. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Igbos bore the greatest brunt of security operations as the civil war devastated the South-East region of Nigeria . In the middle and late 1980s, the Islamic fundamentalists in the North, especially the militant factions like the Maitatisne were the targets of security strikes. After the June 12 1993 imbroglio, the Yorubas were targeted. In each case, the target of operation was politically powerless at the time of the operation and was viewed as ‘a troublemaking region.’ Evidently, starting from the middle 1990s, the Niger Delta has been characterized as the ‘troublemaking region’. Among the indigenes of the region, the Ijaws are considered to be the greatest ‘troublemakers’ for demanding political and economic equity in the sharing of national resources. Of course, the stereotypical view that the Ijaw are trouble-makers goes way back when they vehemently refused to permit their colonization. When oil was struck, the desire to exploit the resource and the fear of the Ijaws increased. This resulted in the politically calculated refusal to create an Ijaw state while states were being created for other ethnic groups and regions, even for groups that had vehemently opposed the creation of states.

5. The wide margin between officers and noncommissioned officers in terms of benefits:

A military or a police force made up of angry soldiers or police men and women is a very dangerous force indeed. There is no doubt that most members of the armed and police forces are not happy with their situation. They are poorly paid and the benefits are very insignificant. On the other hand, the senior officers live relatively well. Add to that is the ability of the senior officers to embezzle. The NCOs do not have the opportunity to embezzle because they are not in decision-making positions. This creates anger since the officers can buy fleets of cars, build mansions, and send their children overseas for education while the NCOs cannot do so. The NCOs and the foot soldiers try to make up for the socioeconomic difference at various military or police checkpoints. They also try to pay society back for their poor treatment during security operations by destroying everything on their path or looting as much as possible.

This being the case, it is very dangerous for political and military leaders to deploy soldiers and police officers at the slightest suspicion of trouble. Since most of the ordinary soldiers and police men and women are angry and unhappy, deployment provides them an opportunity to be merciless toward any community. It is therefore understandable why excessive use of force always seems to take place whenever there is deployment to a conflict area. Deployment of security personnel based on regions of origin is like adding fuel to an already bad situation. Sending an angry soldier from the North to the South or from the South to the North or from the Non-Oil Producing regions to the Oil Producing region or from the Oil Producing region to the Non-Oil producing regions is absolutely very dangerous to the stability of Nigeria ..

Why do Nigerian leaders choose to adopt deployment policies that counteract the notion of national integration and national unity?

Some probable reasons why Nigerian leaders choose to adopt deployment policies and tactics that tend to counteract the spirit of national integration include: (1) the failure of leadership, (2) tribalism and regionalism, (3) personalization and of the armed forces, (4) corruption, (5) Vengefulness, (6) the need for quick solutions, and (7) lack of foresight.

1.The failure of political and military leadership: Nigeria ’s political and military leaders have consistently failed to demonstrate good national leadership. The political leaders in the First Republic did not want the armed forces to grow, hence, made sure that soldiers were only to be occasionally seen and not heard. Despite the regional imbalance in the armed forces since most military officers originated from the East and the Mid-West and most NonCommissioned Officers (NCOs) came from the North, and the West was barely represented, nothing was done. When the politicians in the 1960s destabilized the country through destructive power struggles, resulting in violence, the senior military and police officers in the First Republic did nothing to warn or stop the politicians. The failure of the politicians and the senior military and police officers to act led to the staging of the first military coup on January 15, 1966 . Gen.Yakubu Gowon and his senior officers tried to solve the structural imbalance in the armed forces by adopting a semi-quota system in military recruitment. Thus, recruitment into the armed and police forces were carried out in various states capitals to enable all Nigerian citizens join the forces. The short-lived Murtala Mohammed regime continued the nationalization effort. Due to this strategic foresight, the armed and the police forces were nationalized with representation from all sections of the country during and immediately after the civil war.

Despite these progressive efforts, both Gowon and Murtala/Obasajno regimes failed to fulfill the “No vanquish no victor” promise, in terms of the reintegration of Nigerian soldiers who fought on the Biafran side. Therefore, during the 1970s and up to the early 1980s, the South-East Region of Nigeria was not represented in the Nigerian armed forces. The Buhari/Idiagbon regime (December 1983-84) did not have much time to do anything of substance regarding the restructuring of the armed forces, although they tried to bring discipline into the military ranks, as well as to the general civilian population through the “War Against Indiscipline.” The effort was seriously criticized as being too harsh and led to an internal military coup.

2. Tribalization and Regionalization: The failure of leadership is directly connected with tribalism and regionalism. Most Nigerian leaders have either been very tribalistic or regionalistic in their initiation, implementation, and execution of policies. This affects the degree to which security forces are deployed. It also affects how security forces respond to crisis situations in the country. Generally, when a leader and or an officer of a security unit is hateful of a particular ethnic group or region, there is a tendency for the leader and or the officer to unleash destruction on that part of the polity. Due to the oil factor, for example, the people of the Niger Delta are hated by political and military leaders. This means that there is no hesitation to use strong-arm tactics to quench any opposition to oil exploration in the region. Before Odi, Umuechem, in the Rivers State was devastated in 1990 when three policemen were abducted by youths who were protesting environmental pollution and neglect of their communities by oil companies. When the youths did not give up the policemen, a detachment of policemen were sent to the community. By the time they finished with the community, “ 25 persons had been killed, 650 buildings reduced to rubbles and 175 bicycles had become a mangled heap of twisted and charred metal” (Nwajah, 1999, December 6). In the Middle Belt, the Tivs have tended to be hated for one reason or another. Thus, the excessive use of force against certain communities is often motivated by tribal and or regional factors.

Unfortunately, the initiation, implementation, and execution of policies that are ethnically or regionally motivated often lead to short-term results that later come back to haunt the entire nation. The efforts to crush the Islamic movements in the 1980s rather than negotiate the issues resulted in religious militancy in the late 1990s and the institution of the Sharia. The failure to resolve the oil revenue sharing question has resulted in militant uprisings in the 1990s and 2000s against the federal government and the oil companies.

3. Personalization of the armed forces: In the Third Republic , Gen. Babangida tried to upgrade the military position of the South-East by appointing Brig. General Ukiwe to a senior critical military position. The effort did not last and Ukiwe had to leave. Thereafter, Gen. Babangida began the wholesome personalization of the armed forces. These tactics shipwrecked the attempts by his predecessors to nationalize the armed forces. Gen. Babangida’s tenure also resulted in the open looting of the public treasury by senior military officers. In the past (pre-Babangida), looting was done covertly in a discrete manner. Professionalism, which was the hallmark of the senior officers during the First Republic and during the military regimes of Gowon and Mohammed, was destroyed or relegated. Personal loyalty became the most significant element in the progression of an officer’s career. Those closest to the leader were abundantly rewarded and given a free hand to loot from the public treasury while those who were opposed to the excesses were sidelined, regardless of their military status. The National Supreme Military Council (SMC) which gained respectability during the military regimes of Gowon and Mohammed, became a mere shadow and simply reinforced the position of the leader, instead of being a forum for serious policy discussions about Nigeria’s national development and security.

Gen Babangida can also be credited for initiating the tactics of punishing an entire region for the slightest threat of an alleged military coup. The Middle Belt region was severely punished for the failure of Maj. Gen. Vatsa’s coup in the eighties. So many officers from the region were dismissed or terminated. Gen. Babaginda could also be credited for using strong-arm military tactics to interfere in the politics of the Sokoto caliphate and the efforts to eliminate Islamic militants during the heydays of Maitatisne uprisings in the North. Hundreds, if not thousands of people, were wiped out. Again, after the abortive coup led by Maj. Orka in April 1990, many officers from the Middle Belt and the Niger Delta were terminated from the armed forces. In fact, the Ijaws continue to complain that many military officers from their ethnic group ( who were not involved in that coup) were removed from the armed forces. As a result, it stopped the progression of Ijaw officers into the senior ranks. The Ijaws viewed the removals as a political ploy to retard their presence in the armed forces since the Niger Delta situation remained unresolved.

Gen. Sani Abacha’s regime (1994-1998) upgraded personalization of the armed forces into an art. He literally wrecked havoc on the chain of command of the armed forces by using fear and intimidation to decimate the role of the senior officer ranks. Regardless of rank, those closest to him acquired so much power and those farthest from him had little power. Some junior officers acquired so much power and commanded more influence than many generals and admirals. Thus, Nigerian generals and admirals became mere paper tigers. Some even stood at attention and saluted in the presence of some junior officers. Borrowing from his immediate military predecessor, Gen. Abacha too adopted the practice of punishing an entire region for the slightest case of a rumoured coup. As a result, due to an alleged military coup initiated by his one-time deputy, Lt. Gen. Popoola Diya, senior military officers from the South-West suffered indignities at the hands of Abacha’s security agents. The indignities suffered by South-Western military officers partially contributed to the creation of Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC). The Ogoni people too paid dearly for attempting to bring world attention to the deplorable Niger Delta situation.

4. Vengefulness: Nigeria has been unfortunate to have political and military leaders who have no sense of forgiveness. As a result, they appear to be very vengeful and punitive toward those considered as enemies. Part of the reason for misapplication of force and the excessive use of force has to do with the need to punish enemies. When a Nigerian has been identified as a trouble- maker, there is a calculated effort to punish the person and the person’s community. So, when a force is sent to that community, the commanders are tactically given a green light to inflict as much destruction as possible. The “ Kalakuta Republic ” was ravaged to punish Fela Ransome Kuti for criticizing the military in the 1970s. Fela’s mother, Mrs. Kuti was speculated to have died after an encounter with the military Individuals and communities that have suffered severely for taking a position against governmental policy or action include Dele Giwa, Pa Rewane, Lt. Gen. Yar Adua, Mrs. Abiola, Chief Ibru who narrowly escaped death, Dr. Obi Wali, Ken Saro Wiwa, Umuechem, Ikenya, Opia, Odi, Tivland etc.

Vengefulness is common since Nigeria ’s leaders tend to personalize governmental authority. Therefore, when someone criticizes the government, the criticism is regarded as a personal attack on the leader or the boss. The response is to teach the critic a lesson, using excessive force.

5. Corruption: Having been exposed to the spoils of the nation through embezzlement, beginning during the civil war (1967-70) and almost officially sanctioned during Babangida’s regime, senior military and police officers became beholden to the person at the top and went along with any policy or decision recommended by the person at the top, in the hope of having their own share of the national loot. The situation did not improve when Lt.Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar took over the reigns of power on June 9, 1998 after the sudden death of Gen. Abacha the previous day. Nigeria ’s media reported cases of massive corruption during the regime’s reign. Nigeriatoday.com (2002, December 12), reported “ Nigeria ’s notoriously corrupt military elite has been emptying the country’s coffers on a massive scale before handing over power to an elected president next Saturday.” Maj. Hamza Al-Mustapha, the chief security officer of the Late Gen. Abacha alleged that “he handed over cash worth millions of dollars, plus 23 cars and 45 homes to the former military ruler Abdulsalami Abubakar in 1998” (Yahoo News, 2001, July 10 AFP).

Thus, during the regimes of Babangida, Abacha, and Abubakar, investment in the nation, as well as in the armed forces deteriorated beyond bounds. Money meant for infrastructural resuscitation and personnel of the armed and police forces fall prey to the money-grab phenomenon. This is why the Nigerian Navy and the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) are in shambles and the NonCommissioned Officers of the forces are treated likes mere security guards. After a visit to a Nigerian Army barracks in Katsina recently, the Chairman of the Defence Committee of Nigeria’s House of Representatives, in the Fourth Republic, Chief Oluwole Oke “condemned the use of dilapidated houses as accommodation for soldiers at 35 Motorized battalion of the Nigerian Army, Katsina…buildings in the barrack fell below the standard of houses befitting barracks” (Ilelabaye, 2004, February 23). Some soldiers who retired voluntarily have not been compensated and are barely struggling to live. In some cases, they have had to protest in order to express their plight (Yusuf, 2003, February 18).

It is evident that the armed and police forces were allowed to rot so that senior military and police officers could amass personal wealth. This explained the reasons why Nigeria ’s retired generals appear to be some of the richest people in the world. In some aspects, Nigerian generals can be said to be actually richer than American generals, even though the United States is the richest and most technologically advanced country in the world. It is ironic that a country that does not produce any economic good of substance seems to have some of the richest retired generals in the world and the countries that produce the greatest amounts of economic goods in the world have moderately well-of generals. It is amazing that a country with relatively moderate armed forces has some of the wealthiest generals in the world while countries with very large armed forces in the world have generals that are barely making it. Such is the nature of Nigeria , hence, forces are deployed politically to squash any threat to the corrupted elements in society.

6. The need for Quick Solutions: Security forces tend to be deployed to political hotspots in an effort to find quick solutions to thorny political problems. Instead of a calculated, systematic, and long-drawn out plan or strategy to solve problems, Nigerian political and military leaders go for immediate solutions. As a result, they actually exacerbate the issues by sweeping them under the table through the application of force. Of course, even though swept under the table, the issues do not evaporate, instead, they magnify uncontrollably to later threaten the entire nation. It is therefore, not surprising that the issues which led to the civil war in 1967 are still unresolved. Likewise, the issues of revenue derivation, the Niger Delta, Sharia, National Conference, National vs. state police, political rotation of leadership etc. are unresolved. Instead, the leaders use threats to force Nigerians to remain silent.

7. Lack of Foresight. Thus, the desire to accumulate personal wealth resulted in the sacrification of Nigeria ’s armed and police forces. The failure to invest in the forces led Nigeria to miss a golden opportunity to become a great industrial nation. It should be noted that the advanced countries seemed to have attained industrialization and technological advancement through investments in the armed forces. In other words, in most industrialized countries, the armed forces are the engines of technological advancement and economic growth since they engage in serious research and development activities. A large proportion of consumer technological products in the world today, especially in the areas of computers, electronics, telecommunications, automation, robotics, satellites, solar beams, medical technologies etc. came by the way of military technology. Generally, after the armed forces have successfully developed and applied certain technologies, the technologies are then transferred to the civilian sector. The civilian sector then converts the technologies into civilian consumer goods.

In Nigeria , the senior military establishment repeatedly misfired due to greed and short-sightedness when it failed to integrate the Biafran Research and Development (R & D) unit into the Nigerian armed forces. It is a common saying that necessity is the mother of invention. Thus, despite the difficulty of the war, Biafran scientists were able to invent some ways of producing fuel and arms. If this unit had been integrated with the research and development organization set up by Generals Gowon and Mohammed, a vibrant research and development department would have been established within the armed forces to produce all kinds of military and civilian products. South Korea, North Korea, Brazil, Israel, China, Pakistan, India, Taiwan, Chile, South Africa, Iran etc. are beneficiaries of technological advancement spearheaded by the military’s research and development efforts. The United States , Russia , Germany , Japan , Britain , France , etc. are masters at converting military technologies into economic goods and services.

Due to lack of foresight, successive senior military policymakers failed to elevate research and development activities. The Ajaokuta Steel Mill would have served as Nigeria’springboard into the technological age. Unfortunately, corruption did not allow it to germinate. Nigeria ’s armed forces, in the Fourth Republic , still rely greatly on the military assistance of other nations to upgrade their capabilities, after more than 40 years of independence. Nigeria has depended particularly on Britain , Pakistan , and India for training and facilities. On the other hand, India and Pakistan have acquired extensive technological capabilities. The military forces of these two nations now produce advance weaponry and have become major exporters of military technologies. Nigeria continues to seek their assistance to build up its forces. In addition to Britain , India , and Pakistan , the U.S. is increasingly becoming a major player in building up Nigerian forces. One could jokingly say that Nigeria ’s armed and police forces are like Nigeria ’s democratic system, they are always in a state of transition without ever achieving maturity or full development.

In the Fourth Republic , no month goes by without news coverage of an American military effort in Nigeria . In 2003, the US provided Nigeria with some naval boats to patrol the Niger Delta. In February 2004, a senior US military officer was scheduled to arrive in Nigeria to discuss security issues with Nigerian officials (Odeh, 2004, February 28). In early March 2004, it was reported that the United States would donate more boats to the Nigerian Navy “for use in the Niger Delta region to check the restiveness of the youth” (Agbambu, 2004, March 1). Why is Nigeria depending so much on the military assistance of other nations in order to build up its security system? Do Nigerian political leaders and senior military officers realize that they are sacrificing the national security of Nigeria by depending so much on foreign military assistance? Why is Nigeria unable to buy boats for its Navy? Why must Nigeria define its own national security on the basis of other country’s national interests? Do Nigeria ’s service chiefs know what they are doing? Are they providing appropriate professional and technical advice to the political leaders concerning the national security of the country? Why are the service chiefs allowing the Niger Delta situation to be defined solely on the basis of military security when they know that decades of neglect and corruption are the causes of restiveness in the Niger Delta? Why are they failing to persuade the political leaders to apply political solutions to political problems in the country? Why are they allowing the armed forces to be used as manipulative political tools?

The most pitiful aspect of Nigeria ’s military experience is that the Fourth Republic continues to treat the military and the police forces as mere security outfits intended exclusively for the protection of those in power and their interests, rather than as instruments of national economic and technological development. Of course, at the beginning of this republic, serious efforts were initially made to reprofessionalize the armed forces and the police. For instance, when President Obasanjo first took over the reigns of power in May 1999, he retired or dismissed “150 senior military officers, announced a probe of human rights abuses and ordered the suspension of hundreds of millions of dollars of contracts” (Yahoo News, 1999, June 17). In addition, the president tried to nationalize the chain of military command by choosing service chiefs randomly from various regions of the country. It should be noted that for a very long time, the Chief of Army Staff was always reserved for a Northern officer. Today, under the Fourth Republic, Lt. Gen. Alexander Ogomudia, from the Niger Delta, is the Chief of Defence Staff, Vice Admiral Samuel Afolayan is the Chief of Naval Staff, Air Marshal Jonah Wuyep is the Chief of Air Staff, Lt. Gen. Aliyu Gusau (rtd) is the National Security Adviser, Col. Kayode Are is the Director of the State Security Services and Maj. Gen. O.A. Azazi is the Director of Military Intelligence. In addition, Brigadier General Festus Okonkwo, from the South-East, is the head of the Nigerian military contingent in Liberia . These are major developments for which President Obasanjo should be congratulated. It is significant to nationalize the heads of the armed and police forces to ensure that any qualified Nigerian military or police officer can serve as the head of a service, regardless of the region of origin.

Despite these glorious efforts to Nigerianize the heads of military services, Nigeria’s armed forces continue to be managed as if they are parts of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), rather than as a progressive governmental institution geared toward moving Nigeria into the realm of the developed countries of the world.

Consequently, national security is narrowly defined to embrace only those aspects that guarantee and sustain those in power. Under this narrow definition of national security, Nigerian masses are treated as nincompoops that can be manipulated and intimidated to accept whatever the leaders want. Successive military chiefs have tended to go along with whatever political arrangement or policy that enhances the powers of the rulers and diminishes the rights of the citizens. Successive senior military and police officers have either accepted to go along or failed to tell the rulers that political problems should be solved politically and not militarily. The exception is the current Naval Chief of Staff, Vice Admiral Afolayan who boldly stated that

“the crisis in the Niger Delta region required no military action….he said most of the problems in the region were connected with economic empowerment of the youth in particular and the people in general” (Vanguard, 2003, October 2).

As a result of relying increasingly on military and police solutions to political problems, the Fourth Republic seems to be surpassing all previous regimes in the level of incompetency, corruption, sycophancy, intimidations, use of violence, and assassinations. The number of killings under this regime has surpassed every previous record for politically motivated assassinations in the country, apart from the civil war.

It is not an exaggeration to say that there is no competent leadership in the country. Nigeria is controlled by a group of plutocrats who are primarily committed to enriching themselves. The members want to become multimillionaires and billionaires at any cost and would not mind bringing the country down on its knees. They grabbed power by signing secret deals, swearing secret oaths, exchanging Ghana Must Go Bags GMGB), openly rigging elections, and assassinating any one who threatens their desire to exercise power and grab money.

It is obvious that the armed and police forces have failed the Nigerian people. Instead of serving the Nigerian state, they seem to only serve those individuals who happen to wield power in the country. Nigeria does not have a police force anymore. The Former NPF is now the PDP Police Force. It appears that the primary purpose of the police is now to protect and enhance the power of the PDP. The Nigerian Police Force used to investigate crimes thoroughly before assigning responsibility or culpability. The PDP Police Force does not bother to investigate before declaring who is responsible or guilty for committing a particular crime. Consequently, every assassination is explained away as a case of armed robbery even when the facts do not corroborate the possibility of armed robbery. Honest Nigerians serving as police officers under the PDPPF system must be going through serious psychological problems for having to lie to Nigerians on daily basis. Army, navy and airforce personnel must learn, under the current situation, not to express their feelings but act like human drones, even though the political system is devastating their families and communities.

Due to the high degree of uncertainty and the failure of the armed and police forces to provide national security, safety, and protection of life and property, Nigerians are arming themselves through ethnic militias and armed groups. Guns are being acquired at an alarming rate because no ethnic group wants to leave its security or protection in the hands of the armed forces and the PDPPF. So, those public officials who have been calling on armed Nigerians to voluntarily give up their guns are not really serious about what they are saying.

To a certain extent, events in the Fourth Republic are fantastically becoming very similar to events before January 15, 1966 . (a) The unrestrained struggle for political power among the politicians. (b) The general quietness by the service chiefs while Nigeria rots away. (c) Political violence perpetrated by the politicians to eliminate their opponents. (d) Restlessness and lack of security in the country. (e) Political thugs acting like gangsters and terrorizing the populace. At another level, the excesses of the Fourth Republic are surpassing almost every previous regime in the country due to the following reasons: (a) the unrestrained looting of the public treasury; (b) lack of political and financial accountability in governance; (c) the police behaving like the German SS immediately before and during the 2^nd World War; (d) unrestrained political assassinations, (e) lawlessness perpetrated by those in positions of power; (f) the use of the armed forces and the police to settle political scores; and (g) a political system planted and germinated through fraudulent electoral means. In short, the direction of the Fourth Republic is very frightening.

It is not too late for the service chiefs to wake up and take action to save the country from disintegration or political calamity if they are truly committed to the Nigerian nation. Taking action does not mean instigating a military coup to overthrow the government. It simply means taking steps to enhance the democratic system by doing the following: (a) be more patriotic and proactive in offering professional military advice; (b) meet, discuss, and issue reports on the national security situation on quarterly basis; (b) advice the political leadership (the presidency and the National Assembly) about steps to be taken to reverse the deteriorating situation; (c) boldly warn the politicians to apply their conduct according to the constitution; (d) emphasize loyalty to the nation and not to any individual ruler; (e) court-marshal any officer or soldier who violates the rights of the Nigerian people; (f) encourage the solving of political problems politically; (g) stop the deployment of troops based on regions of origin; (h) avoid entangling the military and the police in politics; (i) elevate the armed forces through serious research and development activities; (j) encourage the convening of a national conference to deal with the numerous issues affecting the country’s political and economic health. If the service chiefs jointly take a stand, the politicians, particularly, members of the PDP Enterprise, would be forced to clean up their acts. Of course, there would be a political price to pay by some senior military officers for coming out so boldly.

The need for professionalism should not hinder a proactive discussion of national issues by members of the armed and police forces, especially when the Nigerian house is burning down. Do not wait until it is too late before coming out to say something. It should be recalled that Maj. Gen Malu (rtd) waited until after the Odi disaster before stating that “restricting soldiers to their professional duties would help stem constant friction between the military and the civilian population…We are not trained to settle civil disputes” (Ejime, 2000, January 24).

Nigerians have suffered too much from highly misdirected military and police policies and actions. Nigerians have paid too much with their lives, properties and communities in the name of misguided national security polices and actions that have only tended to enhance the power and interests of the rulers at the expense of the people. The armed and police forces were established supposedly to defend, protect, and enhance the lives of Nigerians and not become instruments of their oppression. History shows that when people feel oppressed, they react militantly to eradicate the sources of their oppression. Nigerians are increasingly reacting militantly because they are tired of continuous misrule. It is time to solve political problems politically and not militarily.

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May 2004