Re Malu fight

Re: Malu fight

Sir:

I thoroughly enjoyed the recent article by the distinguished Professor Mike Ikhariale titled "The Malu fight". It was thoughtful. His points of view were marshaled with uncommon eloquence. I agree with him that reactions to the removal of the Army Chief by the C-in-C have gone beyond the pale. The relative lack of informed debate over the removal of the brilliant and highly effective former Chief of Air Staff, for example, is troubling.

However, since independence, no democratically elected Head of Government in Nigeria has been exclusively served by one Army Chief. In writing this rejoinder, therefore, I hold no brief for Lt. General SVL Malu (rtd) or beef for President Obasanjo nor am I challenging the essence of Professor Ikhariale's arguments and views.

However, I was disturbed by the opening frame of reference in which the derogatory usage of the word "malu" - for cattle - was used to set up the rest of the essay. Had this section not been added, the essay would not have been less inspiring.

The former Chief of Army Staff was certainly impulsive and undiplomatic. I would also like to take him up someday on his concept of internal security operations as exemplified by the sacking of Odi by his boys.

But General Malu is by no means "monumentally stupid". It is also important to note that he was not alone in the views he held - rightly or wrongly - on the American training matter. How widespread those views are held in the military may be more important than the merits or demerits of Malu's self-immolating approach.

Malu was a respected 'home-made' infantry officer. One colleague of his described him as "militarily sound". He was regularly in the top tier of performance throughout his military career, and served as an Instructor or Directing Staff in nearly all of Nigeria's major military training institutions. (In military shorthand, he wore a dagger). Indeed he was himself a victim of political marginalization at key points in his career which is why his original course mates came to supercede him.

Quite apart from his role as ECOMOG Commander in Liberia - which, with all its limitations, was internationally acclaimed by the likes of former US President Jimmy Carter - he served as a Battalion, Brigade and Divisional Commander at earlier points in his career.

Even his controversial role as President of the difficult Military Tribunal in Jos was commended by many neutral observers. It is now obvious that General Diya cannot be taken too seriously when he says he never plotted a coup against his boss who came to power via a coup he assisted. I deeply empathize with Niran Malaolu's experience but there were many civilians, officers and men who were freed by Malu who would certainly have either been shot or jailed or dismissed had they been tried under standards of previous military tribunals in Nigeria. This difficult exercise of caution by the General and his colleagues (under the suspicious prying eyes of Abacha) may have been informed by Malu's own near miss back in 1976 when he was allegedly quizzed over the Dimka coup; but the fact remains that in the vicious, back-biting, witch-hunting and illogical environment of post-coup Nigerian Boards of Inquiry and Courts Martial, Malu set a record for leniency and relative forthrightness. This may come across as an odd comment knowing how strange some of the convictions appeared to civilians, but I am talking about a country where people have been shot or retired or dismissed for coups they knew nothing about or nearly shot even when they had already been formally cleared by investigating tribunals.

It is unfortunate that from the time he became a commissioned officer back in 1970 until he was appointed Army Chief in 1999, the General - like many Nigerian military officers - had only experienced civilian 'supremacy' briefly during the Shagari years from 1979-83. Thus, through no fault of his, he was the thoroughbred product of a different era. Civilian supremacy is as strange to many in the Nigerian military as military subordination is to many in the Nigerian civilian world.

Furthermore, the agreements reached between President Obasanjo and the US - through the MPRI - for "reprofessionalization" of the Nigerian military were essentially "signed, sealed and delivered" BEFORE the President was sworn in on May 29, 1999. We may recall the extensive foreign trips then President-elect Obasanjo undertook after the elections and the maze of committees that were set up to define the policies of the incoming administration at a time the Nigerian public was thoroughly disgusted with the Nigerian military and the Obasanjo government in utero was still enjoying a political honeymoon.

All the recently retired service Chiefs including Malu were "outside the loop" because they did not take office until after the inauguration ceremony. At that stage of the game, they owed it to their C-in-C to fall in line with his policy commitments, try to modify them quietly behind the scenes, or quit. This is the sticking point in my mind about Malu's conduct.

Simultaneously, Aso Rock owed it to the Nigerian military to get 'buy-in' for its policies by involving them actively in defence policy formulation and implementation even if the final word remained with the civilian masters. This is the part that troubles me about the way our President handled matters.

In any case some commentators who now blame American spirits for Malu's demise fail to appreciate the subtle role that may have been played by some influential Americans in his original appointment. Given the immense respect Obasanjo had for Jimmy Carter and his close connections to the "Atlanta crowd", it should have been obvious to the General that an op-ed piece in the New York Times by a former American President extolling his virtues in Liberia was bound to be noticed by an incoming civilian administration eager to place a "known" officer with international credibility at the head of a thoroughly politically discredited Army. This name recognition more than made up for the reservations of those who felt that the General did indeed hold a political appointment by virtue of membership of the ruling Military Council and those who bore a grudge about the Diya affair.

But as fate would have it, the 'brutally frank' Malu - following his trench instincts - did not sufficiently internalize these dynamics. The stubborn and all knowing Obasanjo on the other hand, assisted by two ex-Generals as National Security Adviser and Chief of Staff in Aso Rock enjoys his own counsel - as the Messiah who accepted the surrender in the field of Biafran forces in 1970, emerged from Queen's drive to pick up after Ramat in 1976 and was rescued from Yola by God himself in 1998. Unstoppable Victor Leo of Vandeikya had met immovable Aremu of Ota.

Be that as it may, for the first time in Nigerian history the new Chief of Army Staff has post-graduate level qualifications and not only holds a teeth arm commission but also has a technocratic background. This as an encouraging development if it signals a trend. But much work remains to be done.

Nowa Omoigui Columbia, SC