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RE-VISITING JUNE 12 1993 NIGERIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS By Burtonsville, Maryland, USA October 1994
Introduction ------------ Periodically, one sits down to reflect on why many individuals (including this writer) are so fixated on June 12, 1993, and why we consider that date so important in the annals of Nigeria's history. Are we just closet partisan ethnicists, or political demagogues, masquerading as Nigerian democrats? Below, you will find an attempt to provide some answers based solely on the known numerical figures of the June 12, 1993 presidential elections. The claim is that the incontrovertibility of the results, the size of the national mandate and the ethnic compromises which led to it clearly reveal why the annulment of the elections has so far traumatized a country whose dream for the beginnings of a national consensus suddenly became a nightmare. The Facts about June 12 ----------------------- The rigor of the election process leading up to the election day itself (the so-called Option A4 implemented by Babangida) is well known. As far as the election itself is concerned, first, all the vote counting had been completed and collated, on a ward-by-ward, local government-by-government and State-by-state basis, and known at these levels; the vote count was never suspended; the release was. Secondly, the results had been published but never officially released in entirety by the National Electoral Commission (Nwosu as Chairman), a technicality that has been harped on by the governments succeeding Babangida's - of Sonekan, and currently of Abacha. Thirdly, the two official allegations made by Babangida were that there was vote-buying before the elections (in fact there was a last-minute legal challenge requesting a postponement of the elections by the Association for a Better Nigeria (ABN), led by Arthur Nzeribe, which was thrown out by the Courts) and that the apparent winner Abiola (over challenger Tofa) had a conflict of interest since the Federal Government owes him substantial amounts of money from previous business dealings. The detailed figures are presented in Table 1, and further analyses are presented in Tables 2,3 and 4. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Table 1 The Annulled June 12, 1993 Nigerian Presidential Elections: Unofficial Results State Rank by Rank by -- Votes Cast-- Total -% of Total- Region ----- 1991 Total Abiola Tofa ---------- Abiola Tofa ------ Census Votes ------ ----- ------ ----- ----- ----- Lagos 1 2 883,965 149,432 1,033,397 85.54 14.46 SW Kano 2 22 169,519 154,809 324,328 52.27 47.73 NC Sokoto 3 12 97,726 372,250 469,976 20.79 79.21 NW Bauchi 4 4 339,339 524,836 864,175 39.27 60.73 NE Rivers 5 3 370,678 640,973 1,011,651 36.64 63.36 MN Kaduna 6 5 389,713 356,880 746,593 52.20 47.80 NC Ondo 7 1 883,024 162,994 1,046,018 84.42 15.58 SW Katsina 8 13 171,162 271,077 442,239 38.70 61.30 NC Oyo 9 7 536,014 105,785 641,799 83.52 16.48 SW Plateau 10 6 417,565 259,394 676,959 61.68 38.32 MB Enugu 11 8 263,101 254,050 517,151 50.88 49.12 EA Jigawa 12 27 138,557 89,636 228,193 60.72 39.28 NC Benue 13 15 246,830 186,302 433,132 56.99 43.01 MB Anambra 14 18 212,024 155,029 367,053 57.76 42.24 EA Borno 15 25 153,490 128,684 282,174 54.40 45.60 NE Delta 16 11 327,277 146,001 473,278 69.15 30.85 MN Imo 17 20 159,350 195,836 355,186 44.86 55.14 EA Niger 18 19 136,350 221,437 357,787 38.11 61.89 NW AkwaIbom19 16 214,782 159,342 374,124 57.41 42.59 MN Ogun 20 14 365,266 72,068 437,334 83.52 16.48 SW Abia 21 26 105,273 151,227 256,500 41.04 58.96 EA Osun 22 10 425,725 59,246 484,971 87.78 12.22 SW Edo 23 23 205,407 103,572 308,979 66.48 33.52 MN Adamawa 24 24 140,875 167,239 308,114 45.72 54.28 NE Kogi 25 9 222,700 265,732 488,432 45.59 54.41 MC Kebbi 26 28 70,219 144,808 215,027 32.66 67.34 NW CrsRiver27 21 189,303 153,452 342,755 55.23 44.77 MN Kwara 28 17 288,270 80,219 368,489 78.23 21.77 MC Taraba 29 30 101,887 64,001 165,888 61.42 38.58 MB Yobe 30 29 111,887 64,061 175,948 63.59 36.41 NE FCT 31 31 19,968 18,313 38,281 52.16 47.84 MC --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Total 8,357,246 5,878,685 14,235,931 58.71 41.29 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Note the regions: South-West (SW): Lagos, Ondo, Oyo, Ogun, Oshun {Abiola wins all 5 states} East (EA): Enugu, Anambra, Imo, Abia {Abiola wins the first 2 states} North-West (NW): Sokoto, Niger, Kebbi {Tofa wins all 3 states} North-East (NE): Adamawa, Borno, Bauchi, Yobe {Abiola wins first 2 states} North-Central(NC): Kano, Kaduna, Jigawa, Katsina {Abiola wins first 3 states} Middle-Belt (MB): Plateau, Benue, Taraba {Abiola wins all 3 states} Minority (MN): Delta, Akwa-Ibom, Edo, Cross-River, Rivers {Abiola wins first 4 states} Mid-Central (MC): Kwara, Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Kogi {Abiola wins first 2 states} The "traditional" Northern Region comprised the NW, NE, NC, MB and MC regions, the Western Region was the SW region, the Eastern Region comprised EA region, Akwa-Ibom, Cross-Rivers and Rivers States, and the Mid-West Region comprised Edo and Delta states. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table 2: State Analysis of 1993 Presidential Elections State Rank by Rank by 1991 Census Total Election Elec. Winner Win ----- 1991 Total Count Votes Participatn Partic. ----- Ratio Census Votes ------ Cast Index Ranking ----- ----- ----- -------- ------ ------- Lagos 1 2 5,685,781 1,033,397 40.21 13 Abiola 5.92 Kano 2 22 5,362,040 324,328 12.74 31 Abiola 1.10 Sokoto 3 12 4,392,391 469,976 23.67 27 Tofa 3.81 Bauchi 4 4 4,294,413 864,175 44.52 7 Tofa 1.55 Rivers 5 3 3,983,857 1,011,651 56.18 2 Tofa 1.73 Kaduna 6 5 3,969,252 746,593 41.62 8 Abiola 1.09 Ondo 7 1 3,884,485 1,046,018 59.58 1 Abiola 5.42 Katsina 8 13 3,878,344 442,239 25.23 23 Tofa 1.58 Oyo 9 7 3,488,789 641,799 40.70 11 Abiola 5.07 Plateau 10 6 3,283,784 676,959 45.61 6 Abiola 1.61 Enugu 11 8 3,161,295 517,151 36.19 14 Abiola 1.04 Jigawa 12 27 2,829,929 228,193 17.84 30 Abiola 1.55 Benue 13 15 2,780,398 433,132 34.47 16 Abiola 1.33 Anambra 14 18 2,767,903 367,053 29.34 21 Abiola 1.37 Borno 15 25 2,596,589 282,174 24.04 26 Abiola 1.92 Delta 16 11 2,570,181 473,278 40.74 10 Abiola 2.24 Imo 17 20 2,485,499 355,186 31.62 20 Tofa 1.23 Niger 18 19 2,482,367 357,787 31.89 18 Tofa 1.62 AkwaIbom19 16 2,359,736 374,124 35.08 15 Abiola 1.35 Ogun 20 14 2,338,570 437,334 41.38 9 Abiola 5.07 Abia 21 26 2,297,978 256,500 24.70 25 Tofa 1.44 Osun 22 10 2,203,016 484,971 48.71 5 Abiola 7.18 Edo 23 23 2,159,848 308,979 31.65 19 Abiola 1.98 Adamawa 24 24 2,124,049 308,114 32.09 17 Tofa 1.19 Kogi 25 9 2,099,046 488,432 51.48 4 Tofa 1.19 Kebbi 26 28 2,062,226 215,027 23.07 28 Tofa 2.06 CrsRiver27 21 1,865,604 342,755 40.65 12 Abiola 1.23 Kwara 28 17 1,566,469 368,489 52.05 3 Abiola 3.59 Taraba 29 30 1,480,590 165,888 24.79 24 Abiola 1.59 Yobe 30 29 1,411,481 175,948 27.58 22 Abiola 1.75 FCT 31 31 378,671 38,281 22.37 29 Abiola 1.09 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Total 88,515,581 14,235,931 35.58 Abiola 1.42 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Notes on Table 2: Election Participation Index = 100 * Numerator / Denominator Numerator: Total number of votes cast in State (or region) Denominator:1991 State (or Regional) Census multiplied by (40/88.5) The Denominator is an estimate of the voting population (could be replaced by actual voter registration); 40 million is the voting population, 88.5 million is the total Nigerian population. The denominator presumes that the voter population is distributed uniformly throughout the country. Note that an index close to 100 would indicate almost 100% voting. An index of over 100 could indicate some election fraud, unless there is significant on-sight registration. Election Participation Ranking: Ranking 1-10: Ondo*, Rivers, Kwara*, Kogi, Osun*, Plateau*, Bauchi, Kaduna*, Ogun*, Delta* {*Abiola wins 7, Tofa wins 3} 11-20: Oyo*, Cross-River*, Lagos*, Enugu*, Akwa-Ibom*, Benue*, Adamawa, Niger, Edo*, Imo {*Abiola wins 7, Tofa wins 3} 21-31: Anambra*, Yobe*, Katsina, Taraba*, Abia, Borno*, Sokoto, Kebbi, FCT*, Jigawa*, Kano* {*Abiola wins 7, Tofa wins 4} Win ratio = Votes for winner / votes for opponent Regional Analysis of Results ---------------------------- The above are the raw data. If you accept them, then the discussion can proceed. From these data we can get some information through interpretive analysis. Again, you may disagree with the conclusions, but you have the privilege of working with the same data and coming up with your own conclusions. The analysis below is based on the following assumptions: (1) the 1991 census data is correct. (latest indications are that they are now being belatedly questioned at the National Constitutional Conference going on in Abuja.) (2) the 1993 Presidential results quoted above are correct; (3) the regional division of the states provided above is acceptable. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table 3 Regional Analysis of 1993 Presidential Election Results Region Rank by Rankings: --Votes Cast-- Total -- %Total-- ------ 1991 Census Tot. Votes & Abiola Tofa --------- Abiola Tofa ---------- Elec. Partic. ------ ------- ------ ----- ----------- SouthWest(SW) 1 1 2 3,093,994 549,525 3,643,519 84.92 15.08 East (EA) 4 5 6 739,748 756,142 1,495,890 49.45 50.55 NorthWest(NW) 6 7 7 304,295 738,495 1,042,790 29.18 70.82 NorthEast(NE) 5 4 5 745,591 884,820 1,630,411 45.73 54.27 NorthCentral(NC)2 3 8 868,951 872,402 1,741,353 49.90 50.10 MiddleBelt (MB) 7 6 4 766,282 509,697 1,275,979 60.05 39.95 Minority (MN) 3 2 3 1,307,447 1,203,340 2,510,787 52.07 47.93 Mid-Central(MC) 8 8 1 530,938 364,264 895,202 59.31 40.69 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Total 8,357,246 5,878,685 14,235,931 58.71 41.29 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table 4: Comparative Regional Analysis of Census/Results -------------------------------------------------------- Region 1991 Census Total Election Rank Rankings: Winner WIn ------ Count Votes Partic. by Tot.Votes & ------ Ratio ---------- Cast Index Census Elec. Partic. ----- --------- ------- ---- ------------ SouthWest(SW) 17,600,641 3,643,519 45.80 1 1 2 Abiola 5.63 East (EA) 10,712,675 1,495,890 30.89 4 5 6 Tofa 1.02 NorthWest(NW) 8,936,984 1,042,790 25.82 6 7 7 Tofa 2.43 NorthEast(NE) 10,426,532 1,630,411 34.60 5 4 5 Tofa 1.19 NorthCentral(NC) 16,309,565 1,741,353 23.62 2 3 8 Tofa 1.00 MiddleBelt (MB) 7,544,772 1,275,979 37.42 7 6 4 Abiola 1.50 Minority (MN) 12,939,226 2,510,787 42.93 3 2 3 Abiola 1.09 Mid-Central (MC) 4,044,186 895,202 48.97 8 8 1 Abiola 1.46 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Total 88,514,581 14,235,931 35.58 Abiola 1.42 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- What the Regional Analysis Means - an Objective (?) View -------------------------------------------------------- Election results are often subjected to regional analyses because their outcomes affect the electorate most where they reside (city, state), and where they are most likely to travel (region). However, due to the peculiar ethno-geography and history of Nigeria, there is a keen identification between ethnic groups and regions: for example, the Yoruba live mostly in the South-West, the Hausa-Fulani mostly in the Northern regions, and the Igbo in the East. Consequently, ethnic qualifications of electoral trends, even when resisted (as this writer is attempting to), cannot be escaped. It is with the above riders that the following statements are made. (1) Total votes cast of 14.2 million is 35.6% of the voter population of 40 million (out of a total population of 88.5 million). For a nation that is about 50% illiterate, that is a high percentage, and any mandate should be regarded as a national one. (2) If you compare the Rank by 1991 Census and the Election Participation Indices/Total Votes Rankings, there were some regions which appeared to be extremely keen on voting (Mid-Central, Middle Belt), others voted somewhat in proportion to their population (Southwest, Northeast, Minority), while some appeared relatively disinterested in voting (East, Northwest, particularly North Central.) Of course, this may have been a result of last minute confusion about whether the election was on or off. (3) The Southwest voted in favor of Abiola 6:1 relative to Tofa, the Northwest voted in favor of Tofa 2.5:1 relative to Abiola, the Middle-Belt and Mid-Central voted 1.5:1 in favor of Abiola, but everywhere else it was a toss-up, with Abiola having an edge in the Minority region, and Tofa having an edge in the East, Northeast and NorthCentral regions. (4) It is also interesting to note that Abiola won 5:1 in his home state (Ogun), and also edged Tofa in the latter's home state (Kano); furthermore, Kano State registered the lowest Election Participation Ranking as shown in Table 2. Note that Abiola won with the highest Win Ratio in Osun State (7.18), while Tofa won with his highest ratio in Sokoto State (3.81). Taking the above together, Tofa seems to have won in regions where there was in general voter apathy, while Abiola won in rgions where people were most keen on voting. Even on a state-by-state basis, this conclusion is justified. The regional analysis also seems to debunk three myths: (1) The first myth is that Abiola could have won without including the SouthWest votes, a claim often made by his supporters to enhance their claim of Abiola's national appeal away from his home-base. Now, if we take the Southwest votes away from Abiola alone, Tofa wins: Abiola: 5,263,252 Tofa: 5,878,685 If we take the Southwest votes away from both of them, Tofa still wins marginally: Abiola: 5,263,252 Tofa: 5,329,160 Therefore, Abiola was actually very much helped by the Southwest votes. However, the analysis above shows that it was a keen contest with Abiola holding his own away from his home base, and subject to a loss if he had not. Any allegation of vote buying is difficult to justify from these numbers, particularly when we also look at the "reasonableness" of the Election Participation Indices of Tables 2 and 4. (2) In defence against accusations about lack of sustained post-annulment protests in the East, there have always been claims by some that the East voted "massively" for Abiola (Myth # 2), and hence had done all they could for the struggle for democracy. If that is the case, then there was also "massive" voting for Tofa, so much so that he won in the East Region. Abiola: 739,748 Tofa: 756,142 Even if we include Cross River, Akwa-Ibom and Rivers States in the "East" (they are currently included in the Minority Region), then Tofa still wins the East: Abiola: 1,516,511 Tofa: 1,709,909 with the Rivers State (out of these three non-Igbo Eastern states) contributing largely to maintaining the scale in favor of Tofa by voting for him 1.5:1 over Abiola. What the close vote for Abiola in the Igbo East shows is not "massive" voting, but rather a "magnanimous" heart of the Igbo in these elections, bearing in mind the following facts: (a) Dr. Sylvester Ugo, vice-presidential candidate of Tofa, is Igbo and the former Central Bank Governor of Biafra. If Abiola's ticket prevailed, it would mean a rare period in which an Igbo would not be No. 1 or 2 in Federal government (notice Azikiwe, Ironsi, Ukiwe (albeit briefly), Ekwueme) (b) there is still residual visceral resentment against Yorubas and Awolowo over the Biafran episode (Abiola is Yoruba). (3) The regional analysis also gives an insight into the pattern of protests following the annulment. Since the Southwest voted 6:1 for Abiola, it was most indignant about the annulment, and showed it, sometimes violently. Also, Edo State and Delta State both voted more than 2:1 for Abiola, hence a similar indignation. The disenchantment of Kwara State, which voted for Abiola 3.5:1 appears to have been embodied in the indignation of their former Governor, Chief C.O. Adebayo, who is one of the earliest and longest-held detainees. Elsewhere, where Tofa either won, or votes were evenly split, the human tendency to be a sore loser, or for each person to dissuade his neighbor from any violent tendency was bound to make the reaction much more muted than in the Southwest, Edo or Delta States. Consequently, lack of a national protest does not take away from a national mandate, which debunks Myth # 3 (lack of protests shows lack on national mandate). What to do with these figures ----------------------------- This is a thorny question. But consider the following suggestion: the answer seems to lie with the following individuals, who should now tell the nation why we should or should not accept the June 12, 1993 figures, namely: (1) Abiola (2) Kingibe - the "winning" pair (3) Tofa (4) Ugo - the "losing" pair (5) Nwosu (6) Babangida/Abacha - the "official" trio In all sincerity, we should sit them all down, and have them tell us. In fact, one could toy with the idea of a national referendum following such "tell-all" sessions. However, one is stumped by the puzzle - suppose that the referendum, which after all is an "election" between ideas, if not of persons, is then annulled if its outcome is unacceptable to some, just as June 12 was, then what ? Simplistic ? Yes, but one is at a loss for any justice without June 12, although one is ready to be convinced for the sake of the country ! Sooner or later, we may have to face the truth - the only alternative to June 12 is the ongoing Constitutional Conference, and the maintenance of its annulment. And that is the government line, which will simply make our nightmare to continue. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- The webmaster apologizes for the muddled up figures
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