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Situation Liberia (1) By William Etim-Bassey & Cyprian Ako Preamble The complex dynamism of the Liberian conflict and its multiplayer effects result in more intellectually unanswerable questions than Cyprian and I can presently commit to. However, we remain in-sync in our opinion that exiled president Charles Taylor is a bi-product of the general conflict process and will inevitably become a victim of that process like his predecessors. Especially as the UN assumes control of the Economic Community Of West African States initiated peace process and its facilitating mechanism. The LURD-The Liberians United for Reconciliation & Democracy rebels seemingly loose coherent momentum appearing ideo-intellectualy incapable of ascending the next level thereby loosing gained tactical advantages and running the risk of becoming non-players in shaping Liberia’s future.
This article theme centers on Charles Taylor and international jurisprudence, for Cyprian and I hypothesize that the inter-play and trade-offs added to the need to enhance credibility for a challenged UN system and the need for wider international support for a largely ignored conflict which facilitated Mr. Charles Taylor’s negotiated exile will inevitably force him before the Sierra Leone or an eventual Liberian war crime tribunal.
This article reflects on correlated issues critical to jurisprudence and international law, discusses the Sierra Leone war crimes tribunal concept, reason and rational all in correlation to Mr. Taylor’s war crimes indictment. On the strength of Cyprians experience as a student, researcher and educator in the field international jurisprudence. Added to his witnessing International Criminal Tribunal Rwanda (Burundi)-ICTR sessions (seating) in Arusha.
Preceding Cyprian’s analysis, I’ll briefly discourse peacekeeping related issues and challenges, aspects of the strategic implications of the UN’s commitment to provide more peacekeepers and Nigeria’s non-unilateral intervention as they are influenced by the UN charter and other international treaties and covenants, and the Geneva Convention articles and how it influence international humanitarian law. The need base here-being my self-deluded hypothesis that these articles hold a lee-way for a more interest-centered approach for Nigeria-the dominant regional power to remedy the mess made off the initial Liberia peace mission which culminated in the 2003 re-escalation?
Reasoning For from the year 2000, at foras and in articulation I have while pouring encomium on initiative and concept (by ECOWAS) for its region centered multilateral approach, critiqued aspects of methodology relating to mandate execution and the overall mission handling process.
Central to my critique being the "mission end state concept"-within a mandated context, the lack of sustainable peace-building initiatives post peace enforcement considering the dynamically multi-ideo-strategic threat Charles Taylor then presented although he was the "alternative evil-candidate" for the Liberian presidency and the time-honored "creed" amongst peacekeepers that the end-state to any peace mission is "alleviating human suffering" Alec Morrison (2000).
In my initial analysis (see, The Truth about United States Military Aid II, 2001) the re-escalation of an obviously intractable conflict-which Liberia is, was unfortunately expected. And my comments are not now borne out of standard therapeutic conceit (also see recent articles and interviews by Gen. V. Malu) considering there must have been a lessons learnt component in the overall analysis of all Economic Community for West African Monitoring Group facilitated peace missions in West Africa.
I am thinking, the lessons learnt component is critical to any debriefing process; so ECOWAS leaders should have been better prepared for the 2003 re-escalation. (I emphasize the lessons learnt component because I recently spent the "casual 5 minutes" with DR. Ochehe-the Nigerian presidency’s DG at the Peace and Conflict Resolution Institute in Abuja and he portrayed an esoteric and dynamic mind in peace and conflict resolution related matters)
For in truth, even with the transition of authority to the UN, Liberia remains a West African albeit African "problem". The West will commit nothing more for a small inconsequentially non-strategic state, Lou Dobbs (cnn 2003). As witnessed by the vague platitude of the USA who even postured while all the time playing out the well scripted and time tested "African solutions to African problems" concept
I must warn though of the redundancy in over-critiquing the United States within context. Because the United States military traditionally (doctrinally) has never really been interested in chapter 6 type peacekeeping missions except in situations of uttermost strategic imperative-post Somalia events irreparably enforced that. So they played to their strength by involving in operational and humanitarian level negotiation and offering rapid-reactionary capability albeit from the comfort of their fortress ships.
Situational Reality The situational reality is that Liberia is a failed state in every context. Institutional capacity is subverted and eroded, lawlessness and genocidal carnage prevails creating a multiplicity of socio-eco-political "stress" in the West African sub-region. Resultantly the Liberian conflict has altered the socio-political fabric and fortune of, particularly, Sierra Leone and Cote D’ivore, threatens that of Guinea and strategically impacts that of Burkina Faso and Senegal. The Liberian conflict spillover effect cannot be ignored for its disruptive influence.
Truth is, the ECOWAS made a meal of the initial peace mission and Charles Taylor’s non-recognition of diplomatic necessities, convention ignorance and for years the non-observance of any Rules of Engagement. The central figures in this conflict have always been unilaterally contemptuous of International law values, their actions repeatedly at odds with what is permissible and appropriate.
Mission Situational Assessment & Concerns Peace missions are complex endeavors (Pearson peace center, J. Klein 2001) and considering the UN’s perennial economic and logistic over-stretch only the non-esoteric will give a second though to the additional force commitment considering the complexly endemic red-tapism that clogs the UN systems.
In truth, no matter what good intentions Mr. Anan has, deploying a substantial proportion of that 15,000 force could take a critical 6-18 months. Except the Nigerians and or other African States particularly the South African Development Council block led by wealthy South Africa decide to contribute to create the badly required critical force-muscle mass the Liberian mission badly requires. To facilitate peace enforcement capability. Well except low-end contributors like Bangladesh opt to contribute. Especially considering involved trade-offs and comments such as "...The French Army would feel humiliated to go to Iraq and be put in the same category as the Poles and the Uruguayans…" Jacques Chirac 2003
So the biggest pluses for the peace process, while we await the UN deployment actually are Gen. Klein’s nomination as envoy. He’s a thoroughbred ex-soldier and diplomat who is an "alpha-dog" and importantly, has Mr. Anan’s ears without a doubt. (I was visibly excited at the cigar wielding Klein’s involvement-I’ve been opportune to interactively observe Klein) and Nigeria’s seeming commitment to stem further escalation of the conflict.
My thinking, Nigeria’s Policy Response & international law From a strategic standpoint, I have always felt the need for a plan B on Nigeria’s part. A plan B based on a more interest-centered and deterrent approach, in response to peace and conflict resolution especially in resource rich nations like Sierra Leone. And optionally in Liberia for reason of geo-strategic expediency. A policy while seeking to facilitate process sustainability and stifle adventurism by the many latent non-literate "ideologues" in West Africa who are seemingly disconnected from a world dominated by the political-economy concept. That also address conflict-accompanying antecedent effecting non-military instruments, such as trade, economy, diplomacy, aid, public policy by-way of refugee influx. There is a neat symmetry to my thinking which borders on the long-term effect of West Africa’s many conflicts on Nigeria’s overall political economy.
A policy that might require short-term Nigerian dominated occupation through facilitating a bi-leadership process of sort to enable sustainable peace building, human and food security, and the rule of law. This approach becomes expedient due to the intractable nature of the Liberian conflict, considered proportional collateral damage effect, the likely overall conflict outcome based on geo-strategic considerations and cost management.
My thinking is based on Nigeria’s resource-heavy commitment to peace missions and peace response initiatives within the past 20 years. A commitment, which severely weakens her challenged economy while bearing no direct strategic value. Perhaps Tom Ikimi’s (see, Asylum for Taylor and Nigeria’s dilemma , 090103) makes a good read even if an inarticulate representation of my thinking. Inarticulate for being devoid of diplomatic necessities, which is a prerequisite at this bi-level of communication.
In support of my thinking, I have briefly researched exploitable ambiguities within articles, conventions, treaties and the general framework of the international system in support of nations out to facilitate international peace and security especially in furtherance of International Humanitarian Law. Considered aspects of the Brahimi report and the thinking amongst international that a region centered approach to peace and conflict resolution encouraged especially in non-strategic areas.
So on the premises of my "Legal Constructionist" leaning, which vehemently sides with the pragmatic path of the "Right of Humanitarian Intervention to Prevent Overwhelming Humanitarian Catastrophe", I am of the opinion that Nigeria should have intervened earlier in Liberia while working out modalities for the mission to self-support within a short term frame while considering how the peace pays for itself. For although the Kellog-Briand Pact (see General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, August 27 1928) prohibits resorting to the use of force Article 2(4) of the UN charter) does not unilaterally prohibit the use of force for Humanitarian purposes. Besides going through doctrinal articulations on Military necessity versus humanity I note multi-International Humanitarian Law breaches by both the Liberian government and the LURD rebels. Breaches ranging from "War Crimes" to impeding the passage for "relief aid and consignment" etc
These condoned atrocities convince me of the need for a dynamic approach, an approach Tom Ikimi defines as occupation or taking Nigerian businessmen into Liberia to make things functional. Researching the occupation concept, it is clear that while agreeing that "Occupation" is a distinct, abnormal and temporary legal category…the United Nations Security Council grudgingly agrees that an "Occupying power fills the administrative vacuum, assuming special responsibilities for administration etc ….to facilitate meeting the Humanitarian needs of the civilian population…. within a conflict challenged area.
Furthermore, under the UN charter and in customary International Law, a conditions for the right to self-defense includes "the necessity of self-defense: and proportionality of the means used in self-defense" and the "right to anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defense" for which the United Nations Security Council has yet to graciously define a unilateral doctrine for?
International law (jurisprudence), Charles Taylor & Crimes Against Humanity Dovetailing the presage, which analyzes issues relating to the Sierra Leonian and Liberian conflict, the West African response initiative, International law, the United Nations, Peacekeeping and Williams prescriptive analysis, the second part of this article re-emphasizes the articles central theme, Charles Taylor.
This portion analyzes the interrelationship between the Sierra Leone and Liberian conflict, jurisprudence and Charles Taylor vis-à-vis the history of International tribunals from the Nuremberg and Tokyo era. For after World War II the international community felt a strong need to set some standards in international law and diplomacy and post consultations and trade-offs amongst the victorious powers and their allies a tribunal was set up as a deterrent and to try perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity (…. As set out in the Statute, crimes against humanity include crimes such as the extermination of civilians, enslavement, torture, rape, forced pregnancy, persecution on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious or gender grounds, and enforced disappearances - but only when they are part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population….)-see http://www.yannone.org/NewFiles/war-crimes.html
The Nuremberg (Tokyo) tribunals-after 1948 were bi-product of this new era, facilitated by the prevailing thinking amongst internationalist. And the successful manner the tribunal adjudicated in trying the NAZI leadership meant it was the precursor to the ICTY which was set up to try war crime perpetrators in the Balkan conflict-the former Yugoslav Republics and ICTR for Rwanda (Burundi)-These special tribunals have far reaching broad-based jurisdiction to apprehend and adjudicate, but the tribunals jurisdiction is very carefully set out in its Statute. The premise being based on the principle of complementarity, which means that the tribunal can only exercise its jurisdiction when a national court is unable or unwilling to genuinely do so? The first priority always goes to national courts. The tribunals are in no way meant to replace the authority of national courts. But there may when a State's court system collapses and ceases to function (see statues, http://www.qlc.edu.pk/criminal_tribunal.php
On that premise, attempts have been made to apprehend even former regime heads like Slobodan Milosevic and those in rulership indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity-these tribunals are empowered through the UN charter-UN Security Council and act as proxy’s for the International Court of Justice sitting in the Hague (also see, Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations , http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm)a situation invariably in contrast to the league of nations era. When the League of Nations was so powerless that the Italian maximum leader Benito Mussolini violated the sovereignty of Ethiopian and committed heinous atrocities and war crimes in his expansionist bid- Genocide (circa 1944) being a recently added lexicon of international law (see, http://www.isg-iags.org/definitions/def_genocide.html
So generally, the statues empowering these tribunals set out defined end states, which are but not limited to.... Prosecuting and trying four clusters of offences: Grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
William Etim-Bassey is an Associate of the Pearson Peacekeeping Center & Cyprian Ako holds an LLB from the University of Yaounde & an LLM from the Vriej Universiteit of Brussels
October 2003
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