by

Anthony A Akinola

The wish of every patriotic Nigerian and, indeed, all lovers of democracy worldwide is that the handover of power by the military to a democratically elected government on May 29, 1999 marked the end of military intervention in Nigeria's politics. Rather than view the handover as a victory over the military, which it was not, the reasonable position is to examine what has made the military's intrusion the easiest of tasks, and how not to make bad history repeat itself in the future.

The political history books are there to confirm that the coups which ousted civilian government in the past were popular and welcomed by public opinion. Although the military tended to extend their "tenure" through counter-coups or palace coups, the two points at which democratically elected governments were overthrown were in January 1966 and December 1983. The first occasion led to 13 years of military rule, the second to 16 years.

The first military coup received its immediate justification in the crisis that followed the massive rigging of elections in the old Western Region in 1965. The attempt by the leadership of the defunct Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) to impose itself on the people of the West led to violence in which the killing of NNDP supporters and the burning of their houses were the order of the day. The inability or unwillingness of the Federal Government to restore order provided the platform for military intervention.

However, the crisis in the West was only the immediate cause of their intervention. The remote causes were deep-rooted in the nature of Nigeria's heterogeneity and the politics of regionalism in the immediate post-independence era. The hotly disputed census of 1962-63 was viewed as an attempt by one axis of the country to impose its dominance over the other. Similarly for the disputed federal elections of 1964 which more or less pitched the North against the South.

The attempted coup of January 1966 soon led Nigeria into a bloody civil war, as the coup planners were Southern officers, mostly of Igbo origin, and the victims, mostly, were venerated politicians and top military officers from the Northern Region. The coup makers' claim to patriotism could, therefore, not be sustained, not least because of the exclusion of Igbo politicians from the "cleansing" exercise.

During the subsequent years of military rule, there were two changes which would later make an impact on party politics; the creation of states, and the replacement of parliamentary democracy with a presidential system of government patterned on the American presidential/congressional system.

The issue of state creation predated Nigeria's independence in 1960. There was agitation, sometimes violent, by the minority ethnic groups, especially those of the Middle Belt in the North and the Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers areas in the Eastern Region. The British colonial masters indicated, following the recommendations of the Willink Commission on the minority ethnic groups in 1958, that if new states were to be created, independence would have to be delayed for two years in order to allow the new states time to settle down. Because the nationalist politicians were in a hurry for independence they could not agree to that idea.

After independence, because of the advantages of size in Nigeria's politics of regionalism, the only new region that was created by the politicians was the Mid-Western Region - more as a way of curtailing the influence of the Yoruba-dominated Western Region (out of which it was carved) whose authentic leadership was at loggerheads with the ruling coalition of the Northern People Congress (NPC) and the (Igbo-dominated) National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC).

First under General Yakubu Gowon in 1967, later under Generals Murtala Muhammed, Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha, the military split the former four regions into 36 states. Professor A.E. Afigbo, an eminent historian, described the contributions of Gowon's administration to the Nigerian federation in these glowing words: "-it enabled the fundamental character of the Nigerian federation, that is its multi-ethnic character, to emerge full and defiant, as well as naked, repulsive and challenging. Hitherto it had tended to be obscured by British-generated cleavages between mere geographical expressions such as between, first, North and South, and then among North, East and West." (Federal Character and Federalism in Nigeria (1989), p.13.)

The second major change, the introduction of presidential politics as a way of fostering greater political interaction among Nigeria's diverse groups, has also been significant. Because Nigeria's political parties were mostly ethnic-based, the "government" and "opposition" attributes of the erstwhile parliamentary system had merely resulted in one ethnic group allying itself against the other. Under the presidential system, whoever seeks to become president is required to win a majority of popular votes and meet certain requirements of geographical spread. The ugly feature of parliamentary politics as practised in Nigeria's First Republic (1960-66) was that the most powerful party, the NPC, did not even extend its membership to the southern regions, and yet presided over the affairs of the federation.

The military handed over the reins of power to a democratically elected government on October 1, 1979. The election of the president was not without controversy. However, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, the flagbearer of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), became Nigeria's first directly elected President.

The elected representatives in the National Assembly, it must be said, would appear to have deliberately refused to comprehend the rudiments of presidential politics. Under the guidance of their political parties, those who voted in support of bills sponsored by a member of another party were accused of "anti-party" behaviour. The politics of "rub my back, I rub yours" was conducted in monetary terms.

The corruption that ensued in the Shagari era, especially among members of the NPN, was on a scale unprecedented in the history of Nigeria. In the face of general poverty in society, those at the top echelon of the party were busy flying their private jets all over the globe, conducting one business after another: General Olusegun Obasanjo, who handed over power to Shagari, summed up the extravagance of the NPN-controlled executive when, in a keynote address, he hinted that the Shagari administration had spent over 50 billion naira in less than four years with nothing to show for it.

The demise of the Second Republic (1979-83) came with the politics of re-election. Alhaji Shehu Shagari, whose performance in office had been unimpressive, was re-elected in what his supporters celebrated as a "landslide" victory. However, the NPN's incursion into opposition territory was soon to spark a major crisis, especially in Ondo State where the NPN governor-elect had to flee the state in the face of violence directed against NPN supporters. The courts of law assumed the role of electoral officials as they overturned one victory after the other.

The overthrow of the Epicurean politicians was greeted with nationwide jubilation, not least among students, journalists and ordinary Nigerians. It must be said that members of opposition parties had actually called on the military opportunists to overthrow the Shagari government, not knowing that the hurricane would sweep away all democratic institutions nationwide.

What followed the Shagari presidency was 16 years of military rule, featuring such corrupt dictators as Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha. Their misrule, which need not be dwelt upon here, should provide Nigerians with a lesson in the importance of "self-rule" as opposed to military dictatorship.

Now that democracy is back, the politicians must ensure that it works. There are two sides to a stable democracy: the constitutional aspect, which provides the rules and nature of power relations in written form (except in Britain where the constitution is unwritten), and the human factor, which has to do with the behaviour of political elites and their supporters. Both the constitutional framework and the elements of human behaviour must be appropriate and complementary for democracy to survive in any given society.

The constitutional framework agreed on by Nigeria's founding fathers is the federal one. When the first military ruler, Major-General J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi, reversed it to install a unitary system via the Unification Decree no. 34 on May 24, 1966, it sparked off an immediate anti-Igbo "revolt" in the North where his action was suspected to be an attempt to impose his own group's domination over the rest of Nigeria and especially over the North, which was behind the other regions in Western education and commerce. Lt.-Col. Yakubu Gowon (as he then was) returned the nation to the federal status quo following the counter-coup of July 29, 1966.

However, many years of military rule have eroded the tradition of federalism in Nigeria. Today Nigeria is federal only in name. Many informed commentators on Nigerian politics have argued vociferously for Nigeria to return to a true federalism. Politicians do not have to live in perpetual fear of the military. They must make innovative and far-reaching decisions on the organisation of state and society, and carry the people along with them. What they must not do is continue with the irresponsibility of yesteryear.

The culture of corruption, political intolerance, and the arrogance of power have not helped the cause of democracy anywhere in the world. When it is time for the Nigerian voters to decide on change or continuity, their verdict must be respected by the politicians and electoral officials. An irresponsible democracy which does not make change possible by itself, will deserve to be terminated by whoever has the power to do so.