I’ve just been opportune to read and analyze "A Nigerian Military for democracy? not yet, and the seminal discourse, "The Nigerian-US Military Pact, "Fine Prints’" Recipe for Danger Wither National Assembly" Published on the www.nigerdeltacongress.com/ 

While in agreement with perspectives and numerous issues, especially insistence on a National Sovereign Conference. I have reservations about the applicability of certain suggestions discoursed in the write ups-discourses.

I’m titling this discourse "Transition to modernity", for I’m believing that once Nigeria modernizes her armed forces through training and capacity building, present seeming challenges will slowly wilt way. I’m hypothesizing that lapses and schemes that allowed the likes of Sani Abacha and likes to rise to prominence and authority will be checked.

Retrospectively, I’m thinking in years to come, aspects of the discourse, especially "The Nigerian-US Military Pact, "Fine Prints’" Recipe for Danger Whither National Assembly" will appear prescient.

This particular discourse is a required read for Nigeria’s current defense policy managers and a precursor of sort to initiating a future defense and strategic policy for Nigeria and most importantly her armed forces. Many issues are discussed and importantly, questions are raised. Issues questioned are as much moral and political, as they are strategic in nature.

My interest here in "Transition to Modernity", as always concerns the armed forces, conflict and peace.

I’ll attempt, to here inexhaustibly discourse the military and defense policy aspects of "A Nigerian Military for democracy not yet, and "The Nigerian-US Military Pact, "Fine Prints’" Recipe for Danger Wither National Assembly".

Some views of mine will be consistent with issues and thoughts discoursed, some will challenge suggested conceptual frameworks and interpretation of events but most importantly my discourse even if inexhaustive will presents a minor comparative option as an educative read.

I stress however, that being a direct by-product, and an associate of a western strategic studies institute I’m in disagreement with glorified comments, especially comments concerning the internal dimension of security in its ramification. My orientation allows issues and positions to be challenged, challenged and discoursed as no one has supremacy of knowledge. The only pre-condition for an orientation such as mine is knowledge of subject matter backed by empirical reasoning and scientific research.

I unequivocally state my position because I always sense discomfort with issues relating to security and identity especially with the "New South " countries. However issues of security and identity must be discoursed to further knowledge and aid research and development. A fact most "New south" governments are unwilling to accept.

Issues discussed in "A Nigerian Military for democracy not yet "

Government’s conception of the nature of the Armed Forces

The contributive effect of the Armed Forces retreat.

Gen. Danjuma’s capacity to manage Nigeria’s defense portfolio

On the U-turn on demobilization (refer, Niger-Guardian December 24, 000).

On Gen. Danjuma writing the senate committee not to delve into issues of defense matters and force composition

Under his section for democracy, linking to his section on "Lesson from Northern Ireland"

 

Transition to modernity

Discipline

Leadership

History

Doctrine and posture

Ethos-Culture

In "the truth about Nigeria United States Military Training I & II" while elaborating on the challenges faced by the Nigerian armed forces vis a vis benefits of the US-initiated MPRI run capacity building program and the changing face of modern peacekeeping. I suggested useful simple but profound concepts and initiatives, but most importantly I questioned, even if succinctly. The capacity and competencies of our defense portfolio managers.

Importantly, I inexhaustibly discoursed the shift and leanings in western strategic thinking and policy thrust especially concerning conflicts and conflicts in "non strategic regions", I made mention of the unfortunate western notion of "African solutions to African issues-problems" and most importantly I discoursed Nigeria’s likely prominent role in future regional and subregional peace initiatives.

Possible future, because the future of peacekeeping is still undefined and in a sense evolving- (The Brahimi report or its summary makes a good read). The curator of the UN charter, the United Nations is itself challenged. Challenged in many more ways than we know.

In reality, and unfortunately. The western notion that "African solutions to African issues-problems" has come to stay. The west is unwilling to carry "Africa’s burden" again. The option is to build capacity through a collaborative framework to facilitate Nigeria and her likes who will inevitably become regional policemen for strategic reasons.

Listening in on people discourse bi-polarism and its death. I’ve always been fascinated by a lack of circumspect. True, ideo-political bi-polarism is near extinct except in the last vestiges of communism and socialism, Cuba China and North Korea etc. That’s in comparison to western ideology.

Agreeing ideo-political bi-polarism is near extinct, however ethno-cultural bi-polarism, which always existed even if in subtlety, now demarcates and polarizes our world. My hypothesis is ethno-cultural bi-polarism will do more harm than ideo-political bi-polarism and nothing can be done to remedy this.

Faced with this prospect, Nigeria and most "New South" countries must irrevocably strive to build capacity and capability, when and if opportunity arise, I dare to argue that though issues plaguing the Nigerian armed forces are numerous and varied, those arguing that international assistance will not benefit the Nigerian armed forces negate the principle of international development. My point being if other sectors of the component society benefit from international capacity building programs, why can’t the armed forces benefit to reshape its future?

The question remains the west, relationally represented by the United States –MPRI in Nigeria’s case. Have a perfect conception for reasons behind collaborations such as ACRI.

The truth is and still remains. Africa-countries of the "New South" have no significant strategic role or importance in the context of the current world arrangement. True, Africa and most "New South" countries have potential and capacity. Immense capacities, but instability, irrationally dysfunctional, lawless and disorderly ways in by which governance and societies are structured makes for unattractiveness.

Western conception of "Africa" is at best exotic if not primordial-"Most people back home have no idea. They can't imagine what Lagos looks like. They think I'm broadcasting from a hut,'' he says laughing-U.S. Disc Jockey, a Hit in Nigeria, Monday July 16 http://nigeriawold.com/news/source/2001/jul/17/1.html I challenge anyone who thinks contrary.

Against this background, I again here counsel, discoursing the benefit of the US-MPRI capacity building initiative for the Nigerian armed forces the objective being to facilitate the preparedness and character of the armed forces at strategic, operational and tactical levels of operation. My hope is, our defense portfolio managers should look to sustainable capacity building and development collaborations in future for the Nigerian armed forces.

The most relevant issue raised in "A Nigerian Military for democracy not yet and the discourse, "The Nigerian-US Military Pact, "Fine Prints’" Recipe for Danger Wither National Assembly" relates to that of the government’s conception of the armed forces.

A fact which, obvious from the ad hoc nature security sector reforms are being carried out-without communicated desired end-state leaves one in doubt as to what form or shape our armed forces will take in the new millennium and especially as the military sinks into a more deterrent role and diplomacy, dialoguing mediation and negotiation re-take preeminence.

This lack of conception might retrospectively undermine, eroding the capacity building program undertaken by the United States-MPRI and prove that Augustus Aikhomu and the Omoruyis were right in questioning the rationale for the training program.

My fear is, and has always been that rulership solely wants to keep the armed forces from politics and governance while maximizing the armed forces capacity in nontraditional roles i.e. matters of civil disobedience and policing. Roles, in conflict with precepts, doctrine, command and control orientation of the armed forces. This approach ignores too many of the complexities and trade-offs, essential in national affairs.

However, while in agreement with views on conception, as supported by arguments that problems of the Nigerian armed forces are too fundamental. Fundamental I would translate to imply rudimentary. Which in a sense is true, I’m rationally against opinion on the presidential retreat with the armed forces. Quoting from "A Nigerian Military for democracy not yet…"hence retreat cannot change it. A national conference can". I’m feeling, while a national conference is plausible right now and is ideally a rationale step in redirecting Nigeria. Well the British creation we today know as Nigeria. President Obasanjo’s meeting-retreat with the armed forces was a good bonding strategy.

Sometime in March, I developed and attempted testing a pilot research for the Pearson Peace Center. The end-state being to define asses and explore issues relating to organizational\structural and cultural differences between members of the "New Peacekeeping Partnership". The resulting problem being from interactive challenges faced by member of the "New Peacekeeping Partnership" in peacekeeping missions.

An interesting by-outcome was that the military to a high extent, and the intellectual components groups of the "New Peacekeeping Partnership" enjoyed a closer interactive understanding amongst its members than other members of the peacekeeping partnership. The overriding factor being "Ethos"

ETHOS…. Distinguishing character, sentiment, moral nature or guiding beliefs of a person group or institutions (Webster’s)

Ethos in my understanding and literal interpretation represents a socio-cultural representation of being. Being as in constituency. For intent and purpose who and what a soldier is.

From the pilot research, extrapolated information demonstrated while most NPP component NGO’s and IGO’s were challenged by socio-ethno-demographic and cultural difference’s the military for reasons of "Ethos" were less challenged by the exact same factors.

The boding factor being each soldier’s comprehension of sense of common experience. Simulated conditions demonstrated good interactiveness between soldiers from Jordan Barbados Canada South Africa Kuwait Nepal Ivory Coast and Kenya.

The bonding principle, the military "Ethos". In their conception being "country before self-mission above all" in whatever order you choose to put it.

This unique understanding amongst men of arms, devoid creed or color. It unifies and sets aside the armed forces from other societal components.

This goes to demonstrate that, President Obasanjo’s retreat was a well-advised bonding strategy for the Nigerian Armed Forces. For while the government requires the consent of the people in persecution of national objectives there is the need to carry the military along to achieve a unified national path. Agreed, the military is a component of the civil society so subject to the society and rulership. Thus popular objectives and the willful consent of the people should facilitate its strategic objectives. However, I’m insistent on the military being handled delicately, at least for mow. Especially as it transits from years of self abuse. My only worry being what transpired at the retreat and attributed comments post the retreat.

Sometimes, ill conceived ill-advised and ignorantly flagrant and naive remarks by members of our rulership devoid of socio-strategic or political understanding without empirical or logical reasoning causes disaffection. They hardly examine ramificative effects of their comments from either a pluri or multi dimensional perspective.

Precisely, I’m meaning, it’s most unwise for anyone to categorically remark, that "officers with ambition be reported to authority. I’m refusing to ramificate the contextual meaning of such a remark. By this remark I question the remarkee’s concept of the future Nigerian soldier or fighting force, one simply comprised of men without ambition and purpose?

For reasons of expediency, based on my conceptualization of sovereignty and law (extraterritoriality etc). I refuse to under one breath equate and compare Northern Ireland with Nigeria. The applicability of principles and concept even if successful in the Irish context is non-applicable to Nigeria’s immediate situation.

Northern Ireland is a British colony for all intent and purpose and steps taken to develop capacity for the Irish Ulster Constabulary IUC are non-applicable to Nigeria’s immediate situation. We have a choice. We are masters of our destiny. How we have mismanaged and deplorably polarized our country results from choice. The Irish have no such choice.

"Villagers 'massacred' in Nigeria"…"Thousands flee Nigeria clashes"…"Police, OPC Armed Robbers and the Politics of Crime-fighting…. Governors Are Saboteurs – Obasanjo"…"Ethnic violence spills into central Nigerian town"

Collated headlines emanating from Nigeria in a given time. These headlines reflect happenings in Nigeria today. These headlines are akin to what we read about failed states like Sierra Leone, Angola Congo and Rwanda. These headlines make me wonder if Nigeria is a failing or failed state.

To talk about state failure presupposes the existence of a state. The existence of a state, in turn, presupposes (formal, juridical) sovereignty. The institution of sovereignty is a basic, necessary condition of state (Sovereignty, Security, and State Failure Georg Sørensen)

State failure, along with many inexhaustible factors is inseparably connected with problems of authority and political legitimacy.

There are now extensive areas of Nigeria and indeed Africa without semblance of law or order. Particularly in Africa, many states can scarcely be said to exist, in anything more than the nominal sense that they are colored in on maps.

Large parts of Angola, CAR, Congo and Sudan, indeed, have scarcely been under the control of their central governments since independence in the mid-1970s and mid-1950s respectively. The restoration of effective national government in Congo is looking increasingly unlikely. Though, semblance of formal political authority has been restored in both Liberia and Sierra Leone "this has been achieved only by handing over that authority to the principal agents of state destruction, Charles Taylor’s NPFL and Sankoh’s RUF".

It must then be recognized that states bring with them very significant costs, in social, economic and political terms; cost countries like Nigeria might not be ready to pay. However, state-centered and state-supporting literature of international relations has been so heavily concerned to emphasize the benefits of statehood that the other side of the account has gone almost unnoticed.

From an African perspective, amongst the many factors that have contributed to the failure of the states, as a unit is that indigenous bases for state creation in pre-colonial sub-Sahara Africa were for the most part peculiarly feeble.

A familiar weakness of African State formation was the very uneven fit between indigenous bases for statehood as the continent possessed, and the imposed structures of colonial rule. The grafting process was thoroughly inadequate both spatially and temporarily.

Having inexhaustibly defined and analyzed attributes of a failing state. It’s left to the reader’s sense of conceptualization to define having assessed available information define Nigeria.

My caution here being. As I’ve listed certain perspective on why states collapse. I here state that many reasons why most states in Africa have failed while having roots in colonialization can also be linked to ineptness.

At best the call for UN intervention in post Abacha’s Nigeria-1998 is impracticable, impracticable because exaggerated assertions are bound to yield critical and sometimes hostile disappointments. I suspect the call had it’s basis on the noble idea of the impracticable UN trusteeship Council principle, whereby the council would assume control of so called "failed-states" initiating transition.

I reason, most importantly, being that all UN missions eschew legality as a basis, that the applicability of the UN charter as a multilateral treaty and its constituent instruments would have mitigated against UN led intervention-sponsored transitional authority on the scale a Nigerian mission would have required.

The discoursed Cambodia model retrospectively leaves alote to be desired. Resulting form the UN transition program, the incumbent Cambodian regime today displays blatant authoritarian characteristics (Delusions of Grandeur-United Nations and global intervention, edited by Ted Carpenter, CATO Institute 1997), a characteristic Nigeria was transiting from.

These factors aside they’re other considerations I’ll discourse and expantiate upon.

There are two definable peacekeeping (intervention inclusive) operation types. United Nations peacekeeping forces are not armed forces raised by the security council by virtue of articles 43 and 47 of the United Nations charter, nor are they organized by the states members on the basis of an invitation (as in Korea in 1957) or an authorization by the security council (as in the gulf in 1999, and Somalia in 1992. Both these categories are empowered to use coercive measures to restore international peace and security (International Review of the Red Cross, Applicability of international law to United Nations peacekeeping forces-May-June 1993).

Peacekeeping forces differ from the forces previously mentioned, primarily in that their mandate is to keep the peace. Two broad types of operations are distinguishable. One involves the sending of an observation mission (i.e. mission in Palestine, Golan Heights etc. Here the sole function is observation and any active role is ruled out. For these forces are unarmed. While the second broader category usually have specific mandates to keep peace. .

The concept of peacekeeping being that the physical presence of a neutral and impartial multinational will have a deterring affection belligerent.

Traditional peacekeeping is nominally bi-partisan. As with all peacekeeping operations, mandates are empowered by articles of the United Nations charter and "permissible by the United Nations Security Council normally with the consent of the parties in conflict -belligerents.

Traditional operations are sometimes in forms of observer missions and usually have small, lightly armed military capacity. They mostly act as a buffer sometimes in demilitarized zones. Their strategic objective being to help facilitate the resolutive process by way of facilitating cross border cease-fires etc. It is typically referred t as "chapter 6" operations in UN parlance.

Most current peacekeeping operations fall outside this definition. Giving birth to the informal "chapter 6 1\2" reference some missions are now termed, which is against what the UN officially terms as "chapter 7" operations.

The major difference between chapter 6 and 7" mission missions intricacies aside is the capacity of force- arms or enforcement capacity of the mission in reference. And the fact that chapter 7 missions are mostly peace enforcement mission sometimes non bi-partisan?

I’m hoping to here demonstrate that situation in Nigeria 1998 fell outside conditions to mandate a United Nations mission or presence. Nigeria being a signatory to the UN charter, convention’s, covenants etc would have been justified to protest and or react in its capacity as a sovereign state. For those of you who will argue that such actions were taken against FMYR. Please refer to portions of the conditionality in the UN charter which explicitly states and I’ll translate to imply, " … that a peacekeeping force, or in FMYR a coalition, regional or sub-regional coalition or for intent and purpose protecting state is…"empowered to use coercive measures to restore international peace and security"…. Because the UN hadn’t formally accused Nigeria of crimes or threat to international peace, aside claim’s by amnesty and other Human Rights group and committees which are in de facto only NGO’s, who nominally operate by consent in most states.

Post Abacha’s Nigeria was in turmoil, but not in obvious physical conflict. A state existed unlike in Congo Rwanda etc, and state structures or its semblance were in place, though anarchy threatened. Meaning rules of international law, applicable to conflict situations and set forth in the United Nations charter under which Nigeria is signatory which guides and regulates international intervention, would have been intervening in Nigeria impermissible.

For those of you who don’t know, the United Nations draws its principle authority from the collaboration of states, multilateral treaties and through the mechanism’s of international law, which we know draws capacity from dictates of public conscience, custom and from the principles of humanity-thus international law is characteristically referred to as international social responsibility. Without Nigeria’s cooperation’s and willingness. The legality and possibility of the Unfacilitating peace in Nigeria was impossible. In truth the UN was incapable of what would have been a large-scale chapter 6 operation in Nigeria. The complexity of a Nigerian operation would have been much too large. I have been privileged to listen in on Mr. Graham Day, UN point man in East Timor and Amb. Gen. Jean Jacque Klein (Bosnia) lectures on challenges they faced and the UN reluctance to run a state.

In a sense, I suspect Sec. Gen. Kofi Anans meeting with Gen. Abubakar must have carried more of an undertones of a friend of Nigeria, than that of the United Nations sec. Gen., mandated by the Security Council to resolve issue in Nigeria. I know certain committees i.e. the human rights committee etc met on happening s in Nigeria but standing to be corrected, I doubt if a special security session was convened and deliberations made about facilitating a peace possibly physically intervening in Nigeria.

I’ll here also counsel on the strategic importance and required consent of bodies i.e. the World Bank and IMF when peace initiatives and operations are planned.

For a peacekeeping operation to be deemed successful. Sustainable development and infrastructures must be developed and built to sustain achieved peace, meaning funds are sourced from international bodies making them decisive collaborators.

These and many inexhaustibly expedient factors made it impossible for the UN to have considered a Nigerian mission.

Towards what I here term C and the two R’s, Conception Recomposition and Restructuring of the Nigerian Armed Forces My earlier articles, especially "Responding to Aikhomu’s…." makes a fairly decent read

I’m still insisting on the application of proven scientific and tested methodology (as presented by the US military training) to developing capacity for the Nigerian armed forces. I insist on the need to have reason replace myth superstition and in sense illusions of grandeur (I’m conscious our culture defines us, but globalization transcendingly attempts to while harmonizing redefine our world.

Also, from personal experience, I’m conscious of the tendency to define our world and benchmark issues based on unrealistically sentimental standards. I remember such innate statement’s as "as an African country we’re trying" "giant of Africa". Again, globalization, the WTO etc has redefined our world and we must act in accordance with generally acceptable global principles and standards. Nigeria can no longer limit its competition to the likes of Chad, Mali and Rwanda.

My take is, and remains. Nigeria needs the capacity of the United States military (Note my emphasis) to sustainably develop and build capacity for its armed forces by transiting to modernity. Current and past hobnobbing with China North Korea and the purchase of Russian helicopters (except where the dialectics between ends and means dictate) is ill advised and a waste. And will not facilitate the armed forces interoperability capacity. A must for all modern armed forces.

I bear in mind the strategic need to diversify source of arms. However, the concept of "Tri-age" prevails. There is no military capacity greater or as sophisticated as that of the United States of America today. Besides, MPRI is an American company. And the end of bi-polarism continuously accentuates America’s importance.

The capacity of the United States military is inconceivable to the "uneducated" and ignorant mind. Having been privileged. To train with firstly and in my capacity facilitate a course with armed forces personnel from at least 40 countries at a strategic level, and to observe and assist component members from the Inter-American Defense college and many peace component units and personnel from many M.O.Ds, I write, but with reserved humility from experience.

The level of discipline and competence i.e. for members of the United States Marine Corp (USMC) is incredible. For those of you who are in Nigeria refer to Ade Thomas Olabode, of Peace and Social Initiatives foundation (Awori Crescent Coker Rd Ilupeju, Lagos). Ade has been opportune to train at the Pearson Peace Center on two occasions. Recently in March 001. I’m sure, unfortunately. His competencies and acquired skills and expertise go to waste resulting from the politics of Nigeria.

Since challenges faced by the Nigerian Armed Forces are definable their resolution in a competent set up shouldn’t be a problem. For those of you thinking the challenges are insurmountable, research on the capacity and ingenuity of the EPLF "The Tamil Tigers". A challenged insurrectionists group with plaguing limitations, which has built an enviable "armed force" with effective and immense strategic capacity and capability.

The issue of ethnicism, representative military, tribalisim or nepotism shouldn’t even exist in the context of a countries defense force. Not, when you’re seeking to develop a manageably effective, professional and harmonious deterrent-fighting force.

Though insistent on the US-MPRI military training for the Nigerian Armed Forces, my insistence, based on the capacities and proven abilities of the post Vietnam United States defense establishment. I’m sure there’re capable professional civilized and cultured men still in service of the Nigerian armed forces. I know Maj. Gen. Enahoro. However, the task of re-orienting and re-professionalizing the Nigerian armed forces remains above them, because of the Nigerian factor. Besides required research and development that can be mostly carried out by our universities and other strategic institutions is another stickler. These institutions are challenged and incapacitated.

My point is, the US-MPRI should be allowed to build capacity in the armed till when the initiative is cancelled.

As I have insisted time and time again. The agenda of the western countries is set. It’s interest based. And as always it’s African Solutions to African problems". My desire is, our defenses portfolio manager’s exploit MPRI’s capacities to also sustainably build capacity for strategic institutions in the country.

Van Clauswitz discourses fervently in his works that while the understanding of command and doctrine is required, the military must conceptually understand amongst other, the functioning of society, especially as society evolved into a nation. The need to study strategic institutions, aspects of culture, politics and history helps in understanding the military itself, as an institution. I’ll widen my perception of strategic institutions to include Nigerian universities-tertiary institutions of learning, which the government has unwittingly abetted to cripple. For, no institution is more strategic than universities.

Conclusively, while acknowledging the validity of many points raised in "A Nigerian Military for democracy not yet, and especially "The Nigerian-US Military Pact, "Fine Prints’" Recipe for Danger Wither National Assembly", I maintain that the US-MPRI training initiative can only better the Nigerian armed forces.

Its not, and will never be the solutions to challenges faced by the Nigerian armed forces and indeed Nigeria, but it allows for self assessment and the exposure of our forces to scientific and modern happenings developments and research-breaks their captive imaginations and horizons, hopefully inspire while instilling discipline and desire for change-professionalism. But as I’ve insisted again and again, our defense portfolio manager, must know what their strategic desires on conception is for the future Nigerian armed forces.

As per the senate committee being warned off the armed forces by Gen. T.Y. Danjuma, it is important to understand the root of Gen. Danjuma’s seeming intransigence, namely that the Nigerian armed forces must be protected from the manipulative influences of our opportunistic and inexperienced politicians, for now. The morale and ethos of the military must be re-nurtured. Politicians, especially in new democracies like Nigeria’s lack the educative knowledge base to guide reform in institutions like the armed forces. In Nigeria’s case, civilians, the likes of Prof. Omo Omoruyi who have the capacity and having researched challenges faced by the armed forces should be part of a think tank to reform the armed forces, today find themselves polarized from governance.

I’m insistent, that the "neavue politicians" simply can’t comprehend the concept of security sector and required reforms. They lack the capacity education and competency to re-orient the Nigerian military for now. Besides, they lack the required will. A will I’m more than certain Gen. Danjuma has.

A reason for my assertion as per T. Y Danjuma’s stance against the senate committee is that the Human Rights Violation Investigation Commission has unwittingly facilitated the demystifying of the Nigerian military.

By the severe moroonothon which especially the Lagos sitting of the commission turned out to be, Nigerians and especially the Nigerian intelligentsia are able to assess the challenged uncultured and ignorant deviants in uniform that held our country in bondage.

Contextually, I’m not unilaterally declaring all past armed forces personnel incompetents. Ike Nwachkwu is a gentleman, and no matter the position many people take I’m insistent that Gen. I Babangida was visionary.

The question being to what use did he apply his vision in sustainably building a modern Nigeria? For those of you who are uncomfortable with my stance, as per Gen. I Babangida, I say, " amorality doesn’t exist alone… amorality exist by consensus…" (Eichman 1993)-the question being willing or unwilling consensus.

The question of TY Danjuma being a perfect fit for the defense portfolio is neither here nor there, my thoughts are, for strategic positions in governance, appointees require capacity, competency, experience and professionalism…"he selects suitable men…. Sun Tzu insist. I’m sure Gen. Danjuma can pull his weight.

My take is, attributes reflect transcendingly. "…. A visionless leaders is doomed to remain in stagnation, (Nigeria's Electoral Process Excludes the Visionary, Onayeikan. Nigerguaurdian Saturday, July 7, 2001

The Nigerian armed forces today reflectively mirror Gen. Ishaya Bamaiyi and Gen. Sani Abacha’s limitations and challenges.

I’m understanding of fears raised about Gen. Danjumas’s competency, and it all boils down to a communication disconnect. Recently, a contemporary of mine, a Sierra Leonean lecturing and doing a Ph.D. at Queens University in Kingston, Canada talked about a personal experience.

During the Seattle round of the WTO meeting. The meeting a deliberative treaties/round collaborative gathering. The Sierra Leonean head of delegation and minister of trade went on the podium canvassing for financial aid. Question was why on earth his team of advisers didn’t educate the minister to the fact that the meeting was to rub minds and not a forum for soliciting funds. Analytically however, its obvious there are limitations to capacity and pedigree inculcation with certain individuals. This in my opinion is not so much of a school boy error but a fatal fumble.

The issue demonstrates once again the disconnect between reasonability and sheer ignorance. In the Sierra Leone case, a total disconnect between the minister’s apparent ignorance, and the suspect capacity of his advisers, for allowing his folly. I’m sure its situations as such "A Nigerian Military for democracy not yet, and "The Nigerian-US Military Pact, "Fine Prints’" Recipe for Danger Wither National Assembly" rightly seeks to avoid.

My thinking is, square pegs must fit square holes. Many of you will remember Tom Ikimi’s naiveté over-exuberance arrogance lack of diplomatic savvy or pedigree and apparent lack of capacity and understanding of either mechanism or dynamics in international relations or issues of political economy during his unfortunate tenure as minister for foreign affairs. I’m sure we all seek to avoid same. Especially with our armed forces.