"Africa is not winning the battle to control its development agenda, because the battle has been construed too narrowly as one over economic and political power...it is much more than that. It also a struggle of ideas and knowledge… – " Claude Ake.

Clauswitz states that war is a craft… "A great socio-political activity distinguished from all other activities by the reciprocal and legitimized use of purposeful violence to achieve political objectives", and in his discourse, "Art of War". Sun Tzu counsels that resort to force of arms (military action) be as a tactical leverage of sort in the cycle of a diplomatic strategy. I decipher to imply a simple "stick and carrot" tactic to diplomatic practice i.e. commence with diplomacy-dialogue and only apply force if facing recalcitrance, but only required and controlled force objectively aiming to force belligerent to dialogue.

As nations of the world seek to build capacity and facilitate multitrack approaches to conflict resolution, the military component of society, even only as a deterrent option continuously plays a prominent legitimate role in conflict resolution mechanisms world over. The world realizes that coercion exacerbates conflicts but that as a deterrence option, the military has a role to play in conflict resolution. A new role many conflict experts term it. This new role involves multidisciplinary and sometime CI-MIC cooperation, non-military duties i.e. relief duties, election monitoring etc and duties sometimes non-traditional to the military are done. This identified need has led to transformation and capacity building is most armed forces world over to reflect current thinking, thrust and status quo.

And as Nigeria’s transits from her pariah status and her profile rises in the current global security framework, especially concerning Africa, the need to professionlize, re-train to empower her armed forces is more accentuated now than ever. Accentuated because obvious current lack of capacity will militate against Nigeria’s ascendancy to a truly greater strategic role in the envisioned international security framework, especially in an international albeit African context.

The reason being, that Nigeria’s vanguard security mechanism, the Nigerian Armed Forces faces challenges, challenges it must transit from and over come. These challenges today threaten even the foundation of this societal component.

Today, the need to evolve a strategy independent of the US-MPRI run initiative is apparent because though the US-MPRI run capacity building program is positive, it benefits especially ECOMOG component units of the Nigerian armed forces and is adhoc in nature with short-term outward-ECOMOG centered strategic objectives.

Implying, Nigeria internally evolve a strategy to transform her armed forces into a cohesive, capable, professional, mobile deterrent force with a high interoperable capacity, capable of protecting her sovereignty, centers of gravity and vital and strategic interest especially in the West African sub-region.

For those of you who don’t know, conflict is transient, continuously transforming and research demonstrates the world is entering a new era in which competition over vital resources will dominate conflict and war. Much of that conflict will be over water, oil and other strategic resources (Sierra Leon, Congo and Angola-diamond) where resources remain relatively abundant and local governments are too weak to protect them (Michael T. Klare, The New Landscape of Global Conflict 2001). In Nigeria’s case, I’m sure many of you are conversant with happenings in the Bakassi peninsula and Niger-Delta region.

Therefore, aside required deterrent capability; the essence of national survival fuels the identified need to re-profesionalize and build capacity for the Nigerian armed forces. Besides, history demonstrates again and again that weakness is provocative, implying, to safe guard sovereignty and interest, States require capable armed forces as deterrents.

Having identified challenges and issues, and discoursed aspects, required reforms and initiatives for the Nigerian armed forces in "The Truth about the United States Military Aid to Nigeria I & II" " Responding to Augustus Aikhomu’s integrity and the Nigeria Armed forces and "Transition to modernity I" vis-à-vis the changing face of international peacekeeping, the western concept of "African Solutions to African problems I’m thinking though un-solicited the natural final step is to attempt developing a conceptual framework for modernizing the Nigerian armed forces. . A framework to address issues from a strategic-planning level, to an operational and tactical level of operation.

I’m suggesting the principle for rebuilding overall capacity for the Nigerian armed forces based on Boyd’s concept of "People-Ideas-Hardware"; a concept based on robust training and re-training sometimes at the expense of procurement.

I’ve decided upon this path because challenges facing the Nigerian armed forces are rudimentary-cultural, as in identity as to who and what the Nigerian soldier is and what his contributive role is in building a modern "democratic" and stable Nigeria. A fact fervently discoursed by Prof. Omo Omoruyi, in "A Nigerian Military for democracy… not yet". I’m also guided by my interpretation of events, based on my understanding of Nigeria, its socio-ethnicisms, its aspirations as a sovereign state all influenced by my rather global-nationailstic visions and aspirations for Nigeria in the 21^st century and beyond.

I’m thinking the Nigerian government needs to devise a strategy, a strategy based on a concept I’m terming (NASRI) Nigerian Armed Forces Strategic Recovery Initiative. An initiative to facilitate cohesive long-term defense management reforms. NASRI should be empowered to evolve and facilitate a resource management system for efficient defense administration.

I’m advocating/proffering an independent initiative because it’s usually difficult for bureaucracies and large organizations to institute radical reform from within.

I’m thinking, "NASRI" will thrive and function more coherently with a long term shared strategy involving component representatives from possibly the ministries of defense, communication, education, selected members of Nigeria’s strategic institutions, intelligentsia and Nigerians involved in research in the field of peace, conflict resolution, international law, military history and strategic studies.

I’ve decided on a shared strategy to diversify knowledge base because having researched circumspect, I suspect, if operational strategy in a way reflects or mirror’s management strategy, as exemplified in Sierra Leone and Liberia-ECOMOG peacekeeping missions, where the Nigerian armed forces operated what is termed "second-generation" concepts and strategies. Strategies more akin to the industrial age of warfare, where tactics are based on bloody and destructive attrition, and cumbersome management. A Clausewitzian strategy better suited to maybe the 18^th or 19^th century. Then a wide component body will better facilitate NASRI for effectiveness.

NASRI’s objective should be to evolve an overall national defense strategy, setting direction and theoretically integrating all tools of national security — political, economic, social as well as military components. Then national security strategy, in turn, should shape our national military strategy. This way, transparent and goal oriented force improvement programs are instituted aiming to achieve overall defense and force effectiveness

I’m insisting on this route because I’m believing that unless the Nigerian government charts a new national security strategy and course, it will be very difficult institutionally and politically for the ministry of defense to forge ahead on its own.

In implementing NASRI’s strategy, government requires a select committee comprised of persons with diverse experience and capacities, especially in contemporary International relations, strategic studies and military history. Preferably individuals with academic experience, international standing and perhaps individuals whom have authored internationally and have international reform experience.

I’m insisting on personalities with the right competency and capacity to avoid past mistakes. The NASRI implementation committee should be a non-rehabilitative forum for cronies or politically favored, especially if government hopes to strengthen capacity for the armed forces. Government must desist as in the case of appointing Buba Marwa in charge of the Defense Industry Cooperation of arbitrary appointment of non-qualified persons. Burba Marwa, I’m sure is a gentleman in his own right, but in my personal opinion lacks the credential and capacity for managing the Defense cooperation in comparison to Emeka Anyouku, Rilwanu Lukman, Col. Abubakar Umar and other more competent and especially better qualified professionals with internationally proven management experience.

I would suggest a four-phase program commencing with defining the direction of Nigeria’s defense reform. The end-state we aspire to achieve in a sense, the conception we have for our armed forces for the 21st century and beyond etc. This will specifically set goals an enable evaluation of ongoing reforms in progress. Starting from phase I, issues to be examined should include

Judicial reform within the forces

Creation of a new barrack culture

Transparency in governments approach to defense related issues

Enhancement and definition of appropriate decision making standards and guidelines

Promotion of information exchange

Development of a rational personnel and education system

Personnel education and management improvements

Comprehensive improvements for Non Commissioned Officers

Ensuring job security guarantee for military professionals

Improvement in salary system to reflect uniqueness of the military

Improvement of living conditions for military personnel’s and their families

Extending support to veterans etc

 

Chester W. Richards in his work " A swift Elusive sword" expantiates on how through history, cohesion/trust is one constant, especially amongst researched highly effective military units worldwide. Without cohesion/trust, capacity is suspect as command and control is eroded.

Phase I reform should while building capacity specifically target addressing key issues of discipline, mutual trust and transparency, issues directly challenging the Nigerian soldier to facilitate re-orientation. This strategy should aim at facilitating primacy for people-the soldiers because, as already discoursed. "Broken leadership"-caused by incursion into non-traditional roles i.e. incursion into politics and fraying cohesion in the military-"ethos" etc which is eroded, needs to be fixed.

Spin offs of phase I reforms should lead in part to ending victimization, nepotism and halting the system of premature discharge of officers and encourage the need to after training, empowering officers to exercise more initiative. U.S Army Maj. Don Vandergriff in his study, "The Revolution in Human affairs", supports this position.

Currently, in the Nigerian armed forces. There’s a total disconnect between men and officers of the strategic operational and tactical levels. There’s high distrust in all intent and purpose caused by wide apparent disparity. Reason being, that amongst force components, certain officers, units, battalion, brigades and division were over the years more favored than others by virtue of politicization.

The evaluative process pre-phase I and post phase I initiatives should ultimately lead to the required establishment of a resource management system. For as phase I concerns itself with people-soldiers phase II must deal with ideas as to how to better the "improved" soldier, phase 1 ought to have created. Required initiatives will focus on addressing issues such as

Policy direction in defense acquisition

Improvement in defense acquisition systems

Improvement in cost verifying abilities

Internal defense industry consolidation and foundation

Public disclosure of acquisition process to ensure societal interactiveness

Facilitate research and aid the establishment of a command and control system for integrated warfare

 

 

Realigning the military

 

Post force improvement initiatives and programs, phase I & II mid and Long-term strategic defense objectives have to be set. These objectives must now take into consent trends and happenings internationally since Nigeria is a component of the current world order and involved with global security initiatives.

The third phase will act as bridge to all ongoing reforms and should effectively determine to a larger extent the future of the Nigerian armed forces. This phase should actually influence and deal with direct doctrinal and postural strategies to wholly determination of our national defense objectives (internal and external); direction and strategy, which will form the basis of phase IIII. Initiatives will include defining and recommending

Early warning and Crisis response management strategies

Peace time posture

Military readiness posture

Integrated defense operation posture

Mobilization posture-manpower and material

 

The fourth phase-defense will deal with policy objectives as to determining (mainly external) direction based on our national interest

External national goals

ECOWAS-ECOMOG policy

Augmentation capability-Nigeria’s bi and multi-lateral agreements etc

 

Conclusively, I’ve inexhaustibly discoursed reform suggestions, proffering strategies and options, to carrying out institutionalized reform and long term capacity building for the Nigerian armed forces. I’ve discoursed reasons for my choice of strategy opting to suggested and expantiate based on principles laid by Sun Tzu and concepts of John Boyd. I’ve opted to tread the suggested paths of Sun Tzu and John Boyd because my research found little or no material on lessons learned, evaluation and future developmental strategies and or plans for the Nigerian Armed forces except that proposed by the United States which MPRI attempts to implement.

The concept of my suggestion is based on what I term NASRI- Nigerian Armed Forces Strategic Recovery Initiative. A concept based on the need to scientifically research challenges faced by the Nigerian armed forces and defense establishment then addressing issues by proffering strategies some which I have suggested as initiatives in this write-up. My concept hopes to while addressing issues and proffering suggestions, make transparent and interactive the future Nigerian defense establishment to win public trust and acceptance especially for the Nigerian armed forces of the future.

Finally, I’ve also knowingly avoided a large portion of this discourse I had planned focusing on interactive communication. I’m feeling I can’t adequately do required justice to the subject. But again and again leadership, in Nigeria and most "New South" countries demonstrates what I term naiveté in communicating with its constituency-the society.

Prof. Omo Omouriy’s observation that information on Nigeria’s defense policy direction, and issues such as force conception or strategic objectives are no secrets is true. Government ought to state and or take position on important national issues and most importantly educate by communicating with the people.

Government-rulership should seek to maximize public support by pursuing an interactive and transparent communication strategy. Using forums to address national issues is distasteful and demonstrates our non-transition from the military cloak and dagger era. When secrecy was sustainably applied as a veil for wrongdoings and incompetence's.

Though I’m seeing redress, as with Gen. Danjuma’s attempt to clarify issues concerning Nigeria’s so called "military pact with the United States". A pact I doubt exists for strategic reasons. And as exemplified by President Obasanjo’s comments today on the past military retreat as a bonding strategy, a position I expantiated upon in "Transition to modernity 1’. It’s medicine after death.

Government must learn to transparently communicate with its constituency-the people and carry the people along. Many of you will remember president Babangida’s S.A.P debate where even the market women without educated knowledge were for once carried along in governments attempts to define and choose an appropriate developmental strategy for the Nigerian economy.

As I’ve maintained square pegs much fit square holes. The current disconnects between government and the governed leading to accusations of unilateralism in decision making is reflectively bad on the government. I’d chose not to personify issues and believe that with his challenges and limitations, president Obasanjo means well for Nigeria. But without the people being educated by communication he’s instituting failure discontentment and misrepresentation. Challenges he-president Obasanjo should care about if were in a truly democratic dispensation and the peoples will via the electoral ballot will determine who governs Nigeria.